A THEORY OF COUNSELING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL CHARACTER

By

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A THEORY OF COUNSELING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL CHARACTER

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Data from available evidence are interpreted as supporting abstraction of such a quality of personhood, such an inner organization and force as may dependably render an individual both sensitive and subject to considerations of right--as against wrong, and moral--as distinguished from prudential or preferential, whatever the situational incentive or opportunity to be otherwise. Hypothesized to be primarily a psychological construct (with secondary aspects deriving from neurological functions) this quality of personhood is designated as moral character. Essentially it is seen to consist of matured moral judgment and the ego-control strength necessary to constantly implement the principled decisions of such judgment in behavior.

From available empirical and theoretical studies a theory of the development--as distinguished from formation or inculcation--of moral character is synthesized. The basic theoretical framework providing the foundation of this aspect of the theory is the cognitive-developmental--as distinguished from the psychoanalytical or learning--theory orientation.

The more general theory is then used to abstract a theory of counseling that specifies counselor behaviors which, it is postulated, may be predicted to contribute to increments in such development. The counselor's encounter with a counselee inevitably finds the individual's primitive structures of moral character already formed, but subject to ongoing developmental restructuring. It is hypothesized that the theory-specified behaviors in one-with-one and group interaction stimulate--as distinguished from either facilitation or causation--the counselee's experience of what is designated a moral functioning. By a moral functioning is meant a) distinguishing by principled decision which among available alternatives may be adjudged right and which wrong in a moral sense; b) commitment of the self to one among the right options thus distinguished; and c) implementation of the commitment in behavior. It is experience in such a total moral functioning that is hypothesized to stimulate an increment in character development.

It is proposed to measure such developmental increment through analysis of pre- and post-treatment variances in moral judgment level.

It is acknowledged that counseling literature has rather generally and deliberately shunned addressing itself to the area of moral education or of moral character development. Nevertheless, it is proposed that few things could so contribute to the goal of freeing an individual from the control of unconscious or irrational behavior determinants as development of moral character as it is here conceptualized.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Problem

There is need for a character theory such as can be so integrated with counseling theory that the effectiveness of practitioners holding character development to be a paramount value may be maximized. Studies to be reviewed below have left efforts for its education and development haphazard, capricious, and largely ineffectual. One of the remarkable things about reading in the literature of character education is the way a writer can at one and the same time a) acknowledge that there is no agreement as to what character is, and b) outline procedures and methods for character education. If counselors concerned for moral character are to be effective, they need to have available evidence and theory synthesized and coordinated with their special concern in central focus.

Some Preliminary Considerations

By Way of Perspective

It is no special secret that in recent years the whole concept of 'moral character' as a meaningful and viable construct for scientific investigation has not been accorded a large measure of enthusiasm in academic circles. Nevertheless it remains of considerable and vital concern

in the minds of many practitioners of the helping professions. Particularly is this so among those involved with religious education--whether in the family, the Church, or in Church-operated or Church-related schools. Often it is also seen to be of similar concern among many whose primary interest is simply in education as such (Kohlberg, 1966; Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971).

If any given culture is to persist over time, one of its primary functions must be to provide for passing on from generation to generation its normative values, i.e., behavioral patterns so valued as to merit obligated conformity in behavior. In fact, the central focus of a society's religion has often--though not invariably--been the effort to foster conformity to norms valued by the society.

From time to time there have been religious leaders, as well as public-spirited persons in a variety of roles, who have conceived that a central concern should be the development of moral character. They have sought thus to develop within individuals some kind of inner control system that would motivate them to conformity to moral standards without direct external coercion, surveillance or sanction.

Though quite frequently it has not been apprehended, the Judeo-Christian tradition in particular has emphasized this focus on the inward quality of a person.[1] Those who have embraced this tradition, however, have neither been consistent nor unanimous in this emphasis on the inward quality of persons. Instead, they have with great frequency

resorted to all sorts of external coercion, surveillance and sanction, as well as a sometimes heavy-handed manipulation of guilt to foster conformity to moral standards.

This is not to intimate that the Judeo-Christian tradition has been alone in this emphasis on external control. The whole function of civil law, as well as of conventional handling of violaters of that law, has almost exclusively been to bring external measures to bear so as to assure conformity to societally valued norms.

But as pointed out above, from time to time there have been those who have contended that a wiser, or more proper concern would be upon the development within persons of an inward quality that would assure consistent and continuing moral behavior quite without external pressure, surveillance or sanction. This concept--often quite amorphous--of an inward quality, or an inner control system, has commonly been spoken of as 'moral character.'

Definitions

One of the basic objectives of this study is conceived as being to attempt again to conceptualize a comprehensive operational definition of the character construct. Nevertheless, it seems important at the very outset to delineate at least generally what 'moral character' is here held to signify.

Character is being posited as a hypothesized organization of internal events or forces that to a greater or lesser degree in different individuals predisposes to

particular, distinguishable behavioral response patterns. Thus, from the very outset it is acknowledged that 'character' must probably remain a hypothetical construct.

Moral has variously been used to signify emphasis upon

1) a social orientation, wherein, in harmony with Lowe (1969, p. 257), 'morals' are seen as "standards of good and evil imposed from outside through sanctions";
2) a value orientation, wherein 'moral' distinguishes the 'should' and 'ought' values from those of preference and taste, while 'values' (again following Lowe, p. 257) are seen as "individual perceptions of good and evil stemming from internal or psychological determinants";
3) a principle orientation, wherein 'principle' represents that specific class of value that reflects apprehending of fundamental laws of operation as they derive from the essential, intrinsic quality or nature of things.

The emphasis being developed in this study is the 'principle' orientation.

Character has not always been apprehended as a moral construct. Thus, it has been seen variously as temperament, as individuality, as personality type. By modifying 'character' with 'moral' the intent is simply to delimit the

perspective, not to prescribe a mode for character. Thus it is the functioning of character in moral issues that is being considered, entirely apart from specifying what resolution of issues may be called 'moral.'

In Defense of the Concern about Character

In the final analysis, it would appear to be impossible to demonstrate empirically that there are, in fact, internal events that must be considered if human behavior is to be fully accounted for. Certainly it is impossible to observe or measure such internal events directly. While it may be possible to infer them from observable, external events, it can hardly be demonstrated empirically that this inference is necessary. It is equally impossible, however, and for the same reasons, to demonstrate that these internal processes do not in fact operate. Hence, there can be no valid faulting of those who for one reason or another assume that such processes do serve to account for human behavior.

Therefore, if there are those who find a basis for such an assumption--for instance, in the Biblical teaching of the central concern of Deity for the 'heart' of man--then their assumption can neither be considered unscientific, nor scientific. However it cannot but influence markedly their entire orientation in counseling.

As suggested in the opening paragraph, there continue to be those in the helping professions who maintain a deep concern for promoting the development in individuals of this inward quality they speak of as 'moral character.' They

share the objective which Patterson (1963) posits for psychotherapists and counselors--i.e., the changing of human behavior. But along with some, they conceive that behavior change is preferably (and, in fact, necessarily) the result of 'person change.' Moreover, the kind of behavior with which they are particularly concerned (as distinct from such behavior as overeating, compulsive avoidance of heights, hysterical symptom substitution) leads them to conceive their objective as development (or even change) of 'moral character.'

The evidence seems incontestable (e.g., Hartshorne and May, 1928-1930) that a vast amount of the efforts for development and/or change of moral character in others is so haphazard as to be minimally effective. Then again, the uncomfortable feeling often maintains that much of what purports to be character education is so coercively manipulative as to violate the essential integrity and sovereignty of the persons involved. At least, in the name of character education there is a lot of what appears to be rather heavy-handed coercion with much rule setting and much surveillance and punishment to enforce conformity to the rules.

Purposes of the Study

It would seem to have often been assumed that techniques which afford satisfactory control of behavior would would per se afford access to character formation and development. Or that inducing satisfactory behavior was to be equated with character building; or that character formation

was to be equated with manipulating behavior. Success in containing behavior within moral norms, in socializing behavior, has been equated with building moral character.

It would seem, thus, to have often been assumed that character is being moulded and built if it can be . . .

1) contrived to have desired acts repeated often enough;
2) contrived to prevent alternative acts--counter acts--from occurring;
3) to that end contrived to preserve from enticement to such counter acts.

It is with concerns such as these in mind that it is here proposed that out of an examination of relevant literature, such a synthesis and integration of research data and theory be accomplished as to provide . . .

1) a conceptualization of what is to be comprehended in human moral character;
2) a conceptualization of how this character comes to be;
3) a set of propositions for effective fostering of character development through the counseling relationship.

It becomes, then, the purpose of this study to examine available evidence to determine the relationships between behavior control and character education; to determine to what degree the fostering of moral behavior--the containing of behavior within moral norms--may be equated with fostering development of moral character.

It becomes the further and primary purpose of this study to explore to what degree counseling may foster such development of moral character, and how it may most effectively do so.

It is herein to be submitted that it is only the behavior that is moral because an individual himself intends it to be that way in spite of counter incentives, that is productive of moral character. Thus, you may manipulate environment as you like; you may by sanction and manipulation of guilt contain behavior within moral norms all you can; and you may yet fail entirely of producing moral character. On the other hand, moral character will never be formed without the ongoing experience of deliberate and self directed containment of behavior . . . a containment that cannot be perceived as the consequence of environmental conditions.

In Defense of the Approach

The plan of this study, then, is to formulate and interrelate propositions rather than test hypotheses. Hopefully such a formulation of concepts and propositions could then serve as a generator of research to discover if their major bases can be supported empirically.

The speculativeness of a theory developing approach instead of an empirical data seeking approach may be questioned. Actually, it has been proposed (Reynolds, 1971) that wherever there is presumed to be a "real truth" to be discovered, the Baconian approach of "research before

theory" is to be preferred. The further proposal is made that the reverse approach of "theory before research" be reserved for those studies of a descriptive nature only, where there is presumed to be no "real truth" or "laws of nature" to be discovered.

However that may be, it is certainly here assumed that there is indeed "real truth" regarding moral character and its formation and development, as well as regarding such counseling as would most effectively contribute to it. It is also assumed that with this "real truth" are associated reliable natural laws. Nevertheless, the "theory before research" approach seems justified for at least three reasons.

First, although there has been little empirical research recently reported that was directly designed to investigate moral character itself (and certainly far less, even, relating counseling to moral character), there has been considerable research that has a definite bearing upon it, particularly in the areas of moral development and moral education. Out of this research has come evidence that suggests the appropriateness of some reanalysis and reinterpretation of data and conclusions such as reported by Hartshorne and May (1928-1930). All of it, moreover, needs to be integrated and related to character if it is to be useful for counselors with this orientation.

A second justification for the "theory before research" approach is suggested by the fact that character has

been presumed by some to consist of a complex of a number of interacting factors, each of them in itself a variable. To attempt to investigate a multivariable construct like counseling in its relationship to a multivariable construct like character would seem to be a hopeless task without first constructing a theoretical model that might properly integrate some of the variables into a more workable number for investigation.

Finally, whether or not the theory is first developed, counselors are going to be doing counseling. And to leave those of them whose value orientation is toward moral character to continue longer to function haphazardly without anything like a rationally defensible approach based on an integration of whatever evidence is available seems unconscionable.

Wright (1971, p. 22) has held that "All empirical study must be guided by ideas and expectations; some kind of theorizing however naive and rudimentary is inescapable." Prior to any effective empirical study, a theory is essential; hence this attempt to make an initial approach to the problem directly by theory construction.

It seems important to emphasize at this point that the primary objective of this study has not been conceived to be the devising of a precisely defined, closely reasoned theoretical system designed to provide either rigorous or elegant explanation. Rather it has been to derive from an integration of empirical data and theoretical formulations

a working guide for the efforts of practicing counselors who ascribe to developed--or developing--moral character a preeminence in value. Nevertheless, it has been the aim that the theory thus derived shall be of sufficient rigor that its proposals may contribute hypotheses that may be empirically tested, thereby either corroborating or invalidating the theory.

The Values Issue

The question immediately arises as to the propriety and ethics of the counselor's espousal of such a value as 'moral character.' In pursuit of inclusion among those professions eligible for the labels 'scientific' and 'objective,' counselors and therapists have been inclined to eschew any value orientation.

Even more to the point, possibly, than this concern for the scientific has been the desire to be so morally neutral as to avoid imposing values on a vulnerable client. Williamson (1958) warns that to do so is to deprive him of his right to and responsibility for self-determination. And as Lowe (1969, p. 209) points out, clients are indeed vulnerable. In what he describes as an "anomic society" where moral laws once highly regarded have been largely discarded, "the individual is apt to find that moral choice is difficult." And while some may weather such an existential crisis, others "who feel that they are less able to tolerate moral uncertainty seek the behavioral scientist's help."

But precisely out of a reaction against heavy-handed, societal imposition of mores and morals, many counselors have contended for moral neutrality. Williamson (1958) sees them as contending that the individual possesses all the resources needed in achieving his fullest possible growth. While cherishing the surcease from efforts to impose values by sanction which the discarding of older moral standards has afforded, however, they seem often to have assumed that the surcease was dependent upon the denial of moral values entirely . . . as if the only way to espouse values is to impose them--by sanction if necessary. Therefore, to avoid imposing values upon clients, moral neutrality has been seen as essential.

Counselors are increasingly becoming aware, however, that for them 'moral neutrality' is a figment of the imagination. Lowe (1969), for instance, contends that for the counselor, taking a moral stance or value orientation is inescapable. The very attempt to be non-directive is itself based on a valuing of particular objectives. And the client is differentially affected by the counselor's very choice between directive and non-directive approaches.

Lowe goes to great length to delineate the values intrinsic to counselor orientation. His carefully documented and closely reasoned examination of such orientations as the Naturalistic (behaviorist), the Existentialist, the Social, and the Humanistic, shows them to be inextricably value oriented. He recognizes (p. 206) that "in practice

a behavioral scientist often places the different philosophical theories side by side and then fuses them together eclectically." He points out, however, that they inevitably conflict, making contradictory demands on his practice. "Lest he be torn ideologically asunder by these competing moral standards, he must reconcile them by ranking their competing demands for allegiance. The therapist must choose" (p. 206) (underlining supplied).

On the other hand, Williamson (1958) warns that it is when a counselor is not explicit about his personal value orientations that he runs the greatest risk of unwittingly bringing them to bear on a client. Furthermore, he too contends that in reality having such an orientation is inescapable. After pointing out that every action we take involves value judgments he declares

> If we agree that value judgments are implicit in every action we take, we should also agree that counselors cannot fully escape introducing their own value systems into the counseling interview. (p. 524)

Not only so, but he holds that being clear about value orientation is essential for effective counseling. This is vital, he maintains, if the counselor is to help his client a) to understand more clearly his own values, and b) to guide his behavior more rationally and constructively in terms of the standards he has chosen for himself.

Lloyd-Jones and Smith (1954) also explicitly advocate a value orientation. Smith (1954, p. 515) has insisted

> . . . the claim to a value-free science when it goes beyond insistence on a disciplined regard

> for fact whether or not it accords with our wishes, only obscures the value elements in the choice of problem, of research setting, of conceptual framework, in the decision as to when to rest with negative findings, when results are reportable, and so on endlessly.

Moral Character as a Counseling Value

It may be granted then, that an explicit value orientation may not only be inescapable, but may well be vital to effective counseling. Is the development of moral character, however, a legitimate value orientation for such behavioral scientists as counselors?

There are several factors that have probably contributed to disenchantment with character development. And several of these emphasize this question as to whether character development is a legitimate or practical value orientation for counselors.

One such factor is the tendency to equate character with specific moral traits such as honesty, purity, persistence, productiveness, diligence, etc. Specific traits such as these are often characterized as "Victorian," "Puritanical," etc. 'Enlightened,' 'humanistic,' 'objective' practitioners have hesitated to make for their clients the value judgments that would be involved in promoting values such as these.

Then again, there has grown a keener awareness that, rather than being clear cut, moral issues are largely relative and frequently ambiguous. To take responsibility for building into another's character structure a prescriptively

defined trait of honesty for the purpose of assuring an invariable pattern of behavior without regard to situation has been more than many care to do.

Yet again, one conception of stable character that has commonly been held is difficult to distinguish from compulsiveness or even neurotic rigidity. It is commonly identified with authoritarianism and closed-mindedness. A particularly uneasy feeling may arise when it is demonstrated that prejudice tends to be especially strong among individuals who have experienced church-sponsored character education (Rokeach, 1970).

Furthermore, as will be noted more fully below, Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) have demonstrated that it is reasonable to conclude that behavior is more reliably to be predicted from situational factors than from character traits such as honesty. Their findings bring into serious question the very existence of such generalized behavior-determining traits.

It is not necessary, however, to equate character with particular prespecified moral traits. It may, of course, be evaluated according to trait content. But there are other dimensions along which this may be done. Thus, it may be considered along the dimension of integration of structure; or of weakness versus strength; or of persistence in the fact of pressure to deviate from espoused values--be they what they may. Or it can be considered according to the general process or manner of arriving at values and

consolidating a value system. Thus Raths et al. (1966) have urged a primary concern for an individual's process of valuing rather than for the particular values he may adopt.

It is clear that 'moral character' has, on occasion, been equated with specific traits or virtues, externally and prescriptively defined as 'moral'--e.g., honesty, persistence, puritan asceticism, etc. If this be done, then there seems to be proper question as to the legitimacy of a character oriented counseling practice. It will here be submitted, however, that it is both more defensible and more appropriate to abstract a very different conceptualization of moral character . . . a conceptualization that would not leave a counselor in the position either of prescribing a value system or 'bag of virtues,' or of imposing such upon his counselee. Thereupon it would be further defensible to bring available evidence to bear in order to abstract a counseling theory for practitioners in whose orientation development of such an alternative character itself represents a paramount value.

Notes

[1]In the Bible, Deity is repeatedly represented as directing primary concern to the inward quality of a man's 'heart' rather than to his outward behavior (1 Samuel 16:7; 1 Chronicles 29:17). On one occasion God is said to have longed: "O that there were such a heart in them that they would . . . keep all my commandments always" (Deuteronomy 5:29).

The central Covenant or Testament extended by God to men in both the Old and the New Testaments emphasizes the provision of a renewed heart (Jeremiah 31:33; Hebrews 10:16). Again, Christ is reported to have insisted that the vital concern is this same 'inward quality' of a man (Luke 6:45). Then too, throughout his writings, St. Paul stoutly insists that attainment of truly meaningful righteousness can only be achieved through the "faith that works by love" on the inward man, as opposed to attempts through imposition of or subjection to "law" (Galatians 5:6).

CHAPTER II
IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION -- A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In Review of Contemporary Reviews

What, then, is this 'moral character' that is by some so highly valued? Not only what is character, but what is meant . . . what has been meant . . . by the idea? What is meant when it is said that an individual "has character" . . . or that he has a noble or fine or worthy character? What is meant by saying that an individual's character is his most important and valuable possession? Just what is it that character educators and character developers seek?

Ultimately, even after the meaning of the concept has been specified, the question must be faced whether or not that which has been conceptualized has any empirical existence. If it does exist, then again, what, in fact, is it . . . in possible distinction from what is meant by it?

Approximately from the time of the classic Character Education Inquiry (CEI--reported by Hartshorne and May, 1928-1930), there has been little by way of scientific literature specifically related to moral character. Publication of some inspirational literature has persisted, though the volume even of this has been smaller. Very probably the CEI has contributed largely to this decrease.

On the other hand, there has been a growing volume of literature focusing on 'moral development' and 'moral education.' This literature has much to say to the overall subject of this study, but little to the immediate concern for an operational definition of 'moral character' as such. (It will be given more attention in Chapter III.) Prior to the time of the CEI there were two important studies that afforded a review of the literature directly concerned with character.

Roback (1927) provides a monumental, historical review of the whole concept of character. He gives an extensive, longitudinal study that traces the shifting and varied conceptualizations of the subject from the time of Theophrastus of Greece to our own time. He further compares American, British, French and German views with one another. On the other hand, a Hartshorne study (1932--postdating CEI, and to be distinguished from it), provides a cross-sectional examination of the various ways in which character has been viewed generally. He deals with the subject by distinguishing and outlining five categories of theory or orientation by which the subject has been approached.

From the particular overall view here, the manner of Hartshorne's presentation has a more obvious relevance and will therefore be more closely reviewed for this contribution. Both Roback and Hartshorne, on the other hand, will be looked at rather closely for their significant conceptualizations of character.

Hartshorne

The CEI. Hartshorne's (1932) elaboration of character in human relations is very largely an outgrowth of the earlier monumental study in which he and May collaborated (1928-1930). In this latter Inquiry, the researchers accumulated a remarkably large amount of data. As Brown (1965) testifies, it was research on a grand scale, involving thousands of children and many and varied tests on a wide range of conduct and knowledge.

By means of these data they were able to test scientifically what is probably the most common assumption as to the nature of character: that an individual's character is the structure of all his various traits--a kind of algebraic summation of virtues and vices--and that possession of one of these traits justifies expectation of behavior in keeping with it.

Brown declares that the most surprising discovery to come from the CEI was the marked 'specificity of conduct,' already noted. Trait theory assumptions (see below) suggest the expectation that measured conduct will demonstrate the presence and functioning of consistency-producing traits. Thus, a child with the trait of honesty should tend to be honest whatever the situation. And a child who lacks honesty should demonstrate dishonesty over a variety of situations. Put another way, the distribution of honesty scores should be expected to be bimodal with the individuals concentrated at

the honest and dishonest extremes as they possess or do not possess the trait of honesty.

The relevant CEI data, however, are unimodal, with the concentration of individual children proving to be sometimes honest, sometimes dishonest. Very few children were exclusively dishonest--cheating, that is, twenty-three times in twenty-three tests; and very few were exclusively honest --cheating not at all.

Thus there emerges what the investigators term the "doctrine of specificity." This doctrine "maintains that a child's conduct in any situation is determined more by the circumstances that attend the situation than by any mysterious entity residing in the child" (Hartshorne and May, 1930, p. 755).

There are three things, they suggest, that determine whether in a given situation a child will cheat, exhibit self control, be charitable, or be persistent (and no one of them is possession of a related character trait): a) the nature of the situation; b) what the child has already learned in similar situations, and c) his awareness of the implications of his behavior (Hartshorne and May, 1930, p. 755). There is no support for the notion that when a child has been taught to be honest in one situation he will thereby have been taught to be honest in different situations.

Another of their findings has to do with the relation between knowledge and conduct. Contrary to traditional

expectations that good acts are related to good knowledge or motives, no significant correlation was found between specific conduct and specific knowledge. When all conduct scores and all knowledge scores were combined, however, there was a general relation. They eventually came to the conclusion that the only consistency . . .

> from one test to another . . . is accounted for by common elements in the test situations and in the groups where the tests take place. (Hartshorne and May, 1930, p. 757)

This, combined with other data, points to what they spoke of as "group morals." They found this factor to be significantly correlated with the actual behavior that occurs. This influence of overall group morals they take to suggest that "in moral education the group seems to be the natural unit, because the group acts as a unit" (p. 757).

Yet another type of finding of the Inquiry has to do with the relationship between scores on character tests and several biological and sociological factors.

1) Between age and conduct they found practically no correlation. They did find some correlation, however, between age and moral knowledge.

2) Between sex and deceptive behavior there were found no consistent differences. However, "rather wide and significant differences" were found between sex and both self-control and altruistic service (girls being slightly superior to boys in these areas).

3) Between intelligence and honesty there were positive and high correlations. Correlations were lower between intelligence and service, inhibition and persistence.

4) Between physical strength and health, and character scores, there was found virtually no relationship whatever.

[It would seem that there has been a failure to address a most important question with regard to this whole matter of specificity. The Inquiry findings report character status as it existed in the children. It indicates the accomplishments of character education methods with children as they were. In other words, there is no indication as to the influence a generalizing character might have if other methods of education were to be practiced. Does the doctrine of specificity close once and for all the prospect of instituting other processes that will foster the power of character to subject conduct to morality? Such a conclusion seems unjustified simply on the basis of CEI evidence.]

Character conceptualized. In spite of the possible conclusion from the evidence that 'character' as a dynamic entity may not be a viable construct for explaining human behavior, Hartshorne himself (1932) does not subscribe to this conclusion. Brown (1965) cautions, thus, that it should be remembered that . . .

> Hartshorne and May emphasized the specificity of moral conduct because they were surprised by it. They had expected much more consistency of character. In fact their data also reveal some consistency or generality. (p. 407)

The conclusion to which the evidence actually points for Hartshorne is not that there is no such thing as character's having a determining effect on behavior. He (Hartshorne, 1932) contends rather that it is the theory of character as a unified sum of traits which cannot account for individual differences.

Rather than abandoning the character construct--as so many since his study have done--Hartshorne followed the classic CEI with a careful reexamination of the whole concept, analyzing the main theories that have been proposed for it, and developing a theory of his own which he felt was more adequate and in harmony with the empirical evidence.

Among the types of character theory which he examined and found more or less lacking are, first of all, three in which 'character' seems to be almost the same as 'individuality.' Reference is simply made to a summation of characteristics or patterns of them, peculiar to each individual. In none of these three does he recognize a "distinctive principle or entity which, because of its own peculiar properties, does anything" (Hartshorne, 1932, p. 169).

1) Trait theories. In general these theories conceive of character as descriptive of a dominant trait or traits. They hold that it is essentially to be seen as a sort of 'algebraic sum' of relatively independent 'virtues,' severally cultivated to a relative degree, as possessed by an individual. It was this theory in particular that the CEI was seen to refute virtually in its entirety.

2) Habit theories. The several related theories that see character primarily as habits propose to account for them by the laws of learning. Conditioning is held to account for "connections between certain acts and certain situations" such that "If consistency appears, it is a reflection of the presence of common factors in the situation which call forth similar responses" (Hartshorne, 1932, p. 146). Using a phrase he credits to Dewey, Hartshorne speaks of habits as social functions. The emphasis indicated in this use of 'function' may be clarified by reference to an electric spark. Depending on the situation, its function may be a) to ignite fuel in an engine, or b) to provide heat for arc welding. The habits specific to character, then, for Hartshorne (as well as for Dewey) are "responses to situations," and hence "as much the product of these situations as they are of any inborn tendencies to react in certain ways" (1932, p. 151).

There are few data, if any, in the CEI that conflict with the habit theories. Hartshorne cites Dewey (1922) and Symonds (1928), as among others who hold this orientation. In spite of what he considers to be several distinct inadequacies, he gives credit to the theories of Dewey in particular as providing some important bases for his own (see below, p. 39).

For him, though, habit theories fail to account for what he perceives to be a "dynamic quality" of character.

Alone, he feels that they do not adequately provide any distinctive meaning to the term 'character' (Hartshorne, 1932, p. 153).

3) Pattern theories. Under this rubric, Hartshorne includes several theories having in common their emphasis upon pattern, structure or organization. Thus, it is not just the sum of independent traits or habits that account for character, but their pattern of interrelationship.

He draws attention, thus, to the "epochal work" of Shand (1914), who holds that individuals develop a "dominant sentiment," around which and to which all other "sentiments" are subordinated and organized. "Growth in character consists in part in the acquirement of sentiments, whereas degradation of character consists in resort to isolated emotional responses" (Hartshorne, 1932, p. 158). In this view, traits and virtues are seen as instruments developed to serve the central sentiment. An individual's whole life is held to be the working out of a dominant sentiment (e.g., that of a miser, a philanthropist, an artist, a scientist, a lover) and the developing of virtues which enforce it.

Then again, Hartshorne includes among pattern theories the 'types' idea which has long appeared to be extremely attractive to psychologists. This includes, for instance, Freud's character types (oral, anal, phallic, genital). Other groupings he cites are such as: a) according to temperaments--the ardent (i.e., choleric), the sanguine, the

phlegmatic, the melancholic; b) according to physique--the asthenic, the athletic and the pyknic, compressed by Kretschmer (1925) to the schizophrene and the circular. [Sheldon and Stevens (1942) have revised these types based on physique to: ectomorphic--prominence of skin and neural tissue making for thinness; mesomorphic--prominence of muscle; endomorphic--prominence of abdominal region.]

It should be noted here that in an important sense proposing typologies does not define character, nor even approach a definition. Thus, to say that a person is of a phlegmatic character, or anal-erotic, or even rational-altruistic (see Peck and Havighurst, 1960), is in no way clarifying what character is. Nor, for that matter, are we defining character by specifying the way in which an individual came to be phlegmatic, anal-erotic or rational-altruistic.

This is so unless by character we mean simply the type of personality that an individual manifests. And this seems to be precisely what typologists conceive. To them, character is not itself a psychological fact or entity. It is more like a type of personality. Or as Hartshorne (1932, p. 168) summarizes it:

> In general, it can be seen that for those who hold to the pattern theory, character is a structural fact rather than a dynamic fact. It is the particular combination of fundamental systems of traits which characterizes the individual.

In these first three categories of theories outlined by Hartshorne, character signified the sum of, or form taken by, other things (i.e., traits, habits, patterns). This sum has no dynamic entity of its own. He then proceeds to describe two other categories that have been proposed which do postulate such a dynamic entity for character.

4) Factor theories. Hartshorne distinguishes two theories that derive from factor analysis a conceptualization of character that ascribes to it a dynamic entity of its own. ["Factor" in this case, of course, refers to one or the other of a complex of elements which--taken as a complex--become distinguishable as an entity that serves one of several such complexes or factors in accounting for some particular phenomenon.]

One of the theories that point to such a distinguishable entity in accounting for indiviudal behavior is Roback's (1927) theory of "character as inhibition." (Rather than to digress from Hartshorne's study of theory categories for a close look at Roback, this will be held over for p. 43). Suffice it here to note with brief comment the basic form of his definition of character, i.e., an enduring psychophysical disposition to inhibit instinctive impulse in accordance with a regulative principle. Without inhibition, then, there is no character. But equally, there can be no character without instinctive impulses inhibited. Central also is the point that inhibition apart from accordance with

regulative principle would merely be repression, displacement or sublimation rather than character. In brief, then, inhibition is the 'factor' for which Roback contends.

The second theory deriving from factor analysis that Hartshorne cites refers to "character as persistence of motives." Webb (1915) specifies such persistence as one among several of the general (g) factors later discerned by Spearman (1927) to be related to intelligence. By careful statistical analysis Webb showed that within the g factor that determines individual achievement may be discerned another factor that he called w. He described this w factor as "consistency of action resulting from deliberate volition or will."

Thus, whereas Roback emphasized the cessation or withholding of action inconsistent with regulative principle, Webb emphasized the initiation and continuance of consistent action. Hartshorne suggests that hereby we may actually move an important step further. Together, Roback and Webb suggest to Hartshorne three distinguishable factors that could well be seen to constitute together a phenomenon worthy of being designated 'character.' These factors are a) inhibition of impulse to accord with regulative principle, b) consistency, c) deliberation. Another scheme of factors of character--that of Wright--will be noted further on.

5) Self theories. As a group, these theories regard factors such as those Roback and Webb enunciate as being

functions of an even "more fundamental psychological fact--the organization of means to ends" (Hartshorne, 1932, p. 176). Character is thus seen as a functioning of the holistic self in one of several distinguishable emphases:

a) One emphasis postulates character as purposeful action. Thus, the functioning of character is not manifested in mere obedience or conformity to codes, customs, current standards, etc. The purposes of actions "must themselves be self-chosen." "One who is trained merely to obey orders has no character at all" (Hartshorne and May, 1932, p. 178).

b) Another emphasis sees character as the biological unity of the self. Individual trees or animals cannot truly be said to be identified by the sum of their several parts or ways of acting. It is the individual's characteristic form and ways of acting in combination that identify him as an individual. So, it is suggested, is it with character, which must be identified with the entity that is the "self" rather than with the mere sum of a series of tendencies.

c) A further emphasis represents character as the principle of action. Thus, according to Allers (1931), an individual's character is that law

of preference in accordance to which he determines his action. Or again, the general form in which he functions to bring about the realization of values is his character.

d) A final emphasis among self theories of character sees it as 'integration.' Here character, like a machine, must be distinguished from its parts, its structure, its motivating energy, its control or braking system, its direction or purpose, even from itself as an operating unity. Both character and machine are here seen to find their true meaning not in their parts or structure, but in the interacting cooperative relationship of these with one another, and of the whole with the larger universe of which machine or character is itself a part.

The nature of this latter category of theories in particular brings to mind a comment by Shaw (1970, p. 245) concerning Freudian constructs:

> The historical concern in American psychology with the quantification and observability of psychological processes precluded careful attention to Freudian constructs, which often deal with unobservables.... In short, his theoretical system is not subject to traditional forms of empirical testing, and some would maintain that it cannot be tested by any acceptable procedure.

If this be the case with Freudian constructs, it would seem to be so many times over with a conceptualization of character such as these self theories suggest. Nevertheless, for "character" to have any unique meaning of its own, it seems to this writer that just some such a "holistic" construct must be hypothesized (see below, Chapter V).

Rosenhan and London

As has been noted, Hartshorne reviews characterological thinking from the standpoint of five types of theories. Rosenhan and London (1968), on the other hand, organize their updated review in a more topical arrangement. In pursuing this review of character oriented literature, it becomes essential to trace some of the steps of their analysis. Of immediate relevance are only two portions of their study: The Meanings of Character, and The Development of Character.

1) Character meanings. They have discerned three senses in which "character" is most often used:

a) An essentially descriptive sense focusing on distinctiveness, uniqueness or peculiarity. Particularly significant here are the dominant or conspicuous characteristics of personality.

b) An essentially evaluative sense denoting mental and moral attributes which not only are peculiar to the individual, but commonly are invested by the observer with the moral judgment he attaches to those attributes.

c) An essentially technical sense referring specifically to the stability of important traits over time. The emphasis is on persistence, not on prominence or desirability.

The authors point out that whereas in their zeal for objectivity psychologists emphasize the third sense, they do not ordinarily escape involvement in ethical or evaluative considerations. Especially is this evident in their use of the term "character disorders" to denote "psychopathic" and "sociopathic" personalities. It is clear that the antisocial or criminal conduct symptomatic of these conditions is judged to be a disorder of character. As further evidence of this dual emphasis they cite the definition of "Character" in the English and English (1958) dictionary of psychological terms:

> An integrated system of traits or behavior tendencies that enables one to react, despite obstacles, in a relatively consistent way in relation to mores and moral issues . . . . This is the standard, though wavering, current psychological usage. It is distinguished from personality by its emphasis upon a) the volitional aspect, and b) morality.

Rosenhan and London (1968) express their own bias as to the meaning of character by contending that an individual's character is not to be apprehended from the behavior ideals he verbalizes, no matter how cogently or admirably he does so. Rather, it is to be recognized from the ideals to which he adheres in behavior in at least most of the life situations in which they are relevant.

2) Character development. As noted earlier, this chapter's review is not directly concerned with development

of character so much as with what character is, or has been taken to mean. In their consideration of the development aspects, however, Rosenhan and London deal with some typologies that help to clarify what character has been variously perceived to mean.

They cite, thus, Freud's typology to which they ascribe a "biological" focus--as distinct from the focus of Fromm (1947) and of Riesman, et al., (1950) which they term "social or cultural." As they note, it is the well-known and often documented view of Freud (e.g., 1932) that character patterns result from exigencies a child experiences in his stages of psychosexual development. Thus, according to Freud, the shape of a child's character (especially of his superego) is given by the interaction of a) changing stimulus conditions of the environment, and b) the individual constitutional characteristics made operative by those conditions and by the stage of physical maturation. For him, then, character is the unique pattern of traits and behavior that has emerged and persists for each individual as a consequence of his negotiation of those interactions.

For a look at another typology, Rosenhan and London refer to ego psychologist Erikson (1959). Erikson expands Freud's propositions particularly in the light of his emphasis on ego as distinct from superego. For him, it is the individual's negotiation of a series of eight psychosexual crises which gives rise to the relatively stable pattern of traits and behavior which he calls character (cf. Freud's

four stages). The crises of which he speaks according to the order in which they normally occur are: trust versus mistrust; autonomy versus shame and doubt; initiative versus guilt; industry versus inferiority; identity versus identity diffusion; intimacy and solidarity versus isolation; generativity versus self-absorption; and integrity versus despair.

A third formulation to which Rosenhan and London refer is the social-cultural typology of Fromm (1947). Fromm sees character as an individual's distinctive orientation of disposition a) toward the acquisition and assimilation of things, and b) toward people. This disposition emerges from the outcome of his lifelong pursuit simultaneously of closeness and of independence. He describes two types of character orientation: the "nonproductive" (within which he distinguishes the receptive, the exploitive, the hoarding, and the marketing types); and the "productive."

Another social-cultural typology of which Rosenhan and London speak is that of Riesman (see Riesman, Denny and Glazer, 1950). Rather than concerning themselves merely with character as such, Riesman et al. speak more specifically of "social character" (p. 18). In an important sense, this character is not applicable to a single individual, but must be conceived as describing a whole group. They define it as the product of the experience of a significant social group. Of course, such a character may by extension be ascribed to individual members of the group. It is the group that is decisive in Riesman's scheme, however.

Within his "social character," Riesman distinguishes three categories of society:

1) Tradition-directed, stable societies with institutionalized and patterned social practices. All but trivial behavior is essentially determined by a matrix of social forms.

2) Inner-directed, transitional societies in which the institutionalized traditions that earlier provided stability are breaking down. The behavior governor here becomes the goals and purposes implanted early in a child by parents and other elders.

3) Other-directed, material-satiated societies in which primary concern is for people. Here, behavior is essentially directed by a "psychological radar set" by which individuals have been trained to be sensitive to, and to fulfill the desires of others. There is no particular relationship between Riesman's "other-directed" character and Piaget's (1932) "heteronymous morality." While the latter's concern for others derives from its compelling need for their approval, Riesman's "other-directed" may well be quite autonomous. That is, his concern for others may be the result of deliberate consideration of their welfare rather than of

seeking their approval. At the same time, what Riesman conceptualizes is essentially a heteronomous concern for others--for their expectations and prescriptions. It is important to distinguish this from an other-directedness that consists in an autonomous concern for others' interests, values and needs.

Department of Superintendence

While Roback examines the history of the character concept longitudinally, and Hartshorne does so cross-sectionally, and while Rosenhan and London approach it topically, the Tenth Yearbook of the Department of Superintendence (1932) takes yet another approach. Here the definition of character is in terms of that which the hundreds of character education programs reviewed by the writers sought to establish. They distinguish and evaluate, thus, seventeen types of objective-cum-definitions.

1) Character as general goodness, vaguely defined.

2) Character as conformity to conventional mores.

3) Character as life in accord with some religious dogma.

4) Character as a composite of many specific conduct habits.

5) Character as the service of the State.

6) Character as social usefulness, personal self-sacrifice for the larger good.

7) Character as love, good motives, the desire to serve.

8) Character as harmonious adjustment of the personality; happiness.

9) Character as a composite of traits, virtues and ideals.

10) Character as self-control; inhibition in accord with rational principles.

11) Character as self-expression, the obligation to get the most out of life.

12) Character as intelligent living, objectivity, disinterestedness, foresight, understanding and discrimination of consequences, fair-mindedness, scientific spirit.

13) Character as beauty, as a life that is aesthetically satisfying.

14) Character as sincerity in action, accord with conscience.

15) Character as imitation of some ideal persons.

16) Character as creative experience, the continuous reconstruction of life; growth.

17) Character as the integration of values; doing the best possible thing in each situation.

The reviewers propose that while in each of these objectives-cum-definitions there are aspects deserving criticism, with the exception of the ninth, there are elements in each of value in arriving at a comprehensive definition.

A summary outline of the Department's objections to the idea of "character as traits, virtues, ideals" includes items such as:

a) The proposed traits, virtues, and ideals do not have any integral and coherent existence in the make-up of human beings.

b) Emphasis upon traits, virtues, and ideals tends to obscure the real causes of

desirable and undesirable behavior. (Thus, Mary is not truthful. Does she need training in truthfulness? That would be the natural inference. But actually, much depends upon why and how and to whom Mary lied.)

c) Emphasis upon traits, virtues, and ideals centers attention upon the self and obscures the act and its consequences.

d) Emphasis upon traits, virtues, and ideals suggests the fallacious theory that general ideas precede and carry with them their specific applications. (They cite not only Hartshorne and May, 1928-1930, but common sense in defense of this objection.)

e) Any traits, or ideals must be accepted with reservations; in extreme form each one becomes vicious. (Rather than being always desirable, 'virtuous' behavior may become undesirable. He who insists upon neatness at whatever cost becomes ridiculously finicky. He who insists on punctuality at too great cost to other things becomes obsessed. He who offers complete devotion to courage and seeks in every situation to be courageous at all cost becomes foolhardy. Etc.)

In Review of Contemporary Theory Formulations

Beyond discerning a variety of conceptions of character, many reviewers of thought on the subject have themselves enunciated their own theories of moral character that recommend themselves for examination.

Hartshorne Theory

As indicated above, the findings of the CEI did not lead Hartshorne (1932) to abandon the character construct. It did, however, contribute to the conceptualization of character that he proposed.

For him, character can not be adequately conceptualized in terms of any of the theories he had delineated. Above all, it cannot be described solely in terms of the individual. As he saw it, "character" is best represented in terms of the total "mode of interaction" of a given individual with his environment. This mode of interaction incorporates both a) the conditions offered by an individual's universe for his stimulus and growth and b) his responses as an organism as they integrate individual and environment into a whole. To this integrated, inclusive stimulus-response process he applies the term "function."

"Functioning" may occur at several levels. Thus, a function may be purely mechanical, illustrated by the wearing down of hills by flowing water. The hills are there, and the water is there. But it is their interaction that defines the function. On a higher level is that biological functioning wherein the function of a hand or eye is understood only in terms of its contribution to the life and purposes of the organism.

Primitive social functioning refers to that level where complete biological entities (i.e., ants or soldiers) are parts of wholes (ant hill or military organization). The full meaning of these entities can only be understood in terms of the contribution they make to the life of the social unit to which they belong.

On the level of genuinely social functioning, each individual in a group contributes his intelligence and will, as well as his skill and strength, to the enterprise in which the group is engaged. Each understands his final responsibility as well as its meaning for the entire enterprise. At this level . . .

> the individual has come into his own as a cooperating whole, interacting freely with his group and discovering the meaning of his life in terms of the purpose of the group. (Hartshorne, 1932, p. 242)

It is the full experiencing of this kind of true social function in the interaction of a human organism with its environment that spells 'character' for Hartshorne.

Thus, neither 'humors,' nor temperaments, nor body types, nor virtues and vices, nor habits, nor inhibition processes, nor all of these combined, constitute for Hartshorne an individual's character. There is no 'character' except in terms of the whole mode of interaction in which the individual and his environment are involved in true social functioning. To the degree that this mode of interaction takes on a distinguishable quality, to that degree can the individual's character be perceived and differentiated.

In further comment on these experiences which in his view can be regarded as "functions" and thus as having significance to character, Hartshorne emphasizes two points:

1) "Function" experiences cannot be added to ordinary activities of life (as in special "character education" activities) but must be precisely those activities which are integrally part and parcel of real life.

2) In order to be character-significant, though, these ordinary activities must be carried on with a full realization of their significance (p. 257). Thus he declares:

> Character is not a set of practices or thoughts added on to life. Character is a way of living. Furthermore it is a way of living that is characterized not only by the quality of the acts performed but also by their significance to those who perform them. (p. 252, underlining supplied)

In other words, whatever the quality of conduct, feeling, or opinion, they are not character except as they are intimately integrated into a total mode of interaction. And the significance of the individual's conduct in this mode of interaction must be perceived by him.

Hartshorne makes some observations about the character that emerges in such functional interaction that are especially significant to the view to be developed by this study:

> The "control" aspect of the term self-control is fairly obvious. It is not at once obvious whether the self is to be controlled or to do the controlling. Perhaps both. Certainly the self has to be under control. But the implication of the term is that the self is also doing the controlling. Evidently what we mean is that one part of the self controls another part of the self. This would not make sense unless one part were in conflict with another part, and there could be no conflict without movement or at least directions of impulse. Conflict of movement or impulse can be resolved only as one of the contending forces leaves the field. As this hardly happens voluntarily, something outside the particular impulse or desire involved must be at work to prevent its action. If it were merely some single alternative desire, the stronger would win out. But a resolution of this sort, as between hunger and fear, could hardly be termed self-control.

> The human organism is not limited, however, to this type of pluralistic conflict among its desires. There is a certain momentum from past experiences always at work so that each new impulse as it arises is in potential conflict with the general direction in which the whole organism is moving. Furthermore, with experience and reflection, this general direction of movement gains definition and is criticised in terms of other possible directions, and a new or slightly modified direction is projected as an ideal, which acts as a purpose to weigh and select each impulse in accordance with its capacity to move the self toward the ideal. Self-control is the control of all impulses in the interest of the ideal which is cherished by the self as its own. (p. 269)

Roback Theory

Roback (1927) has made one of the more significant contributions to the understanding and conceptualization of character. As noted above, he has traced thinking on the subject from the notions implied in the very earliest literature through views of classical Greece, medieval philosophy, the Victorian era, and on to his own time. The time of his writing coincided with the research activities of Hartshorne and May (1928-1930). Thus he was without the benefit of the volume of relevant empirical research reported over the past forty-five years. Nevertheless he provides a valuable historical review of the subject.

His major contribution for this sutdy, however, lies in the conceptualization of character that he himself has elaborated. He recognized that the subject has historically included the concepts of both temperament and personality as a whole. He urged, however, that character be conceptualized as being one among other aspects of personality, lying thus alongside such aspects as intelligence, temperament, physique, and other mental and physical qualities.

He maintained that "If character is a psychological entity we must endeavor to examine it by means of psychological methods and place it on a psychological basis" (p. 447). With this in mind he sought to abstract what he termed "a psychological fact" to account for and to be postulated as character. His candidate for this was "inhibition."

Thus, his definition of character was: "An enduring psychophysical disposition to inhibit instinctive impulse in accordance with a regulative principle" (p. 450). He emphasized three major elements encompassed in this definition: a) instinctive impulse, b) disposition to inhibit, and c) regulative principle. It seems that yet another emphasis might well be suggested, i.e., d) enduring disposition. He certainly made it clear that for character to be such, there must be an enduring quality in the disposition to inhibit.

Roback contended that whatever the status of a "nature or nurture" controversy, and whatever the "listing" of inherent instincts, it is inhibition of the instinctive impulse mechanism that "stamps the agent with character" (p. 450). Furthermore, functioning of what he specifies as character cannot be postulated until that inhibition of impulse is prompted by intent to be in subjection to "regulative principle."

He defends his emphasis on inhibition against accusations of negativism or inactivity. To whatever degree

instinctive impulses are operative, whether as a basis of learning activity or of behavior determination, and to whatever degree they conflict at any moment, to that degree inhibition of one is but the necessary means for the function of another. He proposes that it is because the "abnormally inhibited" give way to--rather than inhibit--instinctive tendencies, that they are distraught by "onsets of senseless immobility."

> For instance, the man who refuses to budge from his position, in the middle of the room, which he had taken up during a thunderstorm is merely yielding to his fear instinct. He who attends to his business in spite of the terrific bolts, which at least suggest danger, has inhibited the fear tendency. Probably all abnormally inhibited persons are weighed down by an exaggerated fear, either of congenital origin or acquired in the course of events. . . . (p. 457)

He sees inhibition of instinct in deference to regulative principle as actually being deliberate action to achieve accord with principle. Thereby he insists that it is not at all necessary to incorporate into his definition any further element of positive motivation.

Again, whereas sublimation has been characterized as a rechanneling of instinctual energy, Roback's contention is for distributive inhibition of all instinct in favor of regulative principle. Thus 'character' is not here another name for sublimation. Nor is inhibitive character to be confused with repression. The latter must deny impulses of awareness in order to succeed. But the inhibition involved

in character must first admit impulse to consciousness if it would alternatively defer to principle.

Again he contends that it is not just inhibition of instinctual impulse that counts for character. It is not so much that the 'individual of character' inhibits the instinctual impulse itself as it is that in a particular situation he seeks a particular learned objective to that impulse while rejecting another. Thus, it is not inhibiting the sex drive that gives a person character. It is inhibiting it when attainment of its particular object in a given situation would violate 'principle.' It is not, then, asceticism, or inhibition for its own sake, that may be taken for character. Only when inhibition of impulse or inclination is in the service of positive principle rather than of 'negative' forces such as fear do we have character in Roback's view.

Mention has been made of 'conflicting instincts.' It may be that the behavioral outcome of such a conflict is simply a turning aside of one instinct by another. Thus, anger may be turned aside by fear; the threatening finger of the law is sufficient to turn many people aside from acquisitive impulses. Or it may be deference to military or disciplinary pressure that prompts inhibition of impulse. But Roback insists that this cannot be counted for character. He does not even permit the inhibitive function of religious or aesthetic sentiments (including the affect of internalized conscience) to count.

> It is only the ethico-logical principles which count in full measure toward according to character its proper value.
>
> Certainly these principles are not implanted upon us by some mysterious force. They may be regarded as sentiments, that is to say, affective complexes, deriving their nourishment out of the individual's social milieu, but I think it is worthwhile emphasizing the universality and absoluteness of these principles, which are more logical than psychological, inasmuch as they attach to cognition rather than to affection or instinct. (p. 483, underlining supplied)

It may thus be well to accustom an individual to inhibition through discipline, encouragement of sentiment, etc. But there is no character, according to Roback, until the individual has the opportunity to inhibit himself in favor of principle without the complication of disciplinary pressure.

It is important to note in this connection that a number of studies have shown that the pressurized inhibition of defensive or fear-based identification mechanisms is not effective in producing the principled inhibition which Roback postulates for character (e.g., Kelman, 1953, 1961; Hoffman, 1963; Hoffman and Saltzstein, 1967).

Should there yet be a final plea for inclusion of "positive virtue" in the conceptualization of character, Roback responds that the measure of a virtue such as honesty can only be in terms of what was inhibited or resisted in order to accord with principle. Doing the 'right' thing when the 'wrong' thing would be inconvenient may be fine, but it doesn't involve character.

> The garment may seem to be turned inside out, when so much stress is laid on what is ordinarily supposed to be a negative quality--inhibition. Let us remember, however, that the inside of the garment is next to the wearer, and that the outside is for show . . . . From the point of view of the tailor in fashioning the garment, it is futile to ask whether the inside or the outside constitutes the garment. (Roback, 1927, p. 460)

Profiling character. Before leaving Roback, there is one more of his contributions that is significant for this study. To begin with, he denies any relationship to a moralistic viewpoint.

> The position taken in the present work is that instincts are neither good nor bad, but because of their insistent driving force the ability to inhibit them becomes the distinguishing mark of the man of character. (p. 463)

Instead, therefore, of attempting to 'measure' or 'evaluate' an individual's character in any way, he leaves such to those who might see fit to compare the individual's principles to some standard they might elect. Instead, to obtain some index of character, he proposes charting its contour or profile. His scheme, greatly condensed, is as follows.

First, he stratifies the "sanctioners of conduct." In harmony with his contention that regulative ethico-logical principle is essential to real character, he places this at the highest level. In a descending order, admittedly reflecting his own values bias, he places other sanctions thus: aesthetic, religious, social, legal, physical. He locates these on his character contour chart on a vertical

axis. Along the horizontal axis of his chart he would place the several instincts. For what it is worth, his own list includes such factors as self-preservation, food-seeking, acquisitiveness, pugnacity, sex, self-elation.

Figure 1 (see p. 50) is an adapted version of Roback's chart which applies the stratification of regulative principles to the inhibition of specific instinctive tendencies as a means of indexing or contouring character.

Charting the contour of an individual character would then involve noting on the chart the particular stratum of sanction most generally salient in governing behavioral response to each instinct.

Roback does not address himself to how the sanction level functioning might be determined. In fact, he leaves the impression that this is not so much intended to be an operational approach as an aid to conceptualizing character as he perceives it.

The point of significance to this study, however, is his proposal of a contour or profile approach to the description of character. It provides thus for escaping a moralistic evaluation of its contents.

Peck and Havighurst Theory

Among the more ambitious attempts at empirical investigation of character is the "Praire City" project reported by Havighurst and Taba (1949), and Peck and Havighurst (1960). The latter report their review of their various predecessors in the whole area of thought and study. They



Fig. 1 A Scheme for Rating Moral Character
(Adapted from Roback, 1927)

conclude that most of these used the term 'character' to represent "a pattern of acts, rather consistent through time, which may be said to 'characterize' and define the human individual." They recognize a general tendency to emphasize the "inward elements of motivation and intent as the major determinants of character" (Peck and Havighurst, 1960, p. 1).

> The concept is not new that character is to be defined by the intent as much as by the deed: "As [a man] thinketh in his heart, so is he." Insofar as concerns moral character, the intent that counts is the intent to do good or ill to other people. This, too, is at the heart of the definitions of ethical character that have come down to us from many sources: Christ, the Biblical prophets, Buddha, Confucius, Lao-Tze, Mahavira, Zoraster, and Mohammed. Whether to explain present character, or to trace it to its original sources, it appears essential to investigate the individual's feelings and attitudes toward the other people in his life. (p. 2)

Their attempt to answer the question "What is character?" is based upon this consideration. Essentially they conclude that it is to be defined a) in terms of the "control system" an individual uses to adapt his search for satisfaction to the social world; and b) in terms of motivation insofar as the motivation achieves behavioral expression. In other words, they do not conceive that motivational stirrings which do not achieve behavioral expression are to be subsumed in character. [In the light of Roback's contentions, an issue might be raised as to why they should not; for him, of course, the very fact that their expression is inhibited has large implication for character.]

In order to operationalize their definition of character, they seek to analyze the possible modes of adaptation

along with stages of psychosocial development, deriving therefrom a character Type. With this approach it becomes impossible adequately to encompass their definition apart from the generalized Type that accompanies each such stage.

Stated another way, they do not subscribe to a definition that would leave some persons without character while others 'have' it. Nor could some have more of it and others less. However it be defined, they seem to contend, the character of the individual whom Roback would call the "characterless" (i.e., the "psychopath"), must be encompassed in the definition. To accomplish this, their definition must therefore include an elaboration of each Type, as it manifests itself in a stage of psychosocial development, or as it manifests itself in individuals of any age whose behavior corresponds to one or the other stage.

Character of Type I is represented as Amoral, and corresponds to the period of infancy. Whims and impulses are simply translated to action without being troubled by a control system. This may result in delinquent or criminal acts if the individual's basic emotional attitudes are mainly hostile. On the other hand, it might just as well result in "charming behavior" if the individual has a positive, pleasant view of others. Because there are no internalized moral principles in operation, the doer of such charming behavior is no "better" in character than is the doer of criminal acts.

Character of Type II is represented as Expedient and corresponds to the period of early childhood. Here consideration of the welfare and reactions of others is only instrumental to the gaining of personal ends. Behavior corresponds with what society has specified as 'moral' only so long as it contributes to those ends. If unmoral behavior meets these ends and can be expected to go undetected or unrequited, there is no motivation operating to inhibit it.

Character of Type III is represented as Conforming, and along with Type IV corresponds to the period of later childhood. "This kind of person has one general, internalized principle: to do what others do, and what they say one 'should' do" (p. 6). The primary concern is to avoid disapproval. Rules are followed, not for a 'moral purpose' nor out of principle, but out of concern for the effect on other people, especially as that effect is reflected back in approval or disapproval. Behavior may or may not correspond to usual standards of morality depending on the code of the group to which the individual is presently conforming.

Character of Type IV is represented as Irrational-conscientious, also corresponding to the period of later childhood. (A given individual will develop a predominance in only one of Types III or IV.) Here conformity to the group code is not the issue. The code has been internalized and the individual may be said to believe in it. But the process has not actually involved rational consideration of what has positive or negative effects on others. Rules have

been internalized apart from consideration of their functional purpose. Behavior can usually be depended upon to be moral, though possibly so rigidly as to be detrimental to others. Or behavior of an individual of Type IV raised in a criminal subgroup might generally and consistently be seen by a conventional observer as immoral.

Character of Type V is represented as Rational-altruistic and corresponds to the period of adolescence and adulthood. This kind of character comprehends a person who

> not only has a stable set of moral principles by which he judges and directs his own action; he objectively weighs the results of an act in a given situation, and approves it on the grounds of whether or not it serves others as well as himself. (p. 8)

"Rationally," a Type V individual assesses each act in the light of principles he has internalized; "altruistically," he is ultimately concerned for the welfare of others as well as of himself.

> The Rational-altruistic type corresponds to Freud's "genital" character and to Fromm's "productive orientation." Its full emergence and synthesis probably is possible only as adolescence brings the establishment of an examined, differentiated identity . . . . Its perfection being unlikely this side of the Styx, the development of such a character is a life-long process. Indeed, it is in the nature of this character pattern to continue to grow, to experiment, to incorporate new facts, and to develop new depths of understanding as long as life permits. (p. 10)

All of this, then, needs to be comprehended in the Peck and Havighurst definition of character. It is not, thus, for them so much a psychological fact or entity in its own right as it is for Roback (1927). Rather, it is more to be seen as descriptive of an individual's whole behavior

pattern as it emerges from a negotiation of his motivationally determined control system. It is not character that creates stability or predictability of behavior; it is the control system. Character for them is the life pattern that springs in response to the Control System.

Szasz Theory

A brief but significant essay by Szasz (1967) enunciates yet another emphasis that sheds light on what character has been taken to mean. He does not speak of character as such, but of "Moral Man." He does so, however, in a way that makes it clear that moral man may be the closest to a 'man of character' that his humanistic orientation will allow him to acknowledge. He distinguishes his use of 'moral,' however, from what he considers to be the "traditional" use, which he sees as the characterization of a person who lives up to the teachings or correctly obeys the regulations of his particular moral code.

Szasz contends that "To the extent that people have freedom of decision--and to that extent only--they live as moral beings" (p. 46). He uses 'moral,' thus, not in the sense of the following of a code of mores or ethics. Rather, as he represents it, 'moral' is characterized by choice or decision-making behavior. He points to its relationship to the morality of the autonomous personality described by Piaget (1932). Along with Piaget, Szasz distinguishes the autonomous from the heteronomous personality "upon whom specified norms are imposed from without" (p. 46). For Szasz, the moral man must be autonomous man.

Szasz further points out that a person's ability to choose, the availability to him of alternatives, is partly dependent on his store of information. Thus to be autonomous and have the capacity to develop character, an individual must be "educated." For Szasz this "education" must afford for a child, whether by precept or otherwise, "a fund of knowledge about human relationships and ethics and about politics and moral sensibilities" (p. 46). It was lack of such education, he holds, that led so many after World War I to retreat from the burden of decision making (see Fromm, 1941).

Szasz thus holds that autonomous personality is a necessary condition for the development of true morality. Autonomous morality, then, along with the higher, principled types of character (e.g., of Roback, of Peck and Havighurst, or of Wright--see below), are possible only when the environment affords genuine choices, truly open options of which the individual is aware.

While this may be granted, it seems unwarranted to assume that autonomous personality is a sufficient condition for autonomous morality. An issue to which Szasz fails really to address himself is whether the person with genuine options can be depended upon actually to avail himself of the opportunity to choose. If an individual does not so avail himself, can he truly be considered 'moral,' however free he be to choose? It is here contended that he is not. Nevertheless, it is almost as if Szasz's optimistic view of

man ensures that if society be truly open, and if an individual be truly "educated," his morality will be assured.

It is here contended, however, that it is precisely here that the need for 'character' emerges. It is held that character is to be seen as a stable disposition to exercise the decision-making power. Moreover, it is contended that it is essential somehow to educate toward such a disposition by somehow fostering relevant attitudes and skills.

It would seem to be essential, then, that "education" involve more even than knowledge about human relationships, ethics, politics and moral sensibilities. It must also involve development of such attitudes and skills and experience as will assure exercise of decision-making behavior.

Wilson, Williams and Sugarman Theory

Wilson et al. (1967) have authored the first publication of the Farmington Trust Research Unit at Oxford University. This research unit was set up in 1965 to conduct research on the topic of moral education over an anticipated ten years.

In the course of their report, Wilson and colleagues present a "multifactor theory of moral behavior" that proves extremely relevant to this attempt to abstract a theory of character. While the component factors of moral behavior which they suggest come at least one step short of character as it is to be conceptualized in Chapter IV, it seems that they might be persuaded to accept such an extension to their theory as will be explicated in the Summary of that chapter.

They speak of their theory as "a working hypothesis about the nature of moral behavior." They hasten to emphasize that it is so far no more than that. It is the purpose of their continued research to test the hypothesis. Their initial contention, by which they support the multifactored aspect of their theory is that . . .

> Too much stress has been laid in the past on the investigation of single dimensions of morality. Our claim is that moral behavior cannot be fully understood unless a global approach is adopted; unless it is seen as a multidimensional structure.. . . (p. 289)

While acknowledging the research that has sustained the notion of a weak "g" or common factor in morality (see Burton, 1963), they maintain, thus, that explanation and prediction of moral behavior requires that morality be examined as the multifactored, multidimensional construct which they hypothesize.

They offer two distinctive listings of component factors of morality which afford insightful suggestions for character. On the other hand, because morality as they conceptualize it does not entirely coincide with character as it is to be conceptualized in this study, the listed factors do not provide a complete analysis of the character construct. As has been suggested above, however, an extension to their theory yet to be proposed would probably do no violence to it.

By way of a "phenomenological description" of morality, they suggest a listing of components which might even more properly be called attributes (see pp. 192-194, 218). [For

names for these attributes they have used the first few letters of related classical Greek words.]

1) An experiencing of identification with other people such that their feelings and interests actually count or weigh on an equality with one's own. [PHILeo]

2) An experiencing of an awareness both of one's own and of others' feelings, with ability to know what they are and to describe them. [EMPatheia]

3) A mastery of factual knowledge--especially regarding causes and effects, the consequences of actions. [GIGnosko]

4) Formulation of and commitment to a comprehensive body of action-guiding moral principles regarding #2 and #3, and based on #1. [DIKaios]

5) Formulation of a similar body of expediency principles regarding one's own life and interests based again on #2 and #3, but not necessarily on #1. [PHRONeo]

6) A capacity to implement the two classes of principles, i.e., #4 and #5, into action--equatable with will power. [KRATeo]

By way of a listing of components based more upon their study of psychological research as well as of logical and philoscphical considerations, they categorize the component factors of morality as follows:

1) Motivational Factors

   a) The superego and feelings of guilt

   b) Social acceptance and feelings of shame

   c) The ego-ideal and self-evaluation

   d) The id

2) Cognitive Factors

   e) Abilities connected with the formation and use of moral concepts (otherwise spoken of as "moral judgment")--cf. DIK, PHRON.

   f) Abilities connected with understanding of facts and causal relationships--cf. GIG, EMP.

3) Other "Ability" Factors

   g) Ability to relate emotionally to others, and arising from this, the ability to identify and sympathize with other people--cf. PHIL.

   h) Ego-controls, including both defense mechanisms and other conscious means of inhibiting or redirecting primitive impulses--cf. KRAT.

While the last two groups relate directly to moral behavior, motivational factors, they contend, do not; nor, the authors hold, are these factors sufficient to account for development of true morality.

> It is true that they are powerful controls or modifiers of behaviour; but to be motivated entirely by the desire to avoid uncomfortable feelings, or to have other people approve of you, or to conform to a self-picture which may or may not be realistic or mature, is not in itself moral. (Wilson et al., 1967, p. 288)

They hold that the development of genuine morality must, in fact, involve the overruling of the motivational factors by the ego--of which the Cognitive and Other Ability factors are functions.

Instead of attempting to visualize or represent the differences and relationships between various degrees or qualities of morality, either along a single dimension or spatially, they suggest a profile or histogram type of figure. They offer an important caution, however: superiority is not necessarily a quantitative matter. Thus:

> A superego which is too powerful is as hampering to moral development as one which is weak. Over-rigid ego-controls do not bring a heightened capacity for moral behaviour; they simply mean that their possessor fails in a different way from the person with insufficient control. (p. 292)

Beyond the component factors suggested for their multifactored theory, Wilson et al. propose some criteria for a "morally educated" person which also suggest significant considerations for a theory of character. Thus, such a person . . .

1) acts for reasons, not as a result of causes--he is reason-governed, as opposed to cause-governed;

2) reasons offered for his actions relate to other people's interests (cf. prudence-expediency reasons, or reasons connected with mental health-ill health;

3) possesses and uses in a logically consistent manner the data essential and relevant to issues;

4) acts in openness to awareness, perceptiveness and imagination;

5) translates results of his moral thinking (i.e., items 1 to 4) into action.

Items 1 to 4 relate to rational morality in thinking and decision processes--principles and values are prominent. Item 5 relates to rational morality in behavior. While inhibition is prominent, there is yet a freeing of an

individual's energies from irrational and compulsive behavior patterns; a freeing for rational behavior; a freeing to experience and respond to his own motivation.

Wright Theory

One of the most lucid elaborations of moral behavior and of character to date is that of Wright (1971). We may initially note his preliminary definition of character: "Those attitudes and dispositions within an individual which relate to behavior that is the subject of moral evaluation in his society" (pp. 21, 22).

Wright takes note of the influence on this definition that various theoretical orientations have. Thus, he refers to the social-group approach which makes character to be the control power that awareness of the expectations and evaluations of others exercises on an individual's behavior. On the other hand, the control power postulated by the psychoanalytic approach is the affect from the conscience which the individual has internalized through his identifications. Then again, the 'character' of learning-theory approach is essentially the behavior that has been learned through experiences of reinforcement and modeling. And the cognitive-developmental approach, finally, postulates a character that is essentially controlled by intelligent adaptation to social environment that becomes progressively more possible through interaction between developing capacities and environmental conditions. Rather than attempting to construct a theory

that is exclusively derived from one or the other of these approaches, Wright draws from all of them.

In his wide ranging review of research on moral behavior, he specifies five main facets or factors which together largely account for it. These are a) resistance to temptation, b) guilt, c) altruism, d) moral insight, and e) belief.

There is considerable coincidence between these component factors accounting for moral behavior as outlined by Wright and those explicated by Wilson et al. The coincidence is not always obvious due to considerable overlap and to different terminology and emphasis. Nevertheless, Wright's "resistance to temptation" clearly corresponds to the "ego-controls" and KRAT of Wilson et al.; Wright's "guilt" to their "superego" and EMP; his "altruism" to their "ability to relate emotionally to others . . . to identify and sympathize" and PHIL and EMP; his "moral insight" and "belief" to their cognitive factors and GIG, DIK and PHRON.

Because the factors distinguished by Wilson et al. are more finely differentiated, it may well be that they will lend themselves more conveniently to future research. Wright's factors, however, are more conveniently related to research evidence so far generated, and hence may for the immediate present be the more useful.

Wright points to 'character' as the organization and integration within an individual of the five factors he differentiates.

> In saying that a person has a certain kind of character we mean more than that he exhibits a given profile on the five aspects of moral behaviour. Character is defined not so much through an inventory of actions performed, as by a description of the principles that give coherence and meaning to an individual's behaviour, and of the relatively enduring dispositions and motivations that underly it. (p. 203)

He holds that "most of the existing typologies had their point of inception not in empirical data but in some theoretical perspective on personality as a whole" (p. 203). He sees these typologies as falling into three groups:

1) Those that relate character to social structure (as examples he offers Fromm, 1947, and Riesman et al., 1950--see above on Rosenhan and London).

2) Those that derive immediately from empirical study but are based on only one of the factors of moral behavior.

3) Those that have sought to describe character in terms of all aspects of moral behavior.

Wright claims to have based his analysis of character and the typology arising from it on a careful consideration of available empirical evidence concerning all five facets of moral behavior. Though it coincides with none of those before his, it approximates several and is, he claims, a composite of them all. The approximation is closest to Peck and Havighurst (1960). He clearly shares their contention that an adequate definition of character must encompass a description of the several distinguishable patterns to be encountered. The delineation of his typology is essential, then, to his definition.

He shares with Peck and Havighurst, and with Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1964, etc.), and others, a cognitive-developmental orientation. He pointedly warns that the whole 'developmental' perspective of character incorporates an evaluative bias. This is so because 'developmental' implies that certain character structures are more 'mature' than others. To protect his readers, Wright explicitly states his own evaluative assumption:

> The more mature the character is, the more it can justly be described as autonomous, flexible, rational, and sympathetically altruistic. The most desirable type is that which combines independence and individuality with moral sensitivity and concern for others--the type labelled here autonomous-altruistic. (p. 205)

This typology allows, thus, for six main types arranged along two dimensions. The horizontal axis represents "the relative importance during upbringing of the major socializing influences, parents and other adults in authority on the one hand and the peer group and friends on the other" (p. 206). A theoretical point of equilibrium is represented by the mid-point.

The vertical axis allows for three distinct significations:

1) By a Type's locus on the vertical axis is represented the extent to which socializing influence --from whatever source--has been internalized.
2) Also indicated by locus on the vertical axis is the degree of intensity and effectiveness of the socializing influence.

3) A Type's combined locus on the two axes indicates the degree to which it is still dependent upon the sources of influence.

A look at Fig. 2 shows that the relationship on item three is curvilinear. Both the Amoral and the Autonomous-altruistic are independent of the influence either of authority or of social groups, the latter having grown free of the



Fig. 2. Wright's Character Typology

influence, the former never having been brought under it. "Yet the difference between them could not be greater" (see Wright, 1971, p. 206).

As will be apparent from Fig. 2, Wright's typology involves two variations in a progression from Amoral to Altruistic-autonomous. The one runs: Amoral to Authoritarian to Conscientious-rule-following to Altruistic-autonomous. The other runs: Amoral to Conformist to Collectivist to Altruistic-autonomous. The differentiation lies in the primary socializing influence that has functioned: for the first progression it is mainly adult; for the second, it is mainly peer. The characterization of each type is probably sufficiently obvious from the names (or similar to Peck and Havighurst) to justify not describing them in detail here.

Kohlberg

Probably the most prolific present writer on moral development, and incidentally on moral character, is Kohlberg (see, e.g., 1964). His primary contributions have to do with moral judgment, but here we will note one further analysis of the various meanings 'character' holds as he has worked it out.

He draws attention to the factor analysis by Burton (1963) of the data of Hartshorne and May. While the doctrine of specificity continues to be strongly supported, there is clear support for the notion that part of the variation in cheating behavior is due to stable individual differences in attitudes toward classroom cheating.

Kohlberg delineates three possible interpretations of the 'moral character' factor found by Burton (1963), and intuitively apprehended by so many for so long. He first refers to the prevalent recent interpretations, which see moral character as superego strength. In this case, it would represent the rules and demands and expectations 'internalized,' in harmony with psychoanalytic theory, by a child's identification with parents, etc. These internalizations manifest themselves in those feelings or affects such as guilt feeling, anxiety, etc., commonly attributed to 'moral conscience.'

Kohlberg claims that empirical evidence relating to this interpretation remains inconclusive.

> Conformity to a moral rule has not been found to bear much relationship to the strength of stated belief in that rule. More importantly, strength of conformity to a rule has not been found consistently to relate to intensity of guilt following transgressions.. . . (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 388)

He next looks at a second prevalent interpretation of moral character--that of "good habits." These are supposed to have been "produced by training, example, punishment, and reward" (p. 388). And because of the power of habit to produce repetition, the complex of a person's good habits is often seen to account for the influence of the character factor.

Kohlberg goes on to contend, however, that "research results . . . have rather consistently failed to support such notions." He further cites more recent research that shows that there is no positive or consistent relationship

between a) earliness and amount of parental demands or training in good habits on the one hand and b) measures of children's obedience, responsibility, and honesty on the other. He concludes that . . .

> direct training and physical types of punishment may be effective in producing short-run situational conformity but do not directly produce general internalized habits of moral character carried into later life, carried outside the home, or carried into permissive situations. (1964, p. 389)

The third major interpretation of moral character to which Kohlberg refers is in terms of "strength of ego abilities" or "ego strength" rather than of good habits or superego feeling.

He sees the strongest support for this interpretation as coming from findings--too numerous for reference here (see however, Chapters IV and V) but quite impressive when taken together--concerning particular aspects of ego strength. These aspects include a) intelligence, b) foresight, c) focused attention, d) fantasy control, and e) high self-concept.

When evidence relating each of these aspects to consistency of conduct is combined into an aggregate, Kohlberg sees it lending strong support to the assigning to ego strength of a major force in moral character. These major consistencies he sees as representing decision-making capacities rather than fixed behavior traits, moral habits or moral feelings (see Kohlberg, 1964, p. 391).

Ziller Theory

Ziller (1971) does not specifically address himself to moral character. Nevertheless he abstracts and

conceptualizes some constructs that have close relevance to the whole area. He directs his own attention to a theory of "personal change." But in doing so he necessarily addresses himself to aspects of "personal stability" that have definite bearing on the character construct.

Essentially, he attempts to integrate four "micro-theories" into a single "helical theory." His theory incorporates theories of attitude and value change, behavior modification, role theory and self theory. The pivotal construct concerns what he calls "self-other schemas." These are . . .

> cognitive maps of the self in relation to significant other persons. . . . These constructs are assumed to mediate social stimuli and social responses. (Ziller, 1971, p. 64)

He proposes that there are five components that constitute the "personal system" of any individual. These components are structured in the system as a "hierarchy of potentially changeable personal characteristics" that includes attitudes, values, behaviors, roles, and self-concepts. In defining these he attempts to seek a close association with the method of measurement for each usually used in experimental literature.

Ziller enunciates several assumptions regarding this personal system:

1) The five components constitute a hierarchy of difficulty of change. Attitudes are more easily changed than values, which are in turn more

easily changed than behaviors; self-concept is more resistant to change than role, which in turn is more resistant than behavior.

2) It is to the degree that an individual reduces the possible alternatives associated with one of the components in a choice situation by commitment that stability or resistance to change is established--the more so on the higher levels of the hierarchy.

3) There is a "press towards consonance" among the components such that any change at one level induces a tendency among other components to change toward congruence.

4) Because the press downwards in the hierarchy is postulated as stronger than is the press upwards,

> The self concept is . . . the most crucial component of the system. It is the most resistant to change and more time is required for change. Moreover, if the self concept is changed, there is a higher probability that other components in the system will change. (p. 41)

5) The self-concept--which Ziller proposes to be actually a "self-other orientation""--is itself comprised of a hierarchical structure of components. He proposes that three of these components are definitive with regard to social adaptation: self-esteem, social interest (i.e., perceptions of inclusion or separation), and complexity. Each of these components contributes severally

to the stability-changability of the person. While the self-concept is at the highest level in the level in the self-concept and then most largely of all determines the stability or changability.

It is, then, the elements associated with personal change that Ziller emphasizes. He speaks thus of the "flexibility within stability" afforded by the relative liability to change of each of his five components along with the press toward equilibrium assumed for the system.

By extension, however, the reverse pattern may just as well be postulated. Thus as an individual increasingly identifies his attitudes, values, roles, self-concept; as he is increasingly committed to them; and as they are increasingly interrelated one with another, he might be seen as approaching "stability within flexibility."

Ziller actually alludes to this in his discussion of self-esteem. As he uses the term, he sees it as . . .

> concerned with the individual's stability of behavior stemming from his recourse to self reinforcement under conditions of stress. The person with high self esteem is somewhat insulated from moment to moment changes in the environment or lack of reinforcement from the environment, whereas the person with low self esteem is particularly subject to environmental contingencies. (p. 66)

Summary

Rather than attempting at this point to summarize the several streams of theory into a comprehensive definition of character, this task will be held over until Chapter V.

Suffice it to say here that in spite of the somewhat discredited position of the 'character' construct in the decades since 1930, a number of writers of repute have continued to take it seriously. Their theoretical analyses afford some reason to anticipate the deriving of a satisfactory definition.

CHAPTER III
MORALIZATION OF PERSONS--A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

Closely related--but not at all necessarily identical--to the formation and development of moral character is what psychologists and sociologists have commonly referred to as the 'moralization' of persons. Fromm (1947) has characterized the newborn infant as "starting life in an indifferent state" (p. 231). And there obviously is virtually no way by which it could be ascertained that an infant is anything other than entirely premoral--doubtless, actually amoral--having no sensitivity whatever to considerations of 'ought' or of right and wrong.

But it is a phenomenal fact that as human infants develop into personhood, they come to be sensitized--some more, some less--to considerations of 'ought' and of 'should,' of right versus wrong, of good versus bad; with a sense of obligations owed to others, or at least expected and demanded by them. The process by which this sensitization comes about is spoken of as 'moralization,' or as Brown (1965) speaks of it, "the acquisition of morality."

The various processes involved in moralization have been the subject of considerable study, both philosophical and scientific--of the latter, empirical as well as clinical.

The literature regarding moralization, or the acquisition of morality, is here to be reviewed. The objective of the review is not so much for what the literature may suggest about the nature of morality, but for what it may indicate about the process by which morality is acquired, and for the illumination which that may afford regarding moral character and its development.

How do human beings acquire morality? How do they come to be sensitized to questions of right and wrong, of 'ought' and 'ought not'? How do their behavioral responses to environmental stimuli come to be subjected to moral considerations? How do all the promptings, inducements, impulses and other stimuli to behavior come to be subordinated to considerations of rule or of moral principle?

The primary way social and behavioral scientists have approached these questions has entailed a twofold process. First they have attempted to measure the variations in individual morality. This has mainly been done by projective measures, ratings by others, and experimental situations (e.g., situational invitations to cheat).

Secondly, they have sought to discover the determinants of these variations by examining the correlations between them and the various circumstances and experiences which individuals undergo--primarily the antecedents in parental relations and discipline. Data from both correlational and experimental studies that are relevant become useful.

Moralization as Socialization

Before the advent of scientific study of human behavior--until just prior to the beginning of the 1900's--the moralization of individuals was commonly considered to be an 'act of God'; morality, a 'gift of God.' Although Maslow (1954) and other self-actualization theorists would probably resist being categorized here, nevertheless since the individual potential which persons actualize is not by him seen to be socially mediated, it must be a 'gift of God' within the broader meaning of the phrase. Berkowitz (1964) would probably attribute this position to Piaget (1932) also, although it is here held that it would not be correct to do so.

More recently, moralization and morality have been seen as a product of learning through socialization--at the very least, seen as mediated by socialization, if in any way it be a 'gift of God.'

In order to determine variations in individual morality, it is first of all essential to look again at what is meant by the term. 'Morality' has variously been seen to be such as . . .

1) behavioral conformity to culturally determined norms;

2) a code of norms by which questions of right and wrong are resolved;

3) 'internalized' cultural norms (as mediated by parents and/or their surrogates) whereby . . .

a) those norms are conformed to in the absence of situational incentives;

b) self-punitive and self-critical (i.e., quilt) reactions follow transgression;

c) the norms come to be understood and positively valued by the individual.

The term is here taken to refer to

1) sensitivity to considerations of personal culpability, and

2) sensitivity and 'respondability' (i.e., capacity and readiness to respond) to considerations of 'ought,' or right and wrong, and/or of moral principle.

The intent will be, then, to review here what the literature of research has to say concerning the possible determinants of individual differences in the acquisition of morality.

Socialization and Morality

As indicated above, social and behavioral scientists have by and large studied the acquisition of morality as a process of learning by socialization. Barton (1962) represents the socialization process as essentially one of transmission and maintenance of values.

> In all societies there are specialists concerned with the transmission of the culturally approved values to the younger generation, and their maintenance among the adult members of society. These processes in most cultures are highly traditional, and involve rituals full of deep emotional meaning. (p. S-62)

Along with others, Barton distinguishes two different types of values:

1) Preferential values--matters of taste, likings, needs, desires, interests.

2) Normative values------matters of obligation, 'ought' and 'should'; right versus wrong, duty, guilt-related, or blame- or praise-worthy.

It is the normative values that would be involved in morality, their transmission that would be involved in moralization of persons. In this light, then, the moralization of persons would indeed be one of the functions of socialization. Socialization is the larger process of which transmission of normative values, or moralization, is commonly held to be one aspect.

It will here be held that the preferred moralizing of persons occurs not as a transmission of particular values themselves, but as a preparing of persons regularly to subject their motivations to considerations of universal and rational moral principles. Or more to be preferred yet, bringing them to espouse a set of moral principles and to instate those principles themselves as the motivational springs of behavior.

As indicated above, one view of personal morality is that it simply is behavioral conformity to cultural rules or norms . . . however that conformity be achieved . . . by external control or otherwise. But as Kohlberg has suggested (see above), moralization of persons may and probably should be distinguished from the mere controlling of their behavior (see also Barton, 1962). Control of behavior may of course be accomplished by such means as external coercion,

forced compliance surveillance, imposition of sanctions, etc. (cf., Kelman, 1953). But 'moralization' is used to refer to the producing of 'internal' structures of functions in individuals. By these internal structures, "behavior that is not functional for the system" is inhibited, apart from external constraints upon the implementing of stimuli to such behavior (Barton, 1962).

Theoretical Perspectives

How the data regarding the acquisition of morality are analyzed and interpreted depends largely upon the theoretical stance or point of view that is assumed. The theoretical orientation determines the viewer's perceptions just as surely as does the perspective from which one views a given scene. Then again, theoretical considerations serve to focus attention on particular conditions as well as guiding the interpretation of the data concerning those conditions. It is, after all, a theory's propositions and the hopotheses generated by them that are investigated in research.

There are at least four distinctive theoretical perspectives according to which attempts have been made to account for such internal structures as may lead us to "restrain ourselves in the interests of morality" (Wright, 1971). All four coincide in seeing moralization of persons as dependent upon social interaction. But they differ considerably in the processes through which the socialization is held to be accomplished. Moreover, the actual ends of

the processes take quite different forms depending upon the particular role ascribed to the social environment.

1) The social-group approach . . . begins with the idea that people conform their behavior to the expectations of the various groups in which they function in order to avoid being viewed as reprehensible by the group.

2) The psychoanalytic approach . . . based on the idea that people are 'good' because conscience (superego) causes unpleasant guilt feelings for failure to be.

3) The learning-theory approach . . . based on the concepts of conditioning: people are 'good' because

   a) they have experienced reinforcement (or punishment) for past behavior, and

   b) they have been surrounded by good example within an atmosphere conducive to its imitation.

4) The cognitive-developmental approach... based on the proposition that behaving morally is essentially behaving rationally and intelligently--intelligent adaptation to the social environment.

Among the variables that have been seen as accounting for individual differences in morality, Wright (1971) has identified five clusters. He conceives of these as the major dimensions along which people's moral behavior can vary. These dimensions are:

> resistance to temptation, or the capacity to refrain from morally reprehensible behavior when motivated to engage in it, either in the presence of others or alone; post-transgressional responses, or the way people behave and the emotions they express after they have violated a moral rule of some kind; altruism, or sympathetic behavior intended to benefit others; moral insight, or the kinds of reasoning that people engage in to defend and justify their moral judgments and beliefs; and moral ideology, or the actions people believe to be right and wrong, their degree of commitment to these beliefs, and the function such beliefs serve in their personalities. (p. 19)

Wright further deals with these clusters of variables as constituting the major components of individual morality. Without explicitly saying so, he has dealt with moralization as the acquisition of these five components of moral functioning. Whether clusters of variables, dimensions or components, their antecedents may thus be taken as accounting for the development of individual morality.

Three of these five aspects have generally been perceived to be the primary criteria or indices of internalization (cf., Kohlberg, 1963a, 1968a). They have variously been stressed in theory and research:

1) Resistance to temptation. Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) defined moral character as a set of culturally defined virtues (e.g., honesty, charity) which could be measured by observing an individual's ability to resist the temptation to break a rule when it seemed improbable that he would be detected or punished.

2) Guilt reaction to transgression. Freud (1961/1924) declared the sense of guilt to be the most important problem in the evolution of culture. Psychoanalytically oriented studies thus have stressed emotional criteria.

3) Capacity to make moral judgments. Piaget (1932) and others (e.g., Kohlberg, 1963a, 1966, 1968a) have focused on the thinking or reasoning by which individuals make judgments in terms of a standard and justify maintaining that stnadard to themselves and to others.

This review will join Kohlberg in singling out these three aspects of personal functioning as the criteria of morality.

Moralization as a Product of Learning by Identification

"Like father like son." It has doubltess always been recognized that children take over a variety of qualities from their parents, as well as from others around them. In one way or another they tend selectively to reproduce behaviors, attitudes, beliefs and values. Thereby they have been seen as advancing in the acquisition of morality. The kind of process and the dynamics involved in this take-over as well as the factors influencing the selection have been the object of considerable speculation and research.

Both for Freud and his colleagues--past and present--and for behaviorist as well as social group theorists, individual morality is not at all to be considered as the product of a developing or actualizing of structures in some way innate to the individuals. For all three, individual morality is rather the product of learning. For Freudians, individual morality is the product of the functioning of conscience or superego, incorporated from the rules and standards of parents or parental figures as a defense either against a) their aggression, or b) against the loss of their love. For the behaviorist and the social group theorists, it may be said to be the product of the conditioning of both responses and operants to imitate other persons or roles.

Identification as Ingestive Internalization

It would appear that the phrase 'ingestive internalization' may be original with this study. However, Brown (1965) has distinguished between 'ingestion' and 'digestion' as models of internalization. He points out that Freudian theorists tend to suggest that internalization is an "incorporating," a "gulping down in raw form" of adult precepts, such that those precepts "become superego tissue without undergoing significant transformation" (p. 404). If this is perchance overstating the Freudian position, it nevertheless reflects the model that comes through.

As noted above, Freud rejected the idea that conscience is a 'still small voice' implanted in man by God for

the guidance of his conduct. He further rejected the idea that sexual identity is biologically established, instinctually producing the rise of heterosexual desire in adolescence (Freud, 1949/1930; cf. Brown, 1965, p. 365). Instead, in his view, both conscience and sexual identity were largely learned, and largely by the same process, with much the same antecedents.

Freud never consolidated or systematized a theory of the moral development of individuals. The conceptual fabric from which his theory of the acquisition of morality is constructed is clearly intimated, however, in his extensive writings. It is particularly evident in his Introductory Lectures (1963/1915-1916), and in Civilization and Its Discontents 1949/1930). In the absence of any connected presentation of his theory on development of morality, then, this review of literature on the subject is indebted to Brown (1965) for his concise analysis of Freudian theory. [Fromm (1947) provides a similarly connected presentation of Freudian theory that is something of a classic in its own right.] A very abbreviated digest of the already concise analysis by Brown runs something like the following:

The acquiring of morality is said to be accomplished by the installation within the child's personality of the superego. The child derives this superego through a process of internalization by identification with his parents, its content coming from the content of the parents' culture.

The internalization is responsible for installing not only the superego, but also the child's unconscious sexual identity.

The superego--as well as individual sexual identity--arises in boys as "the heir of the Oedipus Complex," in girls, of the "Electra Complex." For the boys, it arises as their envy of father for his possession of mother is resolved; for the girls, it comes in the resolution of "penis envy." The superego consists of two principal aspects: the "conscience," or the observing, judging, punishing aspect; and the "ego ideal," or the positive standard against which the conscience measures the ego. (See Freud, 1961/1924.)

The superego both socializes and moralizes by tapping subterranean streams of traumatic anxiety that remain in the personality as hidden residuals of traumatic experiences of the child's past. It demands control of impulse as the price of avoiding the return of painful dread or anxiety in the form of guilt. Because of the nature of Freud's theory, for him "moralization of the child meant little more than the control by guilt of sex and aggression" (Brown, 1965, p. 352.)

Hoffman (1962) has incorporated the relevant concepts of Freud's theories into the following statement:

> The young child is inevitably subjected to many frustrations some of which are due to parental control and some of which may have nothing to do with the parent, directly, . . . All of these frustrations contribute to the development of hostility toward the parent. But the child's anxiety over counter-aggression by the parent or over the

> anticipated loss of the parent's love leads him to repress this hostility. Simultaneously he begins to incorporate the parent's prohibitions and generally to model his behavior after that of the parent. Among the important parental characteristics incorporated is the capacity to punish himself when he violates a prohibition or is tempted to do so--turning inward in the course of doing this, the hostility which was originally directed toward the parent. The self punishment is experienced as guilt feelings which are dreaded because of their intensity and their resemblance to the earlier fears of punishment or abandonment by the parent. The child, therefore, tries to avoid guilt by acting in accordance with the incorporated inhibitions and by erecting various mechanisms of defense against the conscious awareness of impulses to the contrary. (p. S-18)

In Freudian terms, then, moralization is essentially the induction in persons of superego, or authoritarian conscience. ". . . Conscience is the voice of an internalized external authority, the parents, the state, or whoever the authorities in a culture happen to be" (Fromm, 1947, pp. 143, 144; emphasis supplied). Fromm holds that this superego or authoritarian conscience is actually only one form of conscience (p. 144). At any rate . . .

> the prescriptions of authoritarian conscience are not determined by one's own value judgment but exclusively by the fact that its commands and tabus are pronounced by authorities . . . . they have not become the norms of conscience because they are good, but because they are the norms given by authority. (p. 145)

The significant point in all of this is the internalization. It is the internalizing that constitutes the acquisition of morality. At the same time,

> this internalization must not be imagined to be so complete as to divorce conscience from the external authorities . . . . normally, the person

> whose conscience is authoritarian [i.e., super-ego] is bound to the external authorities and to their internalized echo . . . . If the authorities did not exist in reality, that is, if the person had no reason to be afraid of them, then the authoritarian conscience would weaken and lose power. (Fromm, 1947, p. 145)
>
> The contents of the authoritarian conscience are derived from the commands and tabus of the authority; its strength is rooted in the emotions of fear of, and admiration for, the authority. Good conscience is consciousness of pleasing the (external and internalized) authority; guilty conscience is the consciousness of displeasing it. The good (authoritarian) conscience produces a feeling of well-being and security, for it implies approval by, and greater closeness to, the authority; the guilty conscience produces fear and insecurity, because acting against the will of the authority implies the danger of being punished and--what is worse--of being deserted by the authority. (Fromm, 1947, p. 146)

Even for Freud, however--at least in his writings--there were determinants of identification (the fount of the superego) other than the traumatic resolution of complexes. Brown (1965, p. 380) has detected at least these three:

1) Identification can occur because the ego sees itself as similar to some other person;

2) Identification can occur because the ego envies the success of authority or attributes of another person and wishes to participate in them;

3) Identification can occur because another person threatens the ego with aggression and the ego seeks to conquer its fear.

As Brown (1965) points out, identification #1 could account for cross-sex identification involving non-sex-related

qualities, while identification #2 could account for sex-identity-related aspects. Yet, again, of course, maybe none of Freud's ideas apply, and accounting for identification must be by other processes altogether.

Relevant evidence. The evidence relating to "ingestive internalization" has by and large--though by no means exclusively--come from clinical observation and case histories and from correlational surveys, as distinct from experimental research. Typical of the case histories and "especially important in shaping the Freudian theory of identification" (Brown, 1965), is that of a five-year-old boy, Hans (Freud, 1962/1909). The study may, of course, be examined in the original, but it also has been rather fully reported elsewhere (e.g., Brown, 1965).

In analyzing Hans's phobia about horses, Freud tied together several lines of evidence--e.g., castration threat by mother, but to be implemented by doctor-father; warning against horses that might bite off a finger; witnessing a terrifying upset in the street of a wagon drawn by white horses; birth at home of a sister, complete with white-garbed doctor and traces of blood; ejection at father's insistence from mother's side in bed. Freud interpreted the evidence to demonstrate that in response to such traumatic experiences, Hans had defended himself against his father by internalizing or incorporating his father into his self, providing both a sexual identity and a conscience for

himself. In the process, he had displaced the original trauma onto fantasies that left him in terror of horses--especially white ones.

As noted already, a significant factor in the 'internalization' conceptualized by Freud is the 'ingestive' quality. The parent's standards, values, qualities are simply 'swallowed whole,' so to speak. Admittedly it is the child's own perception of these that he internalizes--he puts that much of his own stamp upon them. But while bread digested or assimilated is no longer bread, having been transformed into cellular matter of the assimilating organism, bread that is merely ingested or swallowed is bread still. So Freud's superego consists of parental standards, values, etc.; indeed it is precisely the fact that they are the parent's that constitutes them superego, as distinct from ego or id.

Familial antecedents. A major portion of the studies inspired by Freudian theory regarding the acquisition of morality has been centered on such variables in the familial environment as may differentially foster this identification by 'ingestive internalization.' In these studies, psychoanalytically oriented researchers have relied largely on correlational procedures. To start with, they have identified what appear to them to be "signs of guilt." Mostly by use of various projective measures, they have attempted to measure individual differences in manifestation of these

signs. Then using these signs as criteria, they have correlated them with data concerning familial background, mostly generated from interviews and surveys. With these correlations they have attempted to identify the variables that determine differential acquisition of morality.

Because of their relevance here, findings of some experimental studies will also be reviewed. Actually, the primary reference of experimental studies is to the "identification as conditioned role performance," (see below, this chapter) of learning and social group theorists. Their importance to that section will therefore be reemphasized there, though the material will not be repeated.

As noted above, Freudian theory suggests that strong guilt or authoritarian conscience results from the eventual turning in of aggressions aroused during harsh treatment in infancy. Hence, a number of studies have included severity of weaning and/or toilet training as a variable.

Heinicke (1953) found that high guilt measures (i.e., how children felt and acted when they had done wrong) were significantly associated with report of severe weaning experiences. There was no consistent relationship with toilet training. Similarly, Whiting and Child (1953) in a wide-ranging multicultural survey found a significant relationship between the degree of self recrimination or guilt reportedly felt for illness and severity of weaning as practiced by the culture, but with no consistency of association for toilet training.

W. Allinsmith's (1960) findings are considerably at odds with those of Heinicke and of Whiting and Child, however. He distinguished between kinds of transgression and found that experience of guilt for hostile thoughts had a curvilinear relationship with severity in both weaning and toilet training--it was only moderate guilt that was associated with severe training, while both high and low guilt were associated with the less severe approaches. On the other hand, guilt for stealing or disobeying had a direct relationship with severity of training, but in the opposite direction from that of the previous two studies: severe training was associated with low guilt scores and vice versa. While attempts to reconcile the discrepancies might yield some results, both Hoffman (1962) and Brown (1965) conclude that the evidence presently available is too insufficient and conflicting to sustain any definitive statement.

These same studies along with quite a number of others have differentiated among methods of parental discipline as variables. Several somewhat overlapping distinctions have differentiated between:

1) physical punishments and psychological punishments (e.g., MacKinnon, 1938; W. Allinsmith, (1960);

2) non-love-oriented methods and love-oriented methods (e.g., Whiting and Child, 1953; Sears, Maccoby and Levin, 1957);

3) power-assertive techniques and love-oriented techniques (e.g., Aronfreed, 1961);

4) extinction techniques and induction techniques (e.g., Aronfreed, 1961).

In general, these distinctions differentiate between:

1) Corporal punishments (as beating, whipping, spanking, slapping, shaking); verbal assaults (yelling, ridiculing, overt threats, etc.); isolating; arbitrary, unexplained demands; unilateral deprivation of privileges, etc., all being some form of power assertion.

2) Manifestation of warm but conditional positive regard; praise, reasoning; explaining painful consequences to parents of child's wrong doing; withdrawal of love; covert threat of ostracism.

Whiting and Child (1953) found strong relationship between high guilt and love-oriented methods, whereas non-love-oriented methods were associated with low guilt. Heinicke (1953) found high guilt related to frequent use of praise and infrequent use of physical punishment and isolation. Allinsmith and Greening (1955) found that college males who recalled parents (especially mother) as using psychological punishment had significantly higher guilt-over-aggression scores than those who reported corporal punishment predominating. For females, the association was only slight (possibly because the subject of the story they completed in the projective test of guilt was male). Sears, Maccoby and Levin (1957) found a positive relation between love-oriented methods and signs of guilt. Aronfreed (1959) found that subjects exhibiting internally motivated, self-corrective action after transgression were significantly

associated with parental use of 'induction' techniques. On the other hand, he found parental use of predominantly extinction techniques to be associated with subjects manifesting passive, externally motivated moral action in reaction to their transgression.

Sears, Maccoby and Levin (1957) report an important study relating signs of guilt (e.g., post-transgressional proneness to emotional upset and to making confession) to parental techniques of discipline (i.e., physical versus psychological). Taking the sample as a whole, there was a small but significantly greater tendency for parents using psychological discipline to have children with strong consciences. However, taking only the children giving evidence of strong consciences (24% of the sample), the significance was much more dramatic; 32% of parents of strong-conscienced children generally tended to use physical methods, while a full 68% employed psychological methods.

Again taking the entire sample as a whole, there was no correlation between withdrawal of love and signs of conscience. But taking the mothers who evidenced warmth in their relationship to the children (in contrast to hostile mothers) there was a strong positive correlation between discipline by love-withdrawal and strong consciences.

Commenting on this study, Brown (1965) concludes:

> Punishment fails to produce a generally strong conscience and fails also to check the particular form of wrongdoing [aggressions] against which it is most often directed. (p. 387)

and . . .

> Warmth as a rule and withdrawal of love for wrongdoing seem to create conscience. (p. 386)

LeVine (1961) replicated this finding that remorse after transgression is related positively to love-withdrawal only when warm mothers are considered. He found further, however, that the best predictor of confessing and remorse was the use of reasoning. Again, he found that mothers who continued discipline (e.g., withdrawal of love) until the child verbalized repentance related to the child's typically confessing wrong doing and experiencing remorse.

By means of a moral judgment measure (see e.g., Kohlberg, 1958), Hoffman and Saltzstein (1960) categorized seventh-graders into a) externally motivated and b) internally motivated. Typically, reaction of the former to transgression depended on threat or fear of detection, whereas among the latter, it was quite independent of such fears but seemed rather to rise out of internal standards of their own. Significant findings included:

1) internally motivated boys reported parents permissive in discipline; mothers less used assertion of power to influence behavior; more used emphasis upon painful consequences to parents of the child's action;
2) internally motivated girls reported mothers threatening to have fathers discipline, and fathers using rational appeal.

Incidentally, they found that even their internalized subjects actually fell into two differentiated groups which they described as a) a conventionally punitive orientation, and b) a humanistic orientation. The former seemed largely to repress impulses to transgress and did not actually have to face conflicts. The latter, on the other hand, evidenced relatively more guilt than the conventional subjects when the consequences involved human life or were irreversible. For relatively minor transgressions they more readily resolved their guilt by confession and reparation. Moreover, they were better able to contemplate forbidden behavior before rejecting it. These 'humanistically oriented' subjects--as Hoffman and Saltzstein dubbed them--even less reported parental punitiveness. An even later study (to be examined below) expands yet further on these findings.

Unger (1962) attempted to refine the distinctions relating to influences contributing to guilt-after-transgression. He found that the major influence on guilt scores of a sample of sixth-grade children was the degree of parental warmth. Children of parents high in warmth had significantly higher guilt scores than did children of parents low in warmth (hostile). Furthermore,

1) For mothers low in warmth, use of psychological discipline related to children with high guilt scores significantly more than did use of physical discipline.

2) For mothers high in warmth, there was an effect in the same direction, but it was not significant.

3) For fathers high in warmth the effect of psychological discipline towards high guilt scores was significant.

4) For fathers low in warmth the type of discipline had no effect. In fact, where fathers were low in warmth (hostile) there was little evidence of conscience in their children regardless either of father's type of discipline or of mother's warmth.

5) Highest guilt scores were associated with both parents' being warm and both using psychological discipline.

Basic psychoanalytic interpretation of the evidence. Psychoanalytic theorists would variously have interpreted all of these data as indicating that children will 'internalize' either . . .

1) qualities of the parent(s) posing threat, in the hopes of thereby lessening the threat of his aggression--in defense against the anxiety aroused by experience and expectation of aggression; or

2) qualities of the parent(s) perceived as a source of treasured warmth and conditional positive regard but not as a threat of aggression, in the

> hope of thereby retaining that regard--in defense against the anxiety aroused by the threat of losing treasured warmth and positive regard.

It appears rather clear that the attempt to account for moralization through identification as "defense-against-aggression" has not been consistently supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, identification as "defense-against-loss-of-love" functions significantly only in the context of interaction between psychological methods of discipline and parental warmth. Kohlberg (1963b) alternatively postulates that guilt reactions in such a warm environment are more a matter of approval and forgiveness seeking or maintaining, than of unconscious, defensive internalization. He would see the latter interaction as an invitation to imitation of selected qualities rather than any incorporation of the parent such as envisioned by psychoanalytic theory.

To whatever degree, however, the acquisition of morality is to be accounted for by ingestive internalization predicated either upon defense-against-aggression or upon defense-against-loss-of-love, there is particular relevance in studies investigating or correlating differential acquisition of conscience with

1) Oedipal conflict,
2) castration anxiety,
3) differential parental warmth and positive regard
4) parental aggression.

There is a rather obvious problem here in that if Son identifies with the source of threat to his monopoly of Mother's love, then it is clear that he will primarily incorporate qualities of Father, including his masculinity. If on the other hand, he identifies with the source of cherished warmth and affection, then Oedipal conflict theory would have him primarily incorporating qualities of Mother. Heads I win, tails you lose!

Brown (1965) has proposed resolving the problem simply by recognizing that both dynamics function from situation to situation and that identification actually occurs from more than one prompting. Basically he suggests that development of sexual role identity is largely to be accounted for by the ego's envy of the success or authority or attributes of another person and its wish to participate in them. On the other hand, he suggests that moral standards having nothing to do with the sex role (e.g., honesty) derive from the ego's seeing itself as similar to some other person. And it very well might be that identification does indeed occur on occasion when the ego perceives itself threatened by aggression and incorporates the aggressor's qualities by way of defense against the threat.

In this connection, Hoffman (1962) has significantly drawn attention to the fact that a child may be highly motivated to emulate a parent in some areas (e.g., sexual identity, vocational preferences, etc.) but not at all in

the area of moral values. High degree of identification need not indicate strong conscience.

If an ingestion model really accounts for the acquisition of morality, it would be reflected in a quite general internalization of the other's identity. Empirical evidence appears more to support a highly selective model for identification--indeed, a digestive, rather than an ingestive model.

Another approach to resolving conflicting theories and seemingly conflicting evidence relating parental discipline to acquisition of morality has emerged from a combining of evidence from several contemporary studies (Whiting, 1960; Mussen and Distler, 1959; Mussen, Conger and Kagan, 1963, and Bandura, Ross and Ross, 1963). This approach, while having to do with identification, actually is more closely allied to social learning theories and so will be examined in that section of this review. It is sufficient here to mention that the evidence is interpreted as showing that the dynamics of identification have primarily to do with "envy" of social power. An individual tends to identify with the one who controls access to resources which he values.

Becker's analysis of evidence. There is, however, still another contemporary analysis of the effects of parental discipline upon learning by identification that seems to fit here. It moreover seems to merit a comparatively extensive treatment. Reference is to the Becker study (1964) previously cited.

Becker has attempted to tie together the many studies --some of which have already here been cited, others of which are here yet to be reviewed--concerning the socializing effects of the various techniques of parental discipline. To do so, he has done extensive factor analyses of variables pertaining both to discipline and to other aspects of parent behavior. His findings point out that in order to reconcile the many studies in this area it is important to consider at least three general dimensions in looking at the data. The three dimensions emerging from his factor analyses are:

1) permissiveness versus restrictiveness,
2) warmth versus hostility, and
3) calm detachment versus anxious emotional involvement.

Thus, the socializing (and moralizing) effects of permissive discipline--or of restrictive discipline--vary according to whether there is a context of warmth or of hostility. They vary further according to whether the context is one of calm detachment or of anxious emotional involvement. Figure 3 (p. 101) affords a graphic representation of the basic interaction effects that emerge.

	RESTRICTIVENESS	PERMISSIVENESS
CALM DE-TACHMENT	organized effective	democratic
	rigid controlling	neglecting
EMOTIONAL ANXIOUS INVOLVEMENT	overprotective	indulgent
	authoritarian hostile--neurotic	anxious neurotic

Fig. 3. Interactions Among Disciplinary Techniques

Becker found little direct data relating the third dimension to disciplinary practices. There was direct evidence, however, regarding interaction among the variables on the restrictiveness-permissiveness and warmth-hostility variables. In the light of this evidence, he concludes . . .

> Actually, as we interpret the research, some of the more interesting implications occur when the effects of restrictiveness versus permissiveness are examined in a hostile or warm context, rather than independently of either. (p. 176)

Typically over the recent decades, battle lines have been drawn between proponents of restrictiveness and proponents of permissiveness. And conflicting evidence and case histories have abounded, confounding the debate. Becker, however, contends that the determining dimension is not

restrictiveness versus permissiveness, but warmth versus hostility, along with the disciplinary methods that tend to be employed in association with each. Thus, his summary of evidence shows that hostile parents tend significantly to employ 'power-assertive' techniques of discipline (especially including physical punishment and verbal assault). On the other hand, warm parents tend to use love oriented techniques. In fact, he draws attention to a remarkable problem: there simply are not enough warm parents relying on physical punishment to measure the effect of that interaction with any reliability. As it is, physical punishment is employed significantly more by hostile than by warm parents.

In regard to fostering internalized conscience, Becker's conclusions (p. 189) suggest that:

1) Power assertive techniques of discipline employed by hostile parents tend to promote in children
   a) externalized reactions to transgression
   b) uninhibited aggression
   3) resistance to authority
2) Love oriented techniques used by warm parents tend to promote in children
   a) guilt and related internalized reactions to transgression
   b) acceptance of self-responsibility

Additional evidence and analysis. Hoffman (1970) has clearly been influenced by the work of Kohlberg (e.g., 1963b, 1968a, etc.). On the other hand, he has attempted to retain much of the theoretical and empirical framework of earlier researchers. He provides, thus, something of a bridge between the two viewpoints.

The research reviewed and produced by Hoffman as well as by Kohlberg indicates quite clearly that there are individuals--both child and adult--whose moral orientation is based entirely or very largely upon fear of external detection and punishment or upon expectation of imminent reward or gratification externally produced. These individuals would be designated by Kohlberg as "preconventional." He would contend that--if children--they are simply functioning at more advanced or adequate stages, while--if adults--development has somehow been frustrated.

Then again, the data just as clearly indicate that there are other individuals whose moral orientation is not currently dependent upon external sanctions and imminent rewards. These would be distinguished by Kohlberg into the "conventional" and the "principled." He would hold that both categories had necessarily passed through the "preconventional" stages, but that their cognitive-moral development had been so stimulated that their orientation is internal rather than external.

Rather than designating individuals as preconventional, conventional, or principled, Hoffman (e.g., 1970) has retained the more traditional designations of "externally oriented" (essentially comparable to Kohlberg's preconventional) and "internally oriented" (generally comparable to the conventional and principled levels combined). At the same time, Hoffman's work has led him also to distinguish two distinct types of moral structure among the internally oriented: a) one which stresses adherence to institutional norms of society regardless both of circumstances and of 'the other'; and b) one which is congenial to institutional norms, but places greater value on human concerns and is thus more responsive to extenuating circumstances. The former type of internal orientation he designates "conventional," and the latter, "humanistic." Clearly, these sub-groups among his internally oriented subjects correspond at least roughly with Kohlberg's "conventional" and "principled" levels.

A considerable portion of Hoffman's research has sought to pinpoint familial antecedents related to the several types of moral orientation and structure. He points out that while psychoanalytic formulations have in the superego suggested an accounting for internal orientations, they have postulated a process that operates essentially outside of conscious awareness. The superego does not thus satisfactorily account for the humanistic or principled

orientations that seem so clearly to be conscious and cognitive processes. Hoffman further contends that 'ego psychology' (e.g., Stein, 1966) does little better in explaining what it is that "makes the individual utilize his ego capacities for prosocial rather than antisocial ends" (Hoffman, 1970, p. 93).

As noted below, Kohlberg has specified the conditions that stimulate individuals of whatever age to movement in the sequence of moral development stages. (It will be remembered that whereas most students of moralization hold that moral structures are ineradicably established very early, Kohlberg holds that they may undergo radical transformations throughout life.) Somewhat in contrast then with Kohlberg, Hoffman has pointed to specific aspects of childhood family experience that correlate with the various moral orientations, including the distinctive "conventional" and "humanistic" types he has distinguished. He clearly suggests that these familial antecedents may themselves be seen as causative of the orientation . . . that the orientations are determined by these antecedents of early childhood and for the most part endure throughout life.

[It seems that Kohlberg might propose that while these familial antecedents may in some cases actually be causative of orientation, they instead may more properly be viewed as causative of a predisposition to 'fixate' at lower stages, however optimal the later stimulation afforded for development. Thus he might ascribe failure to develop a) to

inadequate stimulation at critical points in the developmental sequence, or b) to predisposition to fixate, however adequate the stimulation, arising from early parent-child experience.]

Figure 4 (p. 107) summarizes Hoffman's carefully documented findings from 7th grade children of metropolitan Detroit on familial antecedents of the several types of moral orientation and structure that he has distinguished. The "Consequences-A" column distinguishes between the two types of moral orientation that he labels "external" and "internal." The "Familial Antecedents" column describes the kinds of parent-to-child relationships found to correlate with the two orientations. The "Consequences-B" column, on the other hand, distinguishes between the two types of moral structure that he designates "conventional" and "humanistic," while the "Familial Antecedents" again describe the parent-to-child relationship associated with the two structures.

Hoffman offers the conventional and humanistic as alternative types of orientation. Which type any given individual exhibits would be determined by the antecedents in his particular familial experience. Kohlberg, on the other hand, would contend that whatever the antecedents, the humanistic children could never have become such without first negotiating the external and the conventional orientations. At the same time, their arrival at the humanistic stage could have been significantly slowed or even prevented by

Moral Orientation	Familial Antecedents	Consequences-A	Consequences-B
EXTERNAL	Less..expression of affection induction discipline More..power assertion	Low..guilt confession blame acceptance parent identification	
INTERNAL	More..expression of affection induction discipline Less..power assertion	High.guilt confession blame acceptance parent identification	
Conventional	Much..use of love withdrawal inductions emphasizing harm to parent of behavior of child		More..repressed apt to experience guilt as a result of their own impulse expression than of harm done to others identified with power aspect of parental role
Humanistic	More varied discipline (from permissiveness to power assertion, depending on situation Handling of aggression cushioned by focusing on precipitating issues, suggesting reparation as possible		More..tolerant of immoral impulse apt to experience guilt as a direct result of awareness of consequences of behavior to others identified with personal characteristics of parents

Fig. 4. Antecedents of Moral Orientations

the absence of the kind of stimulation typical of familial environment found to be associated with their orientation.

Relevant to the quest of this study for a specifiable conceptualization of 'moral character,' it is significant here to record some distinctions found by Hoffman between his conventional and humanistic boys. (He suggests that the failure of his study to generate significant data among girls may well be due to his use of measures that failed to be truly appropriate for girls.)

The humanistic boys not only showed more guilt than did the conventional group in situations focused on human need, but also just as much guilt in situations focused on cheating transgressions. The humanistic boys were thus like the conventional in upholding many conventional standards, but were unlike them in being relatively quick to relinquish those standards--not for egocentric interests, but in the service of human needs.

> We would tentatively conclude that the humanistic and conventional boys are two variants of an internalized conscience which differ not so much in the manifest content of moral standards, as in the hierarchical arrangement of these standards and their motivational base. (Hoffman, 1970, p. 105)

The guilt ascribed by humanistic boys to the persons in projective tests tended to stress consequences to others, while commonly taking extenuating circumstances into account. Their own experience of guilt tended to arise as a direct result of awareness of harmful consequences of their

behavior for others, rather than of awareness of their own unacceptable impulses--these they seemed able to tolerate while not implementing them. The conventional boys, by contrast, tended to stress a religious or legal basis for their moral judgments of others, quite disregarding any extenuating circumstances. The evidence was that their own experience of guilt operated in accord with the Freudian notion that guilt stems not so much from the harm done to others as from awareness of and intolerance of their own unacceptable impulses.

> . . . whereas the humanistic conscience is oriented outwardly (toward consequences for others), the conventional conscience is oriented inwardly (toward own impulses). (Hoffman, 1970, pp. 105, 106)

Hoffman summarizes the evidence from his data regarding effect of discipline techniques as follows:

> . . . all discipline techniques have power assertive, love withdrawal, and inductive components. The primary function of the first two is motive arousal and of the last, providing a morally relevant cognitive structure. When degree of arousal is optimal, as we suggest often occurs with the humanistic children, the child attends to and is subject to maximum influence by the cognitive material. That is, focusing his attention on the harm done others as the salient aspect of his transgression helps integrate his capacity for empathy with the knowledge of the human consequences of his own behavior. With too much arousal, as we suggest often occurs with the conventionals, the cognitively relevant material serves primarily as a cue of unacceptable impulse expression, the avoidance of which--rather than consideration of others--then becomes the basis of the child's morality. The parents of the conventional children may thus not only fail to pick up and build

> upon the child's empathic potential, but their frequent withdrawal of love may actually blunt the child's empathic sensitivity, make him less aware of others' feelings, and thus deprive him of the basis for humanistic morality. . . . (Hoffman, 1970, p. 118)

Evaluation of the "Ingestion" approach. According to psychoanalytic theory, then, acquisition of morality is presumed to be equivalent to possessing a strong conscience. A strong and active conscience (i.e., proneness to strong and insistent guilt reaction after transgression) is taken to indicate a high degree of internalization of the rules, standards and values of salient authorities. As has been noted, however, studies seeking to account for such internalization of an ingestive nature have had equivocal results.

Not only is superego-conscience presumed to produce guilt reaction after transgression, however. It is further presumed that it will also inhibit transgression or foster righteousness. Studies have repeatedly shown, however, that any correlation between guilt and resistance to temptation is either . . .

1) very low--Sears, Maccoby and Levin (1957) found a positive but low correlation between proneness to guilt and moral restraint. Hoffman (1962) found the two sometimes but not always correlated. MacKinnon (1938); Unger (1962a); Grinder and McMichael (1963) found that resistors of temptation indicate more and stronger guilt responses. It is important that there is no

evidence here that the direction is not from resistance to stronger guilt rather than the reverse. This is another "heads I win, tails you lose" situation, though: Freudian theory (Freud, (1961/1923) proposes precisely that resistance increases conscience strength. It would appear impossible therefore, to prove anything like priority or causation.

2) nonexistent--Maccoby (1949); W. Allinsmith (1960); Burton, Maccoby and Allinsmith (1961); McMichael and Grinder (1964) all found no relationship between signs of guilt and resistance to temptation. Sears, Rau and Alpert (1966) found all of their subjects, no matter how strong their consciences, finally succumbing to temptation.

3) negative--LeVine (1961) found that stronger guilt correlated with lower moral restraint. In a sample of 4-year-old middle class children studied by Burton, Maccoby and Allinsmith (1961), those yielding to temptation to cheat were reported by their parents as typically predisposed to guilt.

Equally significant is the fact that familial antecedents of guilt proneness and of moral restraint, while often similar, have not always been found to be so. Just as use of physical punishment was often associated with weak internal motivation (see above) so it has been correlated to

failure to inhibit aggression or resist temptation (Glueck and Glueck, 1950 [as well as a variety of other "delinquency studies"]; Sears, Whiting, Nowlis and Sears, 1953; Bandura and Walters, 1959; Hoffman, 1960; B. Allinsmith, 1960).

On the other hand, whereas parental restrictiveness has been found to foster inhibition of impulse and behavior, it has been permissiveness that was more associated with proneness to internally motivated guilt reaction. Among the studies that may be cited in support of the restrictive approach are included Meyers (1944); Sears, Maccoby and Levin (1957); Maccoby (1961); Kagan and Moss (1962). Studies that may be cited in support of the permissive approach include: Watson (1957) [homes that were warm as well as permissive were most likely to have produced internally motivated children, independent of external constraints]; Unger (1962b) [high scores on internal guilt were associated with parental warmth and psychological--generally not highly restrictive--discipline]; Aronfreed (1961) [internally motivated, self-corrective action was associated with "induction discipline," i.e., with focus on reasoning and other psychological techniques; externally motivated posttransgressional action was associated with "sensitization discipline," i.e., with focus on restrictive punitiveness].

Thus, moral restraint probably is not a valid sign of guilt-related ingestive internalization--at least its antecedents do not correlate with those of guilt. Furthermore,

the study of Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) has brought into serious question the whole notion of superego-conscience as the effective agency of moral restraint. As already noted in Chapter II, their evidence demonstrates that . . .

1) the predictability of cheating in one situation from cheating in another was very low;

2) it was not possible to differentiate children into those who cheated and those who did not;

3) decisions to cheat or not to cheat depended very heavily on expediency--i.e., the risk of detection involved and the effort required to cheat;

4) when expediency did not dictate a decision not to cheat, it was largely dictated by factors in the immediate situation such as group approval;

5) decisions to cheat or not to cheat appeared to be little influenced by moral knowledge or values;

6) what values did appear to function appeared to be specific to the socio-economic group to which the child belonged.

On the basis of the evidence from Hartshorne and May, then, the conclusion seems irresistable that resisting incentive to cheat (resisting transgression generally?) was not determined by the disposition of an internal conscience or superego. Instead it appeared to be a function of such situational factors as risk of detection and punishment, weight of incentive, group pressure and values. Kohlberg (1963a) writes:

> The data raise the question as to whether there are any psychological dispositions that can usefully be conceived as "conscience" or "internalized standards" . . . . If there is little consistency from situation to situation involving the same standard, we cannot assume that conforming behavior is determined by the standard and not by situational forces. (p. 285)

Of course, Kohlberg himself goes on to adduce evidence (Grim, Kohlberg and White, 1968; also see Burton, 1963; Nelson, Grinder and Mutterer, 1969) that there is general disposition to be honest. A general disposition to be honest, however, is a long way from the superego of Freudian theory.

Of course, the possibility remains that the data were specific to the sample, and that . . .

1) behavior of other individuals would be less situationally determined; and that

2) the absence of effect from internal forces was due simply to their lack of development at the sample's stage of functioning.

Nevertheless, the existence and functioning of conscience--as Freud conceptualized it--is brought into serious question. The notion that strong conscience will be evidenced by comparably strong resistance to temptation, or that acquisition of moral restraint is to be accounted for in the same way that Freud postulated for acquisition of conscience seems indefensible from the data of studies such as that of Hartshorne and May (1928-1930).

There is a significant aspect of Freudian theory relating to moralization of persons concerning which literature of empirical research is very scarce. Reference here is to Freud's contention that not only does conscience provoke resistance but resisting temptation itself increases strength and severity of conscience. Admittedly this does not seem to fit very neatly into his theory of the origins of superego in defense against threat of aggression or loss of love. Maybe he gets around this by writing (1949) that:

> in the beginning conscience . . . was the cause of instinctual reununciation, but later this relation is reversed. Every renunciation then becomes a dynamic fount of conscience; every fresh abandonment of gratification increases its severity and intolerance. (pp. 113, 114)

The proposition is that the energy from desires (especially of aggression) that are renounced is transferred to the superego-conscience which in turn increases in severity. There is confirmation of sorts in literature previously cited. Individuals who resisted experimental temptations indicated more and stronger guilt responses (MacKinnon, 1938; Unger, 1962a; Grinder and McMichael, 1963).

Freud (1949) argues further that externally imposed deprivation and frustration also serve to moralize persons by energizing the superego:

> As long as things go well with a man, his conscience is lenient and lets the ego do all kinds of things; when some calamity befalls, he holds an inquisition within, discovers his sin, heightens the standards of his conscience, imposes abstinences upon himself and punishes himself with penances. (p. 110)

Brown (1965) adds this comment:

> Can you testify to the truth of this? Have you suffered a serious illness or injury or the death of someone dearly loved? Is Freud's statement true? It seems to me to be a statement that requires no experimental or psychoanalytic data to validate it; most of us find it validated in our own experience. (p. 382)

In summary, then, Freudian theory attempts to account for the moralization of persons . . .

1) by the inception of superego-conscience in the self-punishment that is a response to anxiety over perceived threat of aggression or loss of love;

2) by the 'ingestive' internalization into conscience of the 'whole cloth' of values, standards, demands of the individuals perceived to be the source of such threats;

3) by the energizing of conscience from
   a) renunciation of impulse and/or
   b) externally imposed deprivations.

Empirical confirmation has been rather sketchy at best--much of it fits other theoretical orientations even better (see next section). Signs of guilt do indeed correlate with parental and familial antecedents. But for the most part they do not correlate with the antecedents predicted by the theory. The primary sign of guilt postulated by theory--inhibition of impulse or moral restraint--correlates very poorly or not at all.

On the other hand, reflection upon personal experiences we individually know we have shared suggests that at least some aspects of the theory have a phenomenological fit.

Identification as a Conditioned Role Imitation and Performance

Learning theorists and social group theorists join psychoanalytically oriented theorists in viewing the moralization of persons as essentially a process of learning. Not only so, but they all see the learning as 'identification.' However, as outlined above, psychoanalytic theory conceptualizes the identification as an 'ingestive internalization' which is an individual, innately defensive reaction.

This other group of theorists, in contrast, views identification more as a matter of conditioned imitation and role taking. It is here not so much an innate defensive reaction that is effectual as it is the conditioning power of the social environment, the power of a model to prompt imitation and then so to reinforce the imitative behavior as to produce 'learning.' Moreover, they have led the way in demonstrating that there is much more to acquisition of morality than identification--or at least that it is a far more complex process than conceptualized by Freud.

Furthermore, in contrast to Freudian theory, Hoffman (1962) contends that rather than a child's defensively 'ingesting' the 'whole cloth' of a parent in the form of his whole value or standard system, there is no empirical evidence that he seeks to emulate his parents or anyone else in all respects. He is far more selective in the values and standards that he internalizes.

Wright (1971) distinguishes between the social group and the learning theory approaches to the moralization of persons. But they are combined here because both appear to be largely predicated on the social power of reinforcers. Individual moral functioning is viewed as being acquired in response to the reinforcement provided by social influence. The learning theory approach contributes the basic process --conditioning by reinforcement of responses and operants. The social group approach contributes at least one explanation of the effectualness of that reinforcement which is

particularly meaningful on the human level--the acceptance granted by the group in return for individual compliance with their expectations affords powerful reinforcement by fulfilling an imperatively felt need of the individual.

As Wright points out, there have actually been relatively few studies of the learning of moral behavior as such. On the other hand, there is now an abundance of experimental evidence in the general field of learning. And for learning theorists, behavior is behavior--whether moral, political, sexual, or whatever. For them, moralizing of persons is simply conditioning them to behavior that is moral rather than immoral and amoral. Among many others, Bandura (1969a) gives a rather full account of the present understandings of learning processes. Probably only the very briefest of digests is justified here. The greater consideration must be reserved for empirical studies which have special relevance to moral behavior.

Strictly speaking, of course, for learning theorists there probably is no such thing as moralization of persons. The focus is rather upon moralizing their behavior. The concern is for determining which conditions and reinforcements particularly contribute to behavior that is moral.

An individual's immediate behavior is the product of what experience has 'taught' him is the best way to obtain the reinforcements he momentarily perceives to be desirable and to avoid the reinforcements he perceives to be negative. Repeatedly experiencing the reinforcement conditions him to repetition or avoidance of the eliciting behavior.

The experience does not have to be direct: it may be vicarious. Hence, 'modeling' serves to inform an individual regarding the sources of reinforcement. He may be conditioned not only by his own experience of associating behavior with reinforcement, but by observing another's reinforcement. There seems to be a further logical linkage that may occur also. Thus, according to studies to be specified shortly, the greatest effect of vicarious learning seems to occur from the model who himself has achieved control of resources for reinforcement. In other words, it appears above all to be the control of the resources which is the prize that is sought.

Learning theorists have distinguished between 'responses' and 'operants.' Responses are behaviors emitted in response to stimuli and operants are behaviors emitted to elicit response in the form of reinforcement. Thus a person may 'learn'--be conditioned--consistently to emit a particular behavior whenever he experiences a particular stimulus; and he may learn to emit another behavior whenever he desires a given reinforcement.

Moralizing the individual (again--more properly his behavior, in the view of behaviorists) is essentially a matter of . . .

1) so conditioning his 'operants' that the behavior he emits to elicit desired reinforcement is reliably moral, and

2) so conditioning his responses that the behavior he emits in reaction to external operants may be similarly moral.

Berkowitz's behavioral study of moralization. Berkowitz (1964) has written a major treatment of moral development from the social learning point of view. While sharing with psychoanalytic theory an emphasis on moral learning by identification, his views differ from it in at least three important aspects:

1) He does not subscribe to 'ingestive internalization' concepts--he cites and interprets evidence to indicate that children are highly selective in the values, attitudes, standards and behaviors of others with which they identify themselves.

2) For him, the identification process is more a matter of children's perceiving similarity between others and themselves which prompts them to imitate further the behavior of those similar others.

3) He holds that there is much more to moral development than just identification.

A major proposition in Berkowitz's conceptualization of the moralization process is that variations in learning conditions, especially as differentially encountered by middle- and working-class children account for differences in moral judgment "just as verily" as do developmental factors. In taking this position, he sees himself as taking strong issue

with Piaget (1932), Fromm (1947), and Maslow (1954) along with their colleagues and followers. It is not entirely clear that these theorists would actually consider themselves to be at odds with him in his position. Nevertheless, Berkowitz clearly perceives his position to be at odds with theirs.

In his view, the differences observed in the moralization of several individuals at any given time are not to be accounted for simply on the basis of differential degrees of development (within some limits, this could be a very generalized representation of Piaget's view, however). Those differences, rather, cannot be accounted for apart from the widely differing learning conditions that are experienced by all children, as Berkowitz sees it.

He distinguishes three types of influence which by contributing a wide variability in learning conditions help to account for the differences in morality that are observed from one individual to another.

While religious influences have traditionally been credited with powerful effect on moral development, he discounts the degree to which they--particularly church attendance--themselves determine difference in individual morality. Thus he suggests that while the man who attends church may indeed be more law abiding than the man who does not (although he considers this as far from certain), there is little evidence that it was his religious training or church going that caused him to be more law abiding. For example,

data from Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) admittedly indicate that children who attend Sunday school were generally more inclined not to cheat. But Berkowitz points out that . . .

> Undoubtedly . . . a factor of selection was operating here. Most likely, the children who were placed in Sunday schools by their parents had stronger moral standards to begin with, at least with regard to honesty. Church attendance in itself did not seem to lead to increased honesty; the frequency of Sunday school attendance showed no correlation with the amount of honesty displayed by the children. (1964, p. 65)

A second type of influence Berkowitz distinguishes is that of social class. He contends that Piaget (1932) and Maslow (1954) along with their colleagues fail to ascribe to social class influence upon the developing morality of children the importance which he sees to be demanded by the evidence. Citing support by the sociological studies noted below, he contends that the morality developed by many persons from the lower social strata is heavily influenced by three class-engendered conditions:

1) Serious deprivation in status accompanied by decline in self-esteem engenders a reaction formation of rebellion against middle-class agencies and moral standards (Merton, 1957; Cohen, 1955; Berkowitz, 1962).

2) Prevalence of models affords ever-present opportunities to learn criminal techniques.

3) The support from shared group attitudes and values affords ready reinforcement for antisocial inclination and predispositions (Clark and Wenninger,

1962; Berkowitz, 1962; Glueck and Glueck, 1950). However, referring to the Glueck study, along with studies by himself and by Weiss and Fine (as cited in Berkowitz, 1962), he emphasizes that the influence of association with law-breakers is a function of the initial inclinations of the individual. In harmony with much of common sense, he suggests that we generally "take over most readily those beliefs and values which are consistent with our own initial inclinations" (1964, p. 70). He supports this notion with evidence from a laboratory experiment with college students. It was shown that those of them who had been previously angered by deliberate frustration readily adopted the aggressive beliefs expressed by a communicator. On the contrary, however, subjects whose inclinations had not been thus conditioned by anger failed to accept the aggressive communications. He proposes that . . .

> A similar process is undoubtedly at work in the formation of delinquent cultures. . . . Young offenders reject values which are inconsistent with their aggressive desires and readily adopt other values which support such desires and permit them free expression. (p. 70)

More specifically, he points to statistics of higher crime rates among city working classes (see e.g., Glueck and Glueck, 1950) and refuses to let it be explained away. He contends (Berkowitz, 1964, pp. 66, 67), rather, that three factors contribute largely to the particular type of morality

which tends to develop in a Chicago gangland "concentrated in a social-twilight zone of factories, deteriorated housing, poverty, and cultural change":

1) Frequent economic and social frustrations leading to anti-social aggressive behavior;

2) Class-engendered conditions interfering with the development of conventional moral standards;

3) Parental treatment (as culturally patterned by socio-economic class factors).

Berkowitz joins most other students of moral development in ascribing far and away the most power to parental influences. Even the power he attributes to social class influences he largely sees as being mediated through parents. (It seems remarkable, in fact, that he does not more acknowledge to religious influences a similar indirect power upon a child's developing morality through the mediation of parents.)

From his own studies as well as his review of studies by others, Berkowitz concludes that a cohesive family, bound together by ties of affection, counters delinquent neighborhood, socio-economic class, and peer influences in at least three important ways:

1) Not being exposed to frequent and severe frustrations minimizes the degree to which youngsters have strong aggressive urges and to which they are drawn to groups encouraging expression of hostility.

2) Parents' treatment "undoubtedly" affects the self-concept of youngsters so as to influence the degree to which they see themselves as law

abiding, and to which they are insulated from recourse to criminal elements for reinforcement.

3) Being identified as potent resources of reinforcement empowers parents for explicitly and implicitly teaching or conditioning the child to engage in or to avoid socially disapproved behavior.

As previously noted, among the factors which have been perceived as contributing greatly to the power of parents to stimulate and fashion the learning of a child is the widely acknowledged human tendency toward 'identification.' Berkowitz briefly cites the following distinctive explanations that have been proposed as conditions that enhance the parental influence, and cites strong evidence to sustain his preferential support for the concluding one:

1) The widely accepted 'identification-as-defensive-process' view (psychoanalytically oriented) wherein a child attempts to be like--or even be--the parent in order to reduce anxiety either . . .

   a) from fear of being punished (more specifically, castrated)--i.e., 'identification with the aggressor'; or

   b) from fear of losing the parents' love--i.e., 'anaclitic identification.'

   To support preference of b) over a), Berkowitz cites a Payne and Mussen (1956) study in which father-identified high school boys not only

described their family life as relatively happy, but regarded their fathers as rewarders rather than punishers.

2) The 'status envy' analysis proposed by Whiting (1960) to explain data he found, suggesting that a child will attempt to emulate the person who enjoys resources that he [the child] values highly when he is deprived of these resources.

3) The 'social power' thesis of Mussen and Distler (1959), and Mussen, Conger and Kagan (1963): the child imitates whoever (usually one or both parents) controls the goals that the child desires. In defense of his conclusions supporting this power thesis, Berkowitz cites a Bandura, Ross and Ross (1963) experiment. This study compared the imitating behavior of children in two conditions. Each condition consisted of three-person groups composed of a male and a female adult, and a child. In the first condition, one adult was "resource controller," controlling access to desirable toys; the controller allowed the other adult to be "resource consumer," while the child observed. In the second condition, while one adult continued to control the source of reinforcement, the child was allowed to be the "resource consumer," and the second adult observed. Subsequently, each of the adults

exhibited certain behaviors and the extent to which the child imitated one or the other was recorded. In harmony with social power theory, the children in both conditions imitated the "resource controller" with significantly more frequency. This was directly contrary to . . .

a) 'status envy theory' which predicts imitation of the resource consumer;

b) 'secondary reinforcement theory' espoused by most learning theorists which predicts imitation by the one reinforced.

As noted above, Berkowitz attributes much of what might by some be called 'imitative identification' to 'learning outcomes' fostered by varying methods of parental discipline. He ascribes much of the effect of disciplinary method more specifically to modeling effects, however. Methods of parental discipline especially provide models for their children to copy (Sears et al., 1957). In this connection he cites studies such as these:

1) Bandura and Walters (1959). Fathers of aggressively antisocial teenagers tended themselves to be hostile and punitive; hence the boys may have been modeling themselves after their fathers.

2) Bandura study cited in Berkowitz (1962). Survey showed no difference in frustration and emotional thwartings at home between a) aggressive,

frequently hostile non-delinquents, and b) similarly aggressive and hostile delinquents. But the delinquents tended significantly to have aggressive parents who also more frequently rewarded boys' outside-of-home aggression.

3) B. Allinsmith (1960). Boys showing strong restraint against hostility on projective test generally had emotionally controlled mothers; less inhibited boys had less controlled mothers.

Berkowitz cautions, however, that it must be remembered that the power of modeling to affect behavior has limits. As Bandura et al., (1963) demonstrated, it is the adults who command access to desired goals and resources whom a child imitates.

Thus, the child's moral growth clearly is differentially affected by his warmth providers, his frustraters, his rewarders, his punishers, his models. Berkowitz just might be inclined to declare Quod Erad Demonstrandum!

> Contrary to the views promulgated by the theorists of self-actualization, we certainly have no evidence that a child will necessarily grow up to be a moral, responsible citizen, even though he be never frustrated (p. 84) . . .

without the intervening influence of all these agencies.

As already noted, Berkowitz and other social learning theorists are not at all prepared to go as far as psychoanalytic writers in attributing to identification the major role in moralization of persons. Thus, their emphasis actually turns from a) consideration of the conditions

fostering imitative identification, to b) preoccupation with the conditioning influence of parental discipline upon children's moral behavior.

It is here submitted and subsequently to be developed that this difference in view may be due to a rather common failure of both groups. Both, it seems, fail to recognize the 'cognitive recycling' to which children subject external standards and other persons' values before ever they internalize them, before ever they become in any way their own. Be that as it may, drawing on the data from studies relating to parental disciplinary practices suggests several insights regarding the differential effectiveness of various of those practices for conditioning children to moral behavior.

'Learning' of moral restraint. It has previously been observed that psychoanalytic theory seeks on the basis of conscience to account not only for post-transgressional reaction, but also for the resisting of temptation. Transgression is inhibited by conscience out of distaste for the guilt threatened by prospects of transgressing. And the origins of conscience are said to be found in defensive identification.

Learning theory, on the other hand, would contend that both post-transgressional self-punishment and pre-transgressional moral restraint are simply behaviors which are learned in the same way all other behavior is 'learned.' Having preconditioned an individual to anticipate negative

reinforcement for certain operants, conditioning experiences (i.e., social learning) simply incline him to avoid that behavior.

Moral restraint is necessary, of course, for maintaining consistently moral behavior. Much of the study of antecedents to moral restraint has been prompted by learning theory considerations. For that matter, all such study of antecedents can be useful for evaluating learning theory constructs.

The findings of Sears et al., (1957) clearly suggest that the disciplinary practices which most tend to condition children to maintain consistency in moral behavior are psychological--as opposed to physical. Or in the language of Whiting and Child (1953), they are love oriented in contrast to non-love oriented. Psychological (or love oriented) methods rely on a subtle emotional manipulation rather than on power assertion (Becker, 1965). They begin by customarily reinforcing by the giving of love (e.g., by giving affection or praise), and then punishing by withdrawal of that love, manifesting hurt or disappointment, or reasoning with an offending child to explain how his behavior is not correct. By contrast, physical or non-love oriented punishments are essentially power assertive and include spanking, deprivation of privileges, and imposition of consequences not intrinsic to the behavior.

Berkowitz suggests two factors to account for the fact that psychological discipline fosters the growth of strong moral values significantly more than does physical discipline.

1) As a frustration, physical punishment engenders hostility in the punished, and he well may reject the values of his disliked punisher. Any acceding to the punisher's wishes is likely to be only from fear and will cease in the absence of the punisher. (A Burton, Maccoby, and Allinsmith [1961] study suggests that if the physical punishment has rather invariably occurred with every offense, or if a child is so young as not to perceive that he might get away with offending, anticipation of punishment may maintain honest behavior even in the absence of the punisher. But Berkowitz emphasizes that this must be distinguished from possession of strong moral values of one's own.)

2) Love oriented methods foster conditions in which children are most likely to want a) to do what parents call for, and b) to take over their values.

The evidence he cites to support his conclusions comes from studies that correlated familial antecedents with measures of moral experience. These measures have been sometimes projective, sometimes experimental. Among the studies using projective measures are the following:

1) Whiting and Child (1953). Thirty-five different societies were compared, differentiating them as to a) great use of love oriented methods, and

b) little use. In those using the former, there was exhibited significantly more experience of personal guilt. (The presumption here is that experience of guilt relates to strong conscience.)

2) MacKinnon (1938). Cheating college students significantly more reported fathers who had used physical rather than psychological discipline.

3) Sears, Maccoby and Levin (1957). There was significant relationship between mother's use of withdrawal-of-love methods and strong child conscience, but only for those who regularly were relatively warm with their children. Withdrawing love where little existed proved to be meaningless.

4) Bandura and Walters (1959). Investigators interviewed parents with teenage boys (a who were in trouble with the law for aggressively antisocial offenses, and b) who were law abiding. Parents of the former were found to have been significantly more likely to use physical punishment and privilege deprivation than reasoning.

5) Hoffman (1960). Children of parents relying on physical discipline were found to have children who displayed overt hostility in school groups significantly more than did those using psychological discipline.

6) W. Allinsmith (1960). Use of physical discipline related to weak inhibitions against aggression in projective story completion tests significantly more than did use of psychological discipline.

Experimental tests to measure individual moral restraint or resistance to temptation have largely related to cheating. That is, situations have been variously contrived so that subjects were afforded opportunity and incentive to cheat while threat of detection and penalty was apparently minimal. Differential in cheating behavior by individuals was then taken to be a measure of resistance to temptation. Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) devised a number of tests that have been widely copied and elaborated upon.

Grinder (1961) reports a study in which he used a typical example of this kind of temptation-to-cheat test. He used a ray gun game in which subjects shot at a target for points, and were given attractive prizes if they could achieve a specified score. The game, however, was rigged so that in order to achieve that score it was imperative that the subject cheat. At a point in the game, the experimenter left the subject, permitting him to keep his own score. Resisters and yielders were thus revealed. Typically, such measures have been used to distinguish honest subjects from dishonest. Then by interview or some other means, parental practices and attitudes in a wide variety of aspects are determined. Finally, the two groups are statistically compared to discover correlations that may emerge.

Burton, Maccoby and Allinsmith (1961) attempted to distinguish between honest and dishonest children with such an experimental test. When they attempted to correlate these findings with information from parental interviews, they found very few parental behaviors that discriminate between those who could be expected to yield, and those who could be expected to resist temptation to cheat.

Figuring prominently among the conditions not discriminating between the honest and the dishonest was maternal warmth and affection. This very same non-correlation was also found in the two studies to be reported immediately following. Probably it remains indisputable that maternal influence is crucial to moral growth. However, in the samples, the actual variability across mothers in attitude and relationship toward their children was low. It therefore did not show up as a significant factor in producing the differences to be observed in moral behavior. Becker (1964) gives evidence showing that openly hostile mothers do indeed have a significant influence in the aggressive behavior of their children.

Significant correlations that were found in the Burton et al. study include:

1) Honest boys were related to a) delayed success in bowel training and strict weaning; b) relaxed maternal attitudes over general cleanliness; c) less maternal use of reasoning, more use of physical punishment.

2) Honest girls were related to a) delayed success in dryness training; b) maternal use of scolding and physical punishment, little use of reasoning.

As already mentioned, Grinder's (1962) study found no significant relationship between maternal affection and moral restraint. But . . .

1) temptation-resisting boys coincided significantly with a) delayed success in bowel training; b) high maternal demand for neatness; and c) there was no relationship to distinctions in methods of discipline.

2) honest girls coincided with a) early success in bowel training; b) high maternal pressure against masturbation.

A third such study is reported by Sears, Rau and Alpert (1966). Again, there was no significant relationship found between maternal attitudes and treatment and moral restraint in the children. Unlike the first two studies above, however, this one included a measure of paternal behavior. Correlations included:

1) Honest boys were relatively close to fathers and distant from mothers; fathers were ambivalent--while normally strongly attached, occasionally somewhat hostile.

2) Honest girls had fathers who were relatively distant, critical; mothers were more responsive and used reasoning.

It is noteworthy that with all of the many variables in parental behavior considered, the only ones correlating significantly with experimentally tested moral restraint were those indicated. It seems inescapable, thus, that the findings are both somewhat contradictory and, especially, not particularly meaningful.

This, then, has been a rather extensive review of the evidence and its interpretation that Berkowitz has adduced with regard to moral behavior as a product of . . .

1) reinforcement learning,

2) imitative learning and conditions fostering it,

3) learning of moral restraint and its antecedents.

Further consideration of 'moralization' as 'learning of moral behavior.' A failure of most experimental tests such as described above has been that they did not control for unequal achievement motivation. Nevertheless they have the special advantage of . . .

> clearly separating those who transgress from those who do not and of controlling the conditions under which transgression occurs. (Wright, 1971, p. 66)

On the other hand, for ethical reasons, they have the rather obvious limitation of sampling only minor misbehaviors. Alternatively, then, researchers have used questionnaires and interviews for surveys. Thereby they have sought self-reports regarding whether and how often subjects have engaged in whatever behavior they may be investigating. Or they have sought self-reports from parents regarding their child-rearing practices as well as their evaluation of the resisting behavior of the children.

Two very obvious shortcomings of the survey noted repeatedly by researchers include the selective effects of memory, and the question as to whether subjects in interviews regularly judge the many actions mentioned in surveys to be wrong. Wright (1971), however, has defended the value of self-reports for studying moral behavior. He points to the obvious effort to remove incentives to false report by emphasizing anonymity and the research purpose of the survey. Furthermore, he refers to two areas of evidence:

1) Christendom (1938) and Brogden (1940) give data that suggest that people who say they do, or would, cheat are actually more likely to do so when tested.

2) Clark and Tiffts(1966) evidence attests that when people are interviewed twice they tend very much to stick to their original admissions.

Whether self-report survey or experimental measure, the relevance here has to do with what is revealed regarding the conditions that foster or are antecedent to consistently moral behavior, of course.

A remarkable finding of a number of surveys is the scarcity of individuals whose behavior can justifiably be considered consistently moral. The surveys indicate an unexpectedly high proportion of subjects who admit to behavior which, were they apprehended, would involve them in serious consequences. In Gibson's (1967) sample of elementary school boys, approximately fifty percent admitted behavior·

that, had it been detected, would have resulted in their being labeled 'delinquent.' The number of students in samples taken in 1966 from a number of American universities who admitted cheating on examinations ranged from one third up to over a half (Harp and Taietz, 1966). Crane (1958) found that all of the males in a sample of teachers-to-be admitted that they had been members of gangs that at one time or another had broken the law. Similar unexpectedly high acknowledgement of antisocial behavior is reported in European studies (Elmhorn, 1965; Malewska and Muszynski, 1970).

It probably cannot be denied that, as Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) and others have demonstrated, most children cheat at one time or another. The survey findings above serve to confirm the idea that consistently moral behavior in an individual is extremely uncommon. Nevertheless, Nye and Short (1957) report findings that raise an important possibility. They have shown that subjects who admit antisocial behavior of a relatively serious nature almost always admit to a number of behaviors on the inventory of a more trivial nature. At the same time, there were those who admitted the trivial offenses but not the more serious ones.

Thus it may not be especially meaningful to attempt to differentiate a category of children whose behavior is consistently or invariably moral. However there does seem to be a scale on which they can be located according to the seriousness of the antisocial acts they are prepared to commit. Some are consistently not likely to commit seriously antisocial acts.

The theoretically based assumption is that consistently moral behavior is the product of learning by selective imitation; that the differential in moral behavior exhibited by individuals is a product of the imitative identification which their conditioning has provided for. If this be the case, then the question becomes: What are the conditions that have proved to be so reinforcing as to govern the differentiation made among the models available for imitating?

Nye (1958) describes the findings of a survey comparing parent reports of a) their rearing practices with their children, and of b) their evaluation of their children's moral restraint. While it appears indisputable that complete absence of warmth in a mother is influential, the data from the survey sample confirm the findings of the experimental studies described above. They reveal no variance in moral restraint associated with variance in maternal love. Variation in mother love--beyond what may have been an essential minimum of it--had no effect. The data also showed that while 'brokenness' as such was actually inconsequential, significant effects were found due to variable attachment among members of the extant family . . . the "general cohesiveness" of the family was a significant variable. Again, whereas specific discipline measures did not seem to matter, the example of the father did, especially his fairness (or lack of it). Indeed, as far as antisocial behavior

was concerned, the father's influence was again shown to be a more critical variable than the mother's.

Nye's findings serve to emphasize a point that has seemed to emerge from studies regarding familial environments and morality of children: it is not so much the absence of a father or mother that affects the behavior and personal morality of the child as it is the emotional climate or cohesiveness among the family members actually present.

Another area of Nye's inventory touched on the relationship between religious affiliation or commitment and admitted antisocial behavior. Religious commitment has commonly been promoted as an effective agency for inhibiting antisocial behavior. Nye found that those who attended church irregularly and those who did not attend at all did not significantly differ. However, those who attended regularly admitted to significantly less antisocial behavior. Moreover, what made the difference appeared not to be early training, because length of time attending had no statistical effect. However, it was current involvement that made the difference. On the other hand, McDonald (1969) as well as Middleton and Putney (1962) found no such association, possibly because their inventory items were all less serious than some of Nye's. Wright (1971) offers the tentative conclusion that . . .

> high, current commitment to a religious group may reduce the incidence of serious antisocial acts, but . . . it has no influence over the occurrence of milder delinquencies. (p. 70)

The Nye study involved antisocial behavior. Middleton and Putney (1962) have drawn a distinction between antisocial and antiascetic behavior which has been followed by a number of other researchers. Antiascetic behaviors are differentiated as being forms of self-indulgence which have consequences felt mainly by those who engage in them. Typical are many 'victimless crimes' including certain sexual behaviors, some drug use, etc. The distinction, while often slippery, has proved useful in distinguishing variables relating to response to temptation. Significant variance has been found between response to temptation to antisocial behavior and response to temptation to antiascetic behavior. Quite possibly this reflects a less pervasive generality in ascribing wrongness to various antiascetic behaviors in comparison to a fairly general condemnation of most antisocial behavior.

Schofield (1965) reports findings in a survey comparing home conditions with antiascetic behavior. Actually he found that incidence of antiascetic behavior correlated with incidence of antisocial behavior. There was no correlation between broken homes and antiascetic behavior . . . there was as much incidence associated with intact as with broken homes. But there was significant correlation between antiascetic behavior and a) low family cohesion, and b) rejection of parental values in identification with the peer group. Schofield found that family relations were more important for girls than for boys.

Wright's conclusions drawn from his summary of evidence are that . . .

> early family life is important for moral behavior less because of its shaping influence upon the individual's personality than because it lays the foundation of family cohesion later on. . . . the evidence points to the importance of attachment and parental control as contemporaneous rather than antecedent conditions. . . .
>
> . . . If parents have little interest in their child, and tend to be cool and rejecting towards him, then he will seek compensatory attachment in his peer groups. If the norms of these groups permit delinquent and "immoral" sexual behavior then he can be expected to engage in it. (Wright, 1971, pp. 73-75)

Certain factors of learning that have to do with timing have some highly significant implications for the acquisition of morality.

The fundamental postulate of learning theory is that reinforcement conditions the individual to repeat behaviors associated with positive outcome or reward and to avoid those associated with negative outcomes or punishment. The repetition or extinction of the behavior has not been found to follow in simple or direct relationship, however.

In an experiment with puppies, Solomon, Turner and Lessac (1968) demonstrated that the conditioning effect of punishment just before they ate some forbidden food was different from the effect of punishment just after. On subsequent occasions when the puppies were left alone in a room with the forbidden food, the former group held out against impulse longer, but once they had yielded, they showed few signs of guilt-anxiety. On the contrary, the group punished

after transgression gave in comparatively quickly and then displayed all the signs of guilt common to puppies.

The obvious implications are that . . .

1) the antecedents for post-transgressional guilt and for resistance to temptation are different, while the strong conscience is not necessarily correlated with the moral restraint; and

2) if the primary objective is behavior that is consistently moral (as opposed to strong post-transgressional reaction), that punishment is most effective which somehow coincides most immediately with or even precedes the actual transgression. [The writer is reminded of the almost incredible story told him as a small child about the family life of a young friend: according to report, the parents gave the friend a weekly spanking whether or not he had been naughty; and of course, his exemplary behavior was attributed to that fact!]

Aronfreed and Reber (1965) and Walters, Parke and Cane (1965) have replicated these findings in experiments with children. Of course, as Wright (1971) observed, in the normal family, the effects are complicated by the fact that parents reason with their children. Thus, whether a child will associate punishment with stealing from his mother's purse or with the sight of and touching of the purse will depend much on the verbal communications accompanying the punishment.

In addition to considerations of timing the reward to particular aspects of the behavior situation, there are theoretical considerations that make it clear that the quickest learning occurs when every occasion of the desired behavior (as well as 'successive approximations' to it) is rewarded. But the same considerations indicate that a consistently rewarded behavior will quickly extinguish if the reward ceases. On the other hand, if uncertainty along with expectation are fostered by intermittent or occasional reward, then the learning tends to be more stable and permanent, though the learning will take longer. At the same time, there is the risk that it may not occur at all.

Although the notion that making reward occasional, rather than invariable, will contribute to longer-lasting moral response makes sense, there has been little if any experimental confirmation of it. Instead, the studies relating intermittent reinforcement to moral behavior have focused almost exclusively on inconsistency in its various forms. Glueck and Glueck (1950), McCord, McCord and Zola (1959), Bandura and Walters (1959) and other students of delinquency have repeatedly found that inconsistent or erratic discipline (both within and between parents) is very closely related to antisocial behavior. Read (1945) and McCord, McCord and Howard (1961) found evidence suggesting that inconsistency between parents (as opposed to both being either restrictive/punitive or permissive/nonpunitive) contributed to boys exhibiting unfavorable behavior or being antisocially aggressive.

Furthermore, the period of restrictiveness in a child's life has been shown to be significantly related to morality of behavior. The unique Fels longitudinal study reported by Kagan and Moss (1962) contributes some highly significant additions to understanding of conditions affecting consistency in moral behavior. A measure of maternal restrictiveness was determined for three age periods of the subjects--birth to three, three to six, and six to ten. (Restrictiveness was defined as the degree to which the mother attempted to force the child, through punishment and threat, to adhere to her standards and the degree to which deviations were punished.) The subjects were then rated on a wide variety of behaviors for the same three periods as well as for the periods of ten to fourteen, and of adulthood.

Whatever the degree of maternal restrictiveness during the early period, it tended to persist throughout the other period for girls, but was not related to later periods for boys. Presumably the consistency with girls serves to account for a significant effect for the early restrictiveness measure in a wide range of their behaviors.

For boys, a maternal consistency began with the periods from three onwards--that is, whatever the mothers were between three and six, they tended to continue to be through ten. Strictness in these later periods, however, was highly associated with maternal hostility--for both boys and girls. This latter association was not significantly found during the early period, but when early restrictiveness was present,

it had comparatively permanent inhibiting effects on both boys and girls. These children whose mothers were restrictive in the earliest period proved later to be less aggressive, less competitive and dominant with associates, showed less mastery of their own behavior, and were more dependent on adults.

These effects of early restrictiveness were in contrast to some effects of restrictiveness from three to six. Where maternal strictness characterized the second period, boys who from three to six showed fearful and dependent behaviors shifted at adolescence to more competitive and aggressive behavior. By adulthood, the significantly related element was an anger factor. While maternal restrictiveness at this second period was associated with aggression, the aggression tended to be shown in socially accepted forms, i.e., competitiveness, indirect aggression to peers, justifiable retaliation. By adolescence, rebellion from maternal control and attempt to gain peer acceptance were manifested in a variety of ways, while indicators for adulthood confirmed a continuing suppressed hostility in readiness to retaliate and easily aroused anger. Sons of restrictive mothers tended in adulthood to rate low on criticism of father.

Girls who experienced maternal restrictiveness from three to six were not withdrawn but aggressive, yet rated low in independence and achievement mastery. Continued restrictiveness beyond this second period was associated, in

contrast, with a decrease in aggressiveness, along with passivity and dependence. Nevertheless, adulthood was characterized by easily aroused anger and by strong retaliation wherever justified. Restricted daughters were, in adulthood, low in criticism of mother.

Becker (1964) summarizes some implications of this study thus:

> Early restrictiveness appears to have far greater inhibiting power than later restrictiveness. Restrictiveness at later ages, whether it succeeds in producing a conforming-dependent child or not, is likely to generate more hostility in the child, albeit, controlled hostility. At these later ages, the child is more likely to be aware of the "unfairness" of a restrictive parent and resent excessive control. Also at the later age, the child is more capable of retaliating with aggression, even though it is eventually inhibited. The data further imply that boys are more likely to fight against a restrictive mother successfully. It would be nice to know to what degree father enters into this successful battle. (pp. 192-193)

Summary conclusions relating to 'moralization' as 'conditioned learning.' Once again, then, if the differential in moral behavior exhibited by individuals is a product of the imitative identification their respective conditioning has provided for, what are the conditions most conducive to consistently moral behavior? To summarize and round out the evidence concerning parental practices, attention at this point may be directed to the extensive analysis of Becker (1964) referred to earlier. According to his analysis, the evidence accumulated and cited below indicates that the several specified conditions are conducive to learning the accompanying behavioral patterns.

Parental hostility interacting with parental restrictiveness has been shown to foster considerable resentment, some of it being turned against the self, or, more generally, experienced as internalized turmoil and conflict. Inhibited, neurotic children tend to have considerable excessive constraint and control in their family backgrounds. (Supportive evidence may be found in clinical studies of Lewis, 1954; Rosenthal, Finkelstein, Ni, and Robertson, 1959; Rosenthal, Ni, Finkelstein, and G. Berkwits, 1962.)

Watson (1934, 1957) found that the interaction was associated with hatred and constraint in relations with parents, rejection of teachers, more quarrels and shyness with classmates, more unsatisfactory love affairs, more worry, anxiety, and guilt, more dependence upon parents.

Baldwin (1949) reported that this interaction was associated with nursery school children who were socially withdrawn. Levin (1958) found it to be associated with low rating in adult role taking--assuming that this reflects attitude toward modeling of the parents, this suggests counterindication of imitative identification, of course.

Sears (1961) found maximal self-aggression (self-punishment, suicidal tendencies, accident proneness) for twelve-year-old boys under this condition.

Parental warmth interacting with parental restrictiveness was found by Levy (1943) to be associated with boys who were submissive, dependent, timid in school, neat, obedient and polite. Sears (1961) found warm and restrictive homes to

be associated with minimal aggression among boys. (As noted above, maximal aggression was associated with a hostile-permissive interaction.)

Maccoby (1961) found this interaction to be significantly associated with boys who maximally insisted on conformity to rules by their associates. Their twelve-year-old male subjects showed less overt aggression, less misbehavior when the teacher was out of the room, and were highly motivated to do school work under conditions of parental restrictiveness. When compared with findings for the hostile-restrictive interaction, it is clear that these behaviors are the product not only of restrictiveness but of interaction with it of parental warmth.

Watson's (1957) findings show the interaction to be associated with boys who are dependent, neither friendly nor creative. Meyers (1944) evidence associates it with boys who are maximally compliant.

Parental warmth interacting with parental permissiveness was found by Baldwin (1949) to be associated with boys who were active, socially outgoing, creative and "successfully aggressive"--that is, they were successful in bossing other children and at the same time in being accepted by their group.

Whereas Maccoby (1961) found maximal rule enforcement among boys from warm-strict homes, he found them minimally so under this interaction. That is, they did not demand rigid rule conformity from their associates--they were themselves more relaxed with peers.

Levin (1958) found this interaction to be associated with maximal adult role-taking--suggesting that it is the condition most facilitating imitative identification.

Whereas Sears (1961) found maximal self-aggression among boys from hostile-restrictive homes, he found minimal self-aggression in warm-permissive homes. There was the least tendency here for self-punishment, suicidal inclination, self-depreciation, accident proneness.

Finally, Watson (1957) found that a home comparable to this interaction was associated with boys who were independent, friendly, creative, low in projective hostility.

Clearly, parents whose attitudes towards their children are warm and affectionate have to choose between outcomes desired if they are to exercise an option for restrictiveness or permissiveness. If they give preeminence to submissive obedience, compliance, etc., then the warm-restrictive condition shows up to be the most effective. If, on the other hand, they seek maximal learning by imitative identification (internalization), self-direction (whether for 'good' or 'evil'), then the warm-permissive condition shows up to be the most effective.

With all of these data and their analysis, there is a considerable body of evidence that has been widely interpreted to challenge seriously the entire notion of morality as a function either of individual learning or of individual personality structure. To the contrary it is contended that the evidence suggests that the accordance of individual

behavior to moral standards is predominantly a function of situational factors. To whatever degree that behavior is consistently moral, it is a function of coincidence in situations.

Most notable in this connection is the Hartshorne and May study (1928-1930). Reviewing, the major relevant findings of the study were:

1) The impossibility of categorizing children as either 'cheaters' or 'honest'

2) A very low predictability of children's cheating in one situation from their cheating in another

3) A high correlation between prospects of detection and decisions to cheat or not to cheat

4) A further correlation between behavior and immediate situational factors of group approval and example

5) A very low correlation between a child's moral knowledge and opinion and his moral conduct

6) A tendency--where moral values do seem to be related to conduct--for conduct-related values to be specific to the child's social class or group

Like most other experimental measures of moral restraint, the Hartshorne and May study did not control for individual achievement motivation. Had this factor been controlled, it seems entirely possible that the findings would have been quite different. For instance, the decisions to cheat or not to cheat might have been found to be much less at the caprice of situational factors.

Furthermore, the whole concern for developing moral character arises out of the notion that situational control of conduct is a phenomenon that can be lessened and that it is desirable to do so.

Be all this as it may, there clearly is evidence that can be and has been interpreted to be in conflict with notions of a morality acquired by conditioned learning.

At the same time, it is important to note that even for learning theorists, 'morality' applies not so much to individuals as to behavior. Their focus is not upon the individual and his morality, but upon behavior and the degree to which the behavior exhibited by the individual is consistently moral. It is operant behaviors that are said to be conditioned, not persons.

'Temptation,' then, becomes simply a matter of several reinforcements vying for momentary salience in the field of an individual's desires. Resisting temptation would thus be a matter of resolving the contention for salience by awarding it to be a behavior that happens to be moral . . . the selection itself being a behavior learned by social conditioning.

It appears that it must be granted that learning theory affords a more or less plausible account for how particular responses or operant behaviors come to be predictable for a given individual. It does not, however, provide a completely satisfying account for the universality--give or take an occasional exception--of human sensitivity to culpability. It seems indisputable that individuals vary widely in their capacity to perceive culpability. But once it is perceived and acknowledged, whence the universal sensitivity to psychic pain (or call it what we may) therefrom? Learning theory

constructs seem inadequate to afford a satisfying answer to this question. It is here contended that cognitive structures of self-concept and self-esteem are indispensable for such an accounting.

Moralization as a Product of Learning in Cognitive Development

Both psychoanalytic and learning theorists give preeminence to identification in their efforts to account for individual acquisition of morality. For these, as well as for social group theorists, to whatever degree an individual or his behavior is moral, it is largely because he or it was molded and shaped to be so by others.

Other theorists, however, argue that moralization--as distinct from socialization--of persons involves their engaging in self-determined, ego-related, cognitive processes and development. Among current theorists and writers of such a cognitive-developmental orientation, Kohlberg (e.g., 1963a, 1964, 1966, 1968a, 1971, etc.) is doubtless the foremost. He has largely based his research and theories on formulations of Piaget (1932), with whom he shares a conceptual tradition stemming from Baldwin (1897, 1906), Dewey (1895, 1939), and Mead (1934). More recently, and among others, Loevinger (1966) has written in the cognitive-developmental approach.

As Kohlberg (1968a) has pointed out, the developmental approach attempts to mediate between the position of

Utilitarians and of Durkheim (1953). Utilitarians (e.g., Bentham, 1948; Mill, 1952) have held that true morality consists in judging of right and wrong in terms of the individual's consideration of social-welfare consequences; that act is judged 'right' which does "the greatest good for the greatest number." Durkheim (1961) on the other hand, held that orientation to custom, authority, and the group is the total definition of the essential characteristics of morality. The developmentalists, though, contend that each of a number of distinct orientations to rules and standards depicts a phase or stage in any developing individual morality.

During the emergence and development of his SELF, the child is involved in numerous interactions that occur in institutionalized social patterns. The interactions in turn involve him in a continuing cognitive process of assuming and experiencing the roles or attitudes of other selves. From this process, it is held, emerge in turn various phases or stages of development, each phase a distinct morality in its own right--distinct, though not discrete. Aspects of each morality overlap each other as development continues. Moreover, each phase depends upon and integrates many of the features of the previous one.

Piaget (1932) describes the child's movement, by way both of intellectual growth and of these role taking experiences, from its initial amoral stage to a stage of "heteronomous" or other-dominated morality--a morality of constraint and of unilateral respect for the rules of social

authority. However, given a continuing availability of growth-inducing elements (primarily interaction with peers, according to Piaget), the structures of the child's perceptual organization come naturally to be further transformed from an apprehending of rules as authoritarian commands, to a comprehending of them as expressions of internal principles. The child's morality, thus, becomes "autonomous" or self-directed, and rational--a morality of cooperation and of mutual respect.

It is Piaget's contention that only unusually coercive parents or cultures, or deprivation of experiences of peer cooperation, can prevent an autonomous morality from developing in a child. He holds that apart from such unusual arresting factors, this transition to a morality concerned with justice of reciprocity and equality (as opposed to retributive justice) occurs between the ages of eight and ten.

This specification of an age for transition has been seen to leave Piaget vulnerable to contradiction by empirical evidence. Berkowitz (1964) makes quite a point of issue with Piaget based on findings in societies and socio-economic classes different from the Swiss laboring class in which Piaget did his research. The evidence shows children who manifest autonomous morality with a sense of reciprocal justice and a concern for intent considerably before the age of eight. Berkowitz contends that these individual differences are to be accounted for by cultural and social variables rather than by age-related developmental stages.

It seems a misapprehension of Piaget, however, to consider his theory invalidated on this basis. The evidence cited does not appear seriously to contradict his central proposition: i.e., that because of the nature of human development, autonomous morality grows out of and must be preceded by a stage of heteronomous morality of unilateral respect and constraint.

Inadequacy of the internalization construct. As previously observed, internalization by identification has been seen by theorists of psychoanalytical as well as of learning orientation as the central process in the acquisition of morality. Kohlberg has contended, however, that study of the moralization of persons (as distinguished from their socialization) is not adequately served by any exclusive concentration on the internalization construct. This is not because he denies the phenomenal reality of the process, nor its importance to morality. It would appear that he in fact suggests that some such process may be involved in the genesis of those premoral attitudes whose structural transformation produces moral attitudes and principles. (For that matter, he appears quite ready to acknowledge that the origin of neurotic moral anxieties may rest precisely in childhood punishment-guilt experiences.) But simply accounting for the genesis of moral functions does not adequately describe the actual moralization of persons that is observed to occur. He argues that the internalization construct makes no satisfactory accounting for temporal increase or

expansion either in degree of, or facility for, moral functioning. Understanding the acquisition or particularly the development of human morality requires, among other things, "elaboration of the processes of ego development as these interact with social experiences . . ." (Kohlberg, 1968a, p. 493).

Kohlberg draws attention, moreover, to the findings (e.g., Hartshorne and May, 1928-1930) suggesting that the frequently used index of acquired morality--i.e., resistance to temptation--is commonly determined by situational factors or cues that elicit anxiety rather than by some internalized disposition of conscience or character. A truly functional internalization of rules, standards or values, should, after all, tend to consistency of behavior, whatever the factors of the situation. Thus he argues that

> It is not useful to speak of behavior as being determined by an internalized rule like "be honest" or "don't cheat" if the rule does not predict the individual's behavior and situational forces do. (Kohlberg, 1968a, p. 484)

Thus, it might be argued that since dogs (etc.) as well as human beings have been trained to avoid "transgression" even in situations that are tempting, but which elicit anxiety over detection or punishment, the resistance no more justifies speaking of morality in humans than it does in dogs.

There are further shortcomings of the internalization construct for describing acquisition of morality to which Kohlberg (1968a) points. Among these is the fact already

alluded to that there is nothing distinctively moral about its products. Research, including all that has been here reviewed, has failed to indicate

> . . . a distinctive set of socialization factors . . . that can be considered as an antecedent of moral internalization. . . . In other words, this research does not indicate a distinct area of internalization or of "conscience"--of moral control linked to guilt feelings--that is distinct from general processes of social learning and social control. (Kohlberg, 1968a, p. 484)

Yet another inadequacy of the internalization construct in Kohlberg's view is related to the findings of frequently cited studies such as that of Hartshorne and May (1928-1930). It has already been noted that their study raised serious questions about the functioning of internalized conscience to determine individual behavior in situations of temptation conflict. Instead the behavior was seen to be determined by nonmoral situational factors. Not only so, but Kohlberg concludes about studies including many already reviewed here that

> Usually the child-rearing correlates of children's resistance to temptation in one situation have not proven to be correlated to resistance in another, and the child-rearing correlates of projective test measures of guilt have not proven to be correlates of actual moral behavior. Finally, projective measures of guilt have not proven to predict consistently actual resistance to temptation behavior. (Kohlberg, 1968a, p. 485)

Moral judgment nominated. If, then, there is such a thing as behavior being affected by specifically moral determinants, then individual morality must consist in something other than internalized socialization. While many

students of human behavior are inclined to lean toward denial of a specifically moral determinant, Kohlberg and his colleagues contend for its existence. As their candidate for this distinctive factor, cognitive-developmentalists nominate moral judgment, or moral reasoning. Kohlberg emphasizes not only its genesis, but also its temporal development and elaboration, not only beyond early childhood but throughout adolescence and indeed throughout life. In this he is at definite odds with the other two major orientations heretofore reviewed. Psychoanalytic and learning theory formulations (as well, even, as Piaget) see acquisition of morality to occur no later than age eight. Kohlberg, however, holds that its developmental transformations may continue to occur well into adulthood.

The primary dynamic of this developmental process would seem to be accounted for by Kohlberg's contention that all children are moral philosophers. The sense of such a statement is that children not only behave in moral, immoral or amoral ways, but in addition they do a lot of thinking for themselves about moral issues. Thereby they arrive at standards which are distinctively their own. Many of these standards have in no way been 'ingested' from parents, peers or teachers. Often they have been embraced with no acquaintance with relevant adult standards. Sometimes they are at considerable variance with them.

The findings of Kohlberg's research lead him to take sharp issue with two assumptions that are very common among

psychologists and sociologists who write about moral values in childhood development and education.

1) Whereas it is commonly assumed that all values are essentially relative and that each individual acquires his personal values from what his particular culture holds to be right or wrong, it is contended that . . .

   ETHICAL PRINCIPLES are to be distinguished from arbitrary conventional rules and beliefs and are not themselves relative. Kohlberg holds that there may not be many moral values by which all men always act, but this must not be construed as saying that there are no values in accordance with which all men ought to act.

2) Whereas it is commonly assumed that both moral learning and morality itself are an emotional and nonrational process based on repetition, identification, emotion and sanctions, he contends that . . .

   ETHICAL PRINCIPLES (i.e., universal moral values) as well as a morality based upon them are the end point of an INVARIANT DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE.

Empirical basis. A large part of Kohlberg's theory and philosophy derive from the findings of empirical research. For some two decades, he and his associates have

been listening to children of all ages and cultural backgrounds explain their judgments and the reasoning behind them about hypothetical moral dilemmas. During this time they have . . .

1) longitudinally studied the same 75 boys beginning when the boys ranged from ten to sixteen years of age, and

2) cross-culturally studied samples of children from widely varying societies--e.g., Great Britain, Canada, Taiwan, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey.

These researchers maintain that parents and other adults have long been so busy teaching their standards and values and enforcing repeated compliance with them (albeit if the compliance be no more than external), that they have not listened to children. If they had, they contend, they would have heard more than the mouthing of some few moral maxims by which they have been misled into presuming that moral learning has been occurring. The children's explanations of their own judgments demonstrate that they often have not readily identified with adult standards at all, even when their behavior has conformed to them. This becomes particularly apparent when children consider moral dilemmas in which a readily mouthable external judgment is not applicable.

In listening to children, Kohlberg discovered that they asked and reasoned about all the great philosophic questions. But they answer them in very different ways from the way many adults do. He distinguished a number of

distinctive MODES OF REASONING by which the children attempted to decide among conflicting obligations, or between perceived obligations and conflicting inclinations. These modes of reasoning are governed by the cognitive structure in which the individual organizes his perception of his social environment.

Thus, in one mode of reasoning, the child is entirely egocentric, perceiving himself to be the focal object of dominating forces (others). All judgments about questions of right and wrong are based on the fear of punishing consequences to himself for disobedience of powerful authority. The all-consuming concern is about the self and the consequences to it of behavior.

In another mode of reasoning, however, there is found to be a concern for the other person and the effect on him of the individuals' behavior. But still, it is a one-way concern where the individual considers what the other can do for him and how to behave to be assured of benefit to self from the other.

Yet another example of the modes of reasoning that can be distinguished finds a genuine two-way relationship. Expectations of others--including groups of others--are important. Acceptance and approval of others, fulfillment of their expectations, is the essence of being good.

Age studies and longitudinal studies make clear that an individual's modes of reasoning shift radically over time so that with the experience that accompanies advancing age,

these modes tend to be transformed into other modes. As already noted, the evidence indicates that these transformations in mode of moral reasoning occur in an invariant and universal developmental sequence. Kohlberg's contention is that movement in the process by which individuals acquire morality invariably starts and proceeds according to this sequence of stages. Each one beyond the first is built upon and is a cognitive elaboration of the one preceding it, which itself was necessary to subsequent stages. The philosophical necessity of the sequence has been challenged (see Beck, Crittenden and Sullivan, 1971). But on the evidence to be noted below, Kohlberg maintains that, in actual fact, movement or development does invariably follow the sequence.

Beyond an initial premoral level, Kohlberg distinguished six of these modes or stages which fall into three levels. A brief outline of stages and levels follows:

LEVEL 0. PREMORAL:

Completely egocentric orientation.

LEVEL 1. PRECONVENTIONAL:

While responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, the child interprets rules and labels not in terms of conventional consensus, but in terms of physical or hedonistic consequences or of the power of the rule source.

Stage 1--Punishment and obedience orientation. Avoidance of punishing physical consequences and deference to power determine goodness or badness.

Concern is about self--obedience is to powerful authority.

Stage 2--Naive instrumental hedonism orientation. Right action is that which is instrumental in satisfying one's own needs. Concern includes other persons, but is one-way: what he/she can do for me.

LEVEL II. CONVENTIONAL:

The individual sees being good, doing right, as meeting and loyally supporting the expectations and conventional consensus of the established social order. This is perceived as itself an important value.

Stage 3--"Good boy-nice girl" orientation. Approval being a paramount value, it is behavior that helps others and is approved by them that is good. Intention comes to have weight in judgments. Concern includes groups of people and conformity to group norms.

Stage 4--"Law and order" orientation. Supporting and maintaining authority and the given social order, prompt obedience and the doing of duty to be regarded as the 'right' behavior. Concern includes society and order in it.

LEVEL III. POSTCOVENTIONAL or AUTONOMOUS or PRINCIPLED: The individual seeks his definition of right and wrong by endeavoring to distill for himself

moral principles that are valid apart either from authority or from his identification with groups who espouse those principles.

Stage 5--Social contract orientation. Individual rights, especially as democratically accepted and established by law, determine right action . . . or in the absence of law, by personal values and opinion. Since the latter are recognized as relative, much emphasis is given to procedural rules for reaching consensus. Concern is for the relationship of the self to the whole society.

Stage 6--Universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by decision of individual conscience in reference to self-espoused ethical principles which appeal to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. What is right is a decision of one's own conscience that is based on ideas about rightness that apply to everyone.[1]

Beyond the stages, Kohlberg has identified approximately thirty "aspects of morality." The idea appears to be that these thirty aspects emerge as the 'containers' for the basic moral concepts of every culture. For instance, one aspect of morality common to every culture has to do with motivation for rule obedience or moral action.

Each of the six stages may be defined in terms of its specific stance on each of the thirty aspects of morality.

Taking the one about motivation mentioned above, the stages may be defined thus:

Stage 1--Obey rules in order to avoid punishment

Stage 2--Conform in order to obtain rewards, have favors returned, and so on

Stage 3--Conform in order to gain approval and acceptance or to avoid disapproval, dislike by socially relevant others

Stage 4--Conform in order to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resultant guilt

Stage 5--Conform in order to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare

Stage 6--Conform in order to avoid self-condemnation.

Others of the thirty "moral aspects" include such factors as "value of human life," "basis of respect for moral authority," etc.

Kohlberg data and some implications. As previously noted, the empirical basis for Kohlberg's view of what it means to 'mature' or develop in moral judgment rests in the forms of moral reasoning that his children have done in attempting to resolve a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas. The dilemma most commonly cited as an example in the literature runs like this:

> In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium for which a druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to

> sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done that? Why?

The form of the children's reasoning about each of the dilemmas was carefully rated and its stage determined. On this basis, each individual's overall stage of moral judgment was calculated. Then the percentage of the sample operating at each stage at ages 10, 13, and 16 was reckoned. The accompanying graphs (see page 168) adapted from Kohlberg (e.g., 1963b, 1968b) suggest a number of indications of the findings.

At age 10 for all of the boys, whether of the USA or of any other cultures examined, the greatest percentage of boys was functioning at Stage 1. The percentage was progressively less for each stage in direct order. For the American boys at age 16, the order was directly reversed (except for Stage 6 which still had the least number--though it had increased--of individuals functioning there). Thus, the percentages decreased from Stage 5 through Stage 1. At age 13, the trends toward this arrangement were already clearly underway.

The boys of Mexico were moving in precisely the same directions, though at age 16 their order had by then only matched the order of the 13-year-old American boys. Although not as precisely identical, the graph for the Taiwan boys demonstrates the same trends.



Figure 5. Age-wise Stage Development in 5 Cultures

The graphs for the boys of Turkey and of Yucatan again manifest a pronounced similarity. Moreover, their trends are identical with those of each of the other cultures. In fact, Kohlberg has rather conclusively shown that whatever the culture, as children mature, the form of their moral reasoning undergoes transitions that are remarkably similar. The inclination is to conclude, of course, that the sequence of stages reflects a maturing of morality also. This conclusion, moreover, can be derived without at all making a value judgment that the later stages are to be preferred above the earlier ones.

It appears that, stimulated by experiences common to every culture, and enabled by their maturing intellectual capacities, children repeatedly reorganize the cognitive meanings that culturally universal values hold for them.

The cultural adaptation that has been made in the content of the dilemmas only serves to emphasize the similarity in form of the moral reasoning among all the boys. For the boys in villages of Taiwan and of Malaysia, the dilemma described above was adapted to describe a man whose wife was starving to death while a store keeper refused to give him any food unless he paid--which he could not possibly do. Questioned as to whether the man should steal the food and why, many of the 10- to 13-year-old boys in one village suggested that he should steal "because if she dies he'll have to pay for her funeral and that will cost a lot." Boys of the other village tended not to think of the funeral, but reasoned

that he should steal food because he needed his wife to cook for him. It emerged that funerals were not the vital part of the culture of the second village that they were of the first. The content of their solutions was indeed culturally specific. However, in the form of their reasoning, both groups of boys employed classic Stage 2 responses that showed a clear orientation to judge to be right that action which is instrumental to satisfying the doer's needs. (Neither group, for instance, indicated the slightest orientation to a Stage 6 principled valuing of human life.)

Mode of thought was in no way found to be either culture or socio-economic class specific. This is not to deny that middle class children were likely to use more 'advanced' stages of moral reasoning than were lower class children matched for age. They were indeed found to do so. But both classes were found to have moved through exactly the same sequences--the middle classes simply were found to have moved faster and farther. Age and rate of achievement were culturally related variants. But direction of movement and sequence of stages within that movement were universally identical.

Currently, Kohlberg has been hypothesizing about a possible 7th stage (Kohlberg, 1973a; 1973b) stemming from some pilot work by Fowler (1973). It would provide a moral stage to parallel Erikson's (1959) stage of "integrity versus despair." It would encompass an integration or resolution of life's meaning:"Why be just in a universe full of injustice?" "Why be moral?" "Why life?" "How face death?"

> The resolution of the despair that we call Stage 7 represents a continuation of the process of taking a more cosmic perspective . . . we identify ourselves with cosmic or infinite perspective. (1973b, p. 501)

Recent findings from the longitudinal study indicate an intermediary pseudo-stage (see Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg, 1973a). Initially it seemed that many of the boys who had functioned in a solidly Stage 4 mode retrogressed to a thoroughly preconventional Stage 2. At first this seemed to be a direct contradiction of an essential postulate of theory: that movement is always according to sequence. As time went on, however, it became apparent that rather than retrogression, what was being observed was transition. Every one of these seemingly regressive boys shortly moved on to a consistent Stage 5.

It became apparent that the temporary retrogression was a product of cognitive conflict as the subjects came to question the law and order structure that had been the basis of their Stage 4 conventional orientation. So firmly, indeed, had they espoused the rule structure, so fully conventional had their mode of moral thinking become, that there was no way they could move on to Stage 5 without some real internal conflict or "transitional disequilibration" that reflected itself in a vigorous casting off to their conventional thought and behavior pattern. This "transitional relativism" (Kohlberg, 1973a) between Stage 4 and Stage 5 has been dubbed Stage "4b" or "4 1/2."

This finding of the ongoing longitudinal study led Kohlberg and his colleagues to revise some of the specific aspects of his initial formulation. Thus, he concluded (Kohlberg, 1973a) that thinking of late adolescents which he and Kramer (1969) had ascribed to Stage 5 was really only a sophisticated Stage 4. Furthermore, he has suggested that the developments they described as "retrogression" and as "stabilization" were all occurring prior to any acquisition of true Stage 5. He has concluded that the latter was not achieved by any of his longitudinal subjects until at least 23 years of age. Thus, while his age-study data suggest a proportion of subjects doing some Stage 5 thinking by 16, he currently holds that this was most likely only the more sophisticated forms of Stage 4. He presently holds that development to thinking of Stages 5 and 6 is an adult phenomenon. More than ever he holds that moral development is not to be conceived as accomplished in childhood.

Confirmatory findings. Further evidence supporting the invariance of the stage sequence in moral development is provided by an experimental study by Turiel (1966). He tested the implication that movement to a stage differing from the individual's own should be to the stage directly above his stage, rather than to any other. His findings clearly confirmed his hypotheses that . . .

1) if the sequence of stages is invariant, S's exposed to reasoning directly above their dominant stage would be influenced more than those exposed to stages further above their own;

2) if the acquisition of each stage is a reorganization of the preceding stages, and not simply an addition to them, then S's should resist reasoning at lower stages.

Thus he found that S's exposed to a stage one above ("+1") their own were influenced more than S's exposed either to two stages above or one stage below.

In another experiment, Rest (Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969) attempted successfully to replicate Turiel's (1966) findings. In doing so he found, furthermore, that while S's definitely prefer the thinking characteristic of one and two stages above their own dominant one to that of stages below, they found the thinking at stages above to be increasingly difficult to comprehend, and even more difficult to assimilate and use spontaneously. Rest's findings have largely been responsible for reemphasis on a further Piagetian concept in cognitive-developmental postulations regarding morality.

Reference here is to the notion of "horizontal decalage." As has been noted, the stage sequence is held to describe the invariant and universal order of movement in the development of moral judgment. Aside from this order of vertical movement, recent literature--following Rest's lead --is including discussion of a horizontal hierarchy. Thus, Rest has demonstrated the tendency of an individual to reach out to reasoning in stages above that which he spontaneously uses. His actual usage of reasoning at stages higher than

his own is very limited. On the other hand, he tends to be capable of assimilating somewhat more of higher stage reasoning, while he can comprehend an even wider upward range, and he will indicate preference for yet more of the higher stage reasoning. It is this tendency for an individual to reach out from his current point of usage among the stages that is referred to as "decalage."

It is moreover this ability of individuals to assimilate and comprehend a limited range of reasoning above that which they spontaneously use, and to prefer the very highest level which they can comprehend that makes development possible. Development is thus seen to be the functioning of decalage, which suggests implications for methods for intervention to induce it.

As stated above, the among-culture age studies as well as the within-culture longitudinal study show that not all individuals move from stage to stage at the same age. Both among cultures, and within cultures, some move at a faster rate than do others. The longitudinal study, moreover, indicates that many individuals fail entirely to reach a developmental maturity, 'fixating' instead at some one of the earlier stages, while the vast majority of people in any culture (at least 80%, according to Kohlberg) are found never to develop autonomous principles at all.

Below are indicated the ages at which most children in middle-class American culture have been found to acquire some consistency of function at the several stages (a child

is said to be at any given stage if at least 50% of his thinking is done in that mode). Also shown is the proportion of adults in a scientifically selected sample (Scharf, 1975) who were found to be operating (and presumably fixated) at each level:

Stage	Customary Age of Acquisition	Proportion of Adults
1	6 to 7	3%
2	10	10%
3	12	30%
4	16	30%
5	20+	30%
6	Late 20's+	1%

Stimulating development. Those who have conceived acquisition of morality to be either ingestive or imitative learning have sought to discover the antecedent conditions (largely within the family) associated with identification. Cognitive-developmentalists have instead taken their cue from Dewey's contention that . . .

> Education is precisely the work of supplying the conditions which will enable the psychical functions, as they successively arise, to mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and fullest manner. (In Archambault, 1963, p. 208; cited from Dewey, 1895)

Their concern has been with discovering and providing the types of experiences that stimulate individuals to cognitive reorganization of the meaning which culturally universal values hold for them. The evidence indicates that it is this cognitive reorganization of meaning that prompts

movement from stage to stage (Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971; Turiel, 1969).

As previously observed, morality has commonly been seen as largely a function of such affectional factors as anxiety, guilt, empathy, etc. But moral judgment or reasoning requires that the judging individual first cognitively define the moral situation. For a person to develop morally, it is necessary that there be an increasing ability to perceive social reality and to organize and integrate social experience.

Thus, while not in itself sufficient, cognitive advance on intelligence tests or on Piaget's cognitive stage tasks is necessary to development in moral reasoning. Thus, both logically and empirically it is clear that functioning at the moral stages indicated below requires prior acquisition of corresponding cognitive skill (see Kohlberg, 1973a, Table 1).

Moral Stage	Logical Stage
1	Concrete operations, Substage 1--Categorical classification
2	Concrete operations, Substage 2--Reversible concrete thought
3	Formal operations, Substage 1--Relations involving the inverse of the reciprocal
4	Formal operations, Substage 2
5	Formal operations, Substage 3

It would be pointless, thus, to attempt to seek a maturity of moral judgment beyond an individual's cognitive capacity. On the other hand, it is important to recognize

that possession of the cognitive skill in no way assures commensurate moral judgment--it is necessary but not sufficient.

Evidence from both the longitudinal and the cross-cultural age studies (Kohlberg, 1968a) indicates a second factor that affects moral development. This is the comparative avilability in an individual's environment for social participation and role-taking. By role-taking is meant perceiving the self functioning in the roles of others; vicariously experiencing the role of others; reacting to the self's behavior in the role of the other; and finally, taking account of the other's perspective when the claims of selves conflict.

Kohlberg (1968a) reports a study involving three divergent cultures. In each of them, middle-class children were found to be more advanced in moral judgment than matched lower-class children. All of the children seemed to move through the same sequences, but the middle-class children seemed to move faster and farther. Moreover, in the American sample there was a comparison between peer-group "participators" and "nonparticipators." At each age, the former were strikingly more advanced in moral judgment.

Interesting experiments by Dowell (1971) and by Mosher and Sullivan (1974) further support the conclusion that role-taking, or experiencing the "innerness of other lives" promotes moral development. The experimenters helped high school students to counsel one another in the client centered

or nondirective approach. In both experiments the students experienced significant upward movement in moral reasoning. The implications were the more emphasized by a control group in Dowell's experiment. These controls, who received counseling rather than giving it, registered no significant advance in moral reasoning. Presumably the intense effort required of the counselors to take the view of the other was a major factor leading to their moral development.

Kohlberg (1968a) further emphasizes the function of role-taking in moral development by citing evidence from identification studies. He reaffirms conclusions (Kohlberg, 1963a; 1963b; 1964; Hoffman, 1970) that the evidence regarding conscience formation by ingestive identification is largely conflicting.

As elaborated in earlier parts of this chapter, identification theories variously hypothesize that a child ingests standards and characteristics of significant others out of

1) need to substitute for an absent or rejecting parent;

2) need to defend against fear of aggression; or

3) "status envy."

The assumption has been that

1) parent-child relationships,

2) form and timing of reinforcement (both reward and punishment), and/or

3) modeling

would variably determine formation of a) 'ingestive' identification with parental standards and values, or b) conditioned behavior patterns. Thereby consistently conforming behavior would be effected.

Literature already reviewed has shown that a) parental warmth, b) children's positive attitudes toward parents, and c) children's expressed desire to be like their parents do indeed correlate positively with acceptance of the conventional moral code as measured by tests of conventional expressions of guilt, and by tests of moral judgment. Kohlberg finds little evidence, however, that shows any correspondence between guilt and moral judgment on the one hand, and a fixed, introjected structure of individual parental moral values.

Even less does evidence support the notion that conscience formation is dependent upon a close bond to one or both parents. Kohlberg (1964, 1971) especially points to evidence that Israeli kibbutz-reared children are found to be in no way significantly different in moral judgment, behavior or guilt from conventionally parent-reared children.

Particularly do studies relating punishment practices to guilt fail to show any consistent correlations. This is not to deny that, as Kohlberg (1968) acknowledges . . .

> Some experiences of punishment or at least of blame, are presumably necessary for the development of guilt reactions, and even the most permissively raised children experience them. (p. 493, emphasis supplied)

(However, even punishment by love-withdrawal has not had consistent effects on formation of any dependably functioning guilt-conscience, to say nothing of formation of guilt structure.)

Kohlberg further acknowledges that none of this can deny the demonstrated value of reinforcement by reward and punishment for 'short-term situational control' of moral (conforming) behavior. He cites an unpublished paper by Aronfreed that reports experimental studies manipulating punishment parameters with "striking effects" on short-term resistance to temptation in given situations.

Nevertheless, none of this evidence regarding guilt formation and behavior control can gainsay the findings of Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) to the effect that efforts to manipulate formation of permanent internal structures have failed to produce long-term, consistent behavioral conformity to social values or standards.

The evidence concerning the effect of antecedent conditions on such structure formation, then, has been shown to be most equivocal. On the other hand, Kohlberg finds the evidence from studies of these antecedents of identification to be consistently supportive of the proposition that positive affectional relations to others, along with the reasoning that accompanies psychological (as opposed to physical) discipline, are conducive to role-taking. Thus, while . . .

> findings suggest the importance of children's role-taking of their parents in moral development, . . . they do not support the notion that conscience is a unique product of parent identifications. (Kohlberg, 1968, p. 493; emphasis supplied)

He contends moreover that

> The opportunity for moral role-taking appears to be what is most important in the contribution of the family to moral development. (Kohlberg, 1972a, p. 15)

He further refers to a Holstein study (1976) that showed that

> . . . parents' tendency to stimulate reciprocal role-taking was . . . related to the child's maturity. The parent who sought the child's view, who elicited comparison of views in dialogue, had more advanced children. (Kohlberg, 1972a, p. 15)

A third factor that empirical study has pointed to as stimulating moral development is cognitive conflict. Turiel (1969; see also Kohlberg, 1973a) demonstrated that if a child was provoked to perceive the contradictions in his thinking, he would tend to seek new and better solutions to his moral ambiguities. His experiences of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Festinger and Freedman, 1964) would impel him to reorganize his experience and thought pattern. When a child was led to experience and understand the inadequacies and inconsistencies of his own way of thinking, he sought to resolve them in more consistent and adequate ways of thinking. This led to a significant readiness to grasp the adequacy of more advanced modes of reasoning. It was, then, in the setting of genuine moral dilemma--moral conflict in which previously self-espoused values were ambiguous or problematic--that growth occurred.

Blatt and Kohlberg (1973) report a concerted attempt to apply this principle to a classroom situation. After

pretesting the children for stage of moral reasoning, Blatt proceeded during a 12-week period to induce cognitive conflict through class discussion of a number of moral dilemmas. Because of their very nature, the dilemmas aroused genuine conflict. Moreover, because the children were arguing on different levels (they ranged from Stage 2 to Stage 4), additional conflict and "disequilibration" were introduced. In the course of the discussions, the experimenter interjected support and clarification of the arguments that were one stage above the majority of the children. When it appeared that these arguments were comprehended by them, that stage was challenged through introduction of new dilemmas. Thereupon arguments of the next higher stage were clarified and supported.

> At the end of the twelve weeks, all of the students were asked what they thought of the program and of the teaching. Some students showed little or no interest in the classes, while others expressed high interest in the intellectually provocative nature of the situation. Children showing little interest changed very little, while those who showed considerable change experienced the classroom situations as challenging, were actively involved, and participated in disagreements. Indeed, it was those students showing the most change who expressed what appeared to be the greatest experience of conflict. (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971, pp. 455, 456)

Yet a fourth factor contributing to change in stage of moral reasoning was alluded to above. It was noted that a child will assimilate into his thinking only that verbal moralizing that is one stage above his own. Kohlberg and colleagues derive from this a change-contributing factor which they speak of as "+1 exposure." Turiel (1966)

divided sixth grade children into three experimental groups. One group interacted in moral discussions with an adult who verbalized one stage above the children's own; the second group received messages two stages above; while the third group received one-stage-below messages. In a posttest the children were asked to give their own advice on the new moral situations presented to them. The +1 group used significantly more thinking at the stage to which they had been exposed than did either of the other two. Clearly, the more adequate reasoning was preferred to the lower stage. The children rejected the reasoning beneath them, but failed to comprehend whatever was more than a stage above them.

Kohlberg elaborates on this important concept by relating it to efforts to foster morality through indoctrination:

> Not only our aims, but our research findings, indicate that one cannot successfully take a direct indoctrinative approach in order to simulate moral development. . . . The first psychological principle of developmental education . . . is that the child will assimilate only those moralizings which are developmentally appropriate for him. (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 367,368)

Empirical experience and logical deduction have led the cognitive-developmentalists to yet one more factor emerging as essential to maximum moral development. They speak of it as "just community." It appears that only those can be expected to reach the truly principled stages who have opportunity for participation in group and institutional structures perceived as fair or just. Thus Kohlberg theorizes:

> Social environments or institutions not only facilitate moral development through providing role-taking opportunities, but their justice structure is also an important determinant of role-taking opportunities and consequent moral development. The formation of a mature sense of justice requires participation in just institutions. (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 193)

He goes on to describe an attempt by himself and colleagues to analyze the perceived justice level of certain institutions for adolsecents (e.g., high school and reform school). They seek thereby to compare their influence on the moral development of their respective inmates.

> Impressionistic observation suggests that many reform schools have an official level of justice which is a stage 1 obedience and punishment orientation, while the inmate peer culture has a stage 2 instrumental exchange orientation. An inmate high in participation in either of these structures is not likely to advance in moral judgment, even though in another sense he may be provided with "role-taking opportunities." (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 193)

An ongoing study is the actual effect on moral development from environments perceived to be just and fair by the subjects--as contrasted with those perceived to be unjust and coercively authoritarian. Kohlberg colleagues are currently attempting intervention in moral education through "just community" in a variety of settings. Illustrative are a) prisons (see Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey, 1972); b) "School Within a School" (see Wilson, 1975); c) alternative schools (Mosher, 1975).

While it is not specifically described in the literature to be a major factor in stimulating moral development, there is one other condition that emerges as implicitly vital. Mosher and Sullivan (1974) point to evidence from

Kohlberg's longitudinal studies that indicates a necessity for interventionary efforts to be made at appropriate times. They show that there are age periods when transitions between the three levels of moral development appear to be most easily accomplished.

> The first "open" period occurs from ages 10-13 when the transition from preconventional to conventional moral reasoning is most likely to occur. Longitudinal studies show that children who do not achieve conventional moral thinking by age 13 probably will not achieve postconventional thinking in adulthood. The second period of transition occurs from 15-19 years of age. Those people who do not begin to use some (at least 20%) postconventional or principled thinking in this period are also unlikely to achieve postconventional moral reasoning in adulthood. (Mosher and Sullivan, 1974, p. 4)

Thus, while they see "unusual acceleration" as neither desirable nor even possible beyond some very real limits (governed by acquisition of cognitive skills), nevertheless it is essential to provide the conditions necessary for development at the appropriate times. They note that the evidence indicates that "individuals who remain at a particular stage for long periods of time tend to become fixated at that stage" (p. 4).

Throughout his literature, Kohlberg has consistently sought clearly to distinguish methods he sees to be most effective in fostering true moral development from a) those that have been shown to have failed, and b) those that he sees as inadequate.

The approach he sees as having been shown to have failed is what he describes as the "Cultural Transmission"

approach. This includes all of the efforts at moral education through modeling, reinforcement, and association. It encompasses, in fact, the efforts championed by both the psychoanalytic and the learning theory orientations. As primary evidence of their failure he adduces the Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) study. He holds that the best the Cultural Transmission approach has been able to produce appears to be individuals whose behavior in morally ambiguous situations is governed by the situation. Conformity to societally relative values seems never more than situation-specific.

The second orientation to moral education which he distinguishes is the "Values Clarification" approach (see, e.g., Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966). Rather than seeking to impose a culturally defined set of values ("bag of virtues") that some sector of society has settled upon, the aim here is self-insight, self-awareness, identification of personal values and public articulation of them. Such individual relativity leaves the individual seeking to come out of a values conflict with as much as possible for himself. The product of this approach for the individual, Kohlberg holds, is endless contradiction, and is philosophically unsatisfying.

Finally there is the approach that focuses on "Moral Development." It begins with whatever sense of justice an individual currently has, and seeks to stimulate development of that sense of justice through what Kohlberg holds

has been demonstrated to be the natural, culturally universal, and invariant sequence of structural transformations. Given opportunity for genuine cognitive conflict about morally ambiguous situations, +1 stage exposure, extensive role-taking in a perceived just environment, there can be expected to emerge a more and more highly principled sense of justice that may be depended upon to reflect itself in consistently just/moral behavior.

Summarizing, then, what research has suggested to them as to the most effective approach to moral development, Kohlberg and Turiel assert:

> Assuming that moral development does indeed pass through this natural sequence of stages [the 3-level, 6-stage sequence already elaborated], our approach defines the aim of moral education as the stimulation of the next step of development rather than indoctrination into the fixed conventions of the school, the church, or the nation. Facilitating the child's movement to the next step of development involves 1) exposure to the next higher level of thought and 2) experiences of conflict in the application of the child's current level of thought to problematic situations.
>
> In contrast to traditional moral education, then, our approach stresses: 1) Knowledge of the child's stage of functioning. 2) Arousal among children of genuine moral conflict and disagreement about problematic situations. (In contrast, traditional moral education has stressed adult "right answers," and reinforcement of the belief that virtue always is rewarded.) 3) The presentation of modes of thought one stage above the child's own. (In contrast, conventional moral education tends to shift between appeals to adult abstractions far above the child's level and appeals to punishment and prudence liable to rejection because they are below the child's level.) (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971, p. 416)

Viewing the moralization of persons as a largely cognitive process, then, has led Kohlberg to his emphasis on the

development of moral judgment. At the same time, the cognitive viewpoint requires the inclusion of contributions from at least two other major theoretical formulations in the attempt to account for acquisition of morality. Reference here is to a) ego [as distinct from superego] controls, and b) cognitive dissonance.

Ego control. It has been repeatedly noted here that Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) interpret their data to suggest that honest behavior is a function of factors specific to a situation, rather than to a character trait brought into the situation by an individual. It has also been noted, on the other hand, that Burton (1963) has reanalyzed the data and discovered a general factor that was relatively independent of situational factors. Others have similarly found a generalized consistency to honesty across situations (e.g., Nelson, Grinder and Mutterer, 1969; Sears, Rau and Alpert, 1966; Nelson, Grinder and Biaggio, 1969; and Grim, Kohlberg and White, 1969).

This general factor has been interpreted as a character trait of honesty (e.g., Burton, 1963). Alternatively it has been seen as capacity for self-control generally--a capacity to inhibit impulse not only in situations involving moral rules but in other situations as well (Sears, Rau and Alpert, 1966). This capacity for self-control in general has been correlated with certain cognitive aspects of behavior that have been subsumed under the label of ego controls, or ego strengths (Wright, 1971; Kohlberg, 1964; Redl and Wineman, 1952; Hartmann, 1960).

> These results are of great interest. They imply that self-control in morally tempting situations is a function of some more general control factor rather than of a specifically moral form of inhibition. In psychoanalytic terms, resistance to temptation may be an ego function rather than a superego function. (Wright, 1971, p. 55)

We are indebted to Freud, of course, for his analysis of mind into id, ego, and superego. It is well known (and has here been noted at some length) that he saw the production of morality in conduct as being the consequence of the unconscious forces of the superego. These more recent suggestions, however, have correlated self-control of conduct (as distinct from situation-, parent-, and other-control, and distinct also from ascetic 'self-denial') with a global ego strength, as well as with a number of specific aspects of it.

An example of the studies regarding such a global ego strength is the Peck and Havighurst (1960) study. They found their total moral character scores to correlate rather closely with ego strength (r=.69) . . . more closely, in fact, than with any other 'good' aspect of personality.

Among the specific variables of ego strength found to correlate with measures of moral behavior are:

1) Capacity for stable, focused attention. Measures of this factor have been found to correlate substantially with experimental measures of cheating (as much as r=.68) as well as with teacher ratings of conscience strength (Grim, Kohlberg and White, 1968, 1971). This study has, in fact, shown that the effect of Burton's 'general

factor' approaches zero if attention and ego factors are partialled out. Failure to resist temptation to cheat appeared to be the result of comparative inability to keep attention fixed upon appropriate stimuli and situational instructions. Or in other words, noncheating seemed to be promoted by stable attention as it led to a "higher threshold" against the distraction of thoughts of the opportunity to cheat. Delinquents have repeatedly been found (e.g., Gibbens, 1963) to score higher in Porteus maze tests--suggesting lack of concentration and self-control--than have nondelinquents. Schalling and Rosen (1968) found psychopaths to score highest of all.

2) Extended time perspective, or foresight.

a) Tendency to anticipate and plan for future events as well as to bring past experience to bear upon the present. Subjects who stole the small sums of money when given opportunity by Brock and DelGiudice (1963) wrote stories involving a shorter time span than did those who did not steal. Studies by Barndt and Johnson (1955), Ricks and Umbarger (1963), and Mischel (1963) have all discriminated delinquents and cheaters from nondelinquents and noncheaters by measures of foresight. The delinquents were found not to think ahead

much, being not so deterred by possibly unpleasant consequences, while more often acting on immediate impulse.

b) Readiness to choose a distant greater gratification over an immediate but lesser one. Mischel and Gilligan (1964) gave subjects a measure of cheating, and then a month later in a different context offered opportunity to choose between a small, immediate reward and a delayed, larger one. Subjects who chose the latter were significantly less likely to have cheated. Those of them who did cheat were more likely to have resisted longer before yielding. Some of the delinquency studies cited above reported similar findings. Roberts and Erikson (1968) compared institutionalized rebellious, antisocial boys with the more conforming. Though forbidden by the institution to smoke, all were heavy smokers. Offered either a single cigarette immediately or a whole pack later on, the antisocial boys were significantly more likely to choose the immediate cigarette.

3) General intelligence. Peck and Havighurst (1960), Sanford et al. (1943), as well as Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) report substantial correlations between experimental measures of

moral conduct on the one hand and intelligence on the other. Among others, Terman and Odin (1947) report similar correlations. While Brogden (1940) found no association, Wright (1971) reports finding none who had found a negative relation. These relations have been shown to remain even when factors such as social class, and decreased necessity for brighter children to cheat in order to achieve are controlled (Kohlberg, 1964). At the same time, Mischel (1966) found readiness to prefer a delayed reward over a smaller immediate one to be related to intelligence.

4) Capacity to control unsocialized fantasies. Rau (1964) and Bach (1945) report expression of aggressive fantasy in the doll play of preschool children to be predictive of cheating and disobedience (for Rau: $r=.63$). The correlation was not found, however, between aggressive behavior and cheating. Peck and Havighurst (1960) find aggressive fantasy, like resistance to temptation, not correlated with superego factors like guilt, while they are correlated with ego control factors.

5) Self esteem. Satisfaction with the self and the environment (as measured by California Personality Inventory) are reported by Havighurst and

Taba (1949) to be positively correlated with ratings of adolescent moral character (r=.20 to .88).

These studies strongly suggest that self-control in morally ambiguous or tempting situations is related to self-controlling behavior in situations that raise no obviously moral issues. The implication is that "self-control in a morally tempting situation is a function of some more general control factor rather than of a specifically moral form of inhibition" (Wright, 1971, p. 55). Thus, again, the implication is that truly moral conduct is a product of cognitive development and functioning, being a function of ego strength rather than of superego . . . the result of decision making capacities rather than of the unconscious forces of internalized parents (or of good habits or behavior traits, for that matter).

Cognitive dissonance. While developers of cognitive dissonance theory (see e.g., Festinger, 1957) do not claim for it any kind of exclusive force in accounting for moralization, they do propose that it explicates one among several processes that "undoubtedly occur" (Festinger and Freedman, 1964). The central proposition of the theory is . . .

> that when a person holds two cognitions that are psychologically inconsistent with each other, dissonance is produced; that the existence of this dissonance is uncomfortable, and that the person experiencing it will try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance. In other words, the presence of dissonance serves as a motivating force in much the same way as do other drive states. (Festinger and Freedman, 1964, pp. 220, 221)

By a "cognition" is meant a) any knowledge, opinion or belief about b) an individual, his behavior or the environment. Of particular relevance here is the fact that included among cognitive elements are moral values and principles. By "dissonance" is meant a relation between two cognitive elements in which, if considered alone, "the obverse of one element would follow from the other." Thus, for example, if a person believes that the sun always comes up in the east and yet sees it come up in what he thought was the west, his two cognitions are dissonant. Or if he perceives himself to be honest and yet knows that he just defrauded the Internal Revenue Service, the cognitions are again dissonant. Dissonance, thus, may arise . . .

1) from logical inconsistency;

2) because of transgression of cultural or previously internalized mores;

3) from embracing an opinion or performing an action that is, by definition, in conflict with a more general opinion;

4) because of past experience (e.g., a person having always suffered pain from touching a hot stove experiences dissonance if there be no discomfort).

As already stated, experienced dissonance is said to produce a 'drive state' requiring reduction of the dissonance. This may be accomplished by such approaches as . . .

1) changing one of the cognitive elements (e.g., concluding that the direction in which the sun is seen coming up is not west after all);

2) adding consonant elements (e.g., including in consideration evidence that taxes are being spent for causes to which one is conscientiously opposed).

> The major point is that in a given situation that mode of dissonance reduction will be chosen which reduces the dissonance most effectively and is the easiest to employ. (Festinger and Freedman, 1964, p. 223)

A considerable body of empirical evidence has been amassed in support of the central propositions of the theory. This evidence indicates that considerable flux is produced in an individual's body of attitudes, values and principles by his experience of dissonance among these cognitions and between them and his behavior and experience.

A large share of the research has related to the effects of making a decision or choice on subsequent attitudes and behavior. Upon making a choice between two alternatives an individual normally experiences dissonance between his choice and the positive aspects of the unchosen alternative as well as the negative aspects of the chosen alternative. The theory would predict, then, that after a choice, an individual's attitudes toward the alternatives will be different: the difference in attractiveness of the two alternatives will be greater than before the decision.

Typical among the studies reported is one by Brehm (1956). A sample of housewives was invited to select a gift from among some kitchen appliances. They were first asked to rate the attractiveness of eight appliances and then were invited to choose between two of them. After the choice they were asked to rerate all of them. In harmony with the theory, the second ratings consistently showed the difference between the chosen alternative and the unchosen one to be

significantly greater than before the selection was made. Moreover it was seen that postdecision dissonance was reduced by a shift toward more favorable attitude to the chosen alternative and less favorable to the unchosen. Furthermore, the greater the dissonance caused by choosing (i.e., the closer the alternatives initially), the greater was the shift in attitude.

It has been demonstrated, thus, that formation of and change in internal attitudes--whether moral or general--is appreciably influenced by experience of cognitive dissonance and of its reduction.

An area of research highly significant to the moralization of persons concerns the effects of what has been called "forced compliance." In these situations an individual is somehow induced to perform behavior that a) is contrary to an opinion he holds, or b) is in some way unpleasant. The "force" usually has taken the form of a reward, social pressure, or some other such external inducement to perform the act. The dissonance caused by the discrepancy between a) the knowledge that the act was performed, and b) the knowledge that it was done contrary to a held opinion is said normally to be reduced by modifying the opinion to make it more consistent with the act. Numerous studies have shown that this does, in fact, occur (e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Freedman, 1963; Carlsmith, Collins and Helmreich, 1966; Linder, Cooper and Jones, 1967).

There is a further prediction derived from the theory and sustained by most of the studies cited above. This prediction suggests that the greater the force (i.e., the greater the promised reward, threatened punishment or other justification for performing--or not performing--the act) the less the dissonance and accompanying opinion change. The cognition "I was forced" (i.e., by circumstances, threat, reward, etc.) serves as a consonant element in the situation.

Exemplary of the studies that support this proposition is that of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). They offered rewards of $20 (high reward) and of $1 (low reward) to different subjects for publicly making a statement that had previously been found to be contrary to their private opinion. In postexperiment measures, the private opinions were found to shift toward consistency with the induced public statement significantly more for the low reward than for the high reward group.

Again, Freedman (1963) used justification of an unpleasant task as "very useful" or "not very useful" as his force. Subjects in the "not very useful" group described the task as significantly more enjoyable than in the "very useful" group.

> The basic point is that if a person is induced to perform an act he would rather not perform, maximum opinion change (in the direction of consistency with the act) will occur if the pressure to comply is just great enough to cause the person to perform the act. Any less pressure will produce less change because the person will not commit the discrepant act; any more pressure will provide additional justification and reduce the amount of dissonance produced by the performance of the discrepant act. (Festinger and Freedman, 1964, p. 225)

Aronson and Carlsmith (1963) directed their attention to a specifically 'moral' situation. Children in a play situation who complied with instructions not to play with a particular toy registered a significant pre- to post-treatment decrease in attraction to the toy when the penalty threatened for playing with it was mild. Those threatened severely not only failed to register any decrease, but showed a significant increase in attraction to the toy.

> Clearly, this suggests a mechanism whereby beliefs and values may be developed and changed. . . . If one manages to restrain the child from playing with the toy by means of very weak threats, then the child develops "internalized" opinions which justify his restraint. Too much threat does not produce the same effect. (Festinger and Freedman, 1964, pp. 228, 229)

An experiment by Mills (1958) gives evidence regarding changes in attitude related to succumbing or resisting temptation to cheat. Whereas Aronson and Carlsmith varied severity of punishment threatened for yielding, Mills varied magnitude of reward for yielding. Those who did not yield to high reward (high temptation) showed significant change of attitude in the direction of feeling that cheating is bad. Those who did yield in the high temptation condition showed a small shift in the same direction, though significantly less than was shown by the resistors. On the other hand, those who yielded in response to low reward (low temptation) actually changed their attitude significantly in the direction of feeling that cheating is not so bad. Those who did yield in the low temptation condition changed in the other direction, but not markedly.

The evidence, thus, suggests that experience of high temptation pressure actually intensifies attitudes that oppose the behavior--whether or not the temptation is resisted. On the other hand, when temptation pressure is low, yielding weakens attitudes that oppose the behavior, while resistance even to the low pressure intensifies the attitudes, though not as greatly as when the pressure is high.

The chart on page 200 (Fig. 6) [original in this study but derived from evidence reviewed by Festinger and Freedman (1964) and Carlsmith, Collins and Helmreich (1966)] may serve to summarize the evidence from forced compliance studies relevant to moralization.

The clear implication of dissonance theory, then, is that without dissonance to be reduced, there would be no internalization of moral values. On the other hand, in the arena of dissonances among an individual's cognitions (especially when behavior is involved) there is a marked modification and internalization of values. Moreover, the greater the pressures to comply with external norms and rules, the less the prospect that cognitive dissonance will occur or that those norms will be internalized in the process of reducing dissonance.

Rather than attempting here a summary of the implications of these formulations and findings for the concerns of moral character and its development, this will be incorporated into Chapter IV.

TEMPTATION Modified by...		Response	Dissonance	Resolved by...	Consequence in Internalization of Moral Values
Threat for Yielding	High	Yield	High	Depracating value of resistance	Strong reverse trend
		Resist	Low		Negligible or reverse trend
	Low	Yield	Low		Moderate reverse trend
		Resist	High	Intensifying value of resistance	Strong trend to direct internalization of value
Reward for Yielding	High	Yield	Low		Moderate reverse trend
		Resist	High	Intensifying value of resistance	Strong trend to direct internalization of value
	Low	Yield	High	Depracating value of resistance	Strong reverse trend
		Resist	Low		Moderate trend to direct internalization of value

Figure 6. Consequences to Internalization of Dissonance Source

Notes

[1]At first blush, this morality might appear to be unacceptable to that segment of religionists who contend for the moral authority of divine law. It is likely, however, that some further consideration would find even most of these supporting the idea that the commands of the Decalogue are based on principle (i.e., that God should be loved as oneself), and that unless the principles of that Law are self-espoused, external compliance with its sanctions would leave an individual little better off than one of the "whited sepulchres" to which Jesus so strenuously objected (Matthew 23:27).

CHAPTER IV
A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF MORAL CHARACTER AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

A Philosophical Framework

Need for Philosophical Framework

It is evident (see Chapter II) that 'character' has meant many different things to different people. It seems clearly to have emerged, however, that the many ways of thinking about character can be differentiated into two main categories. One of them represents character as simply descriptive of an individual's whole way of life; descriptive of the whole pattern of conduct that emerges from the interaction between a) all that the individual is at a given moment, and b) the social and physical forces impinging on him from his environment.

The second major category of ways of thinking hypothesizes character as an internal psychological fact which itself comes to exert its own dynamic impact on the behavioral outcomes of the interaction between individual and environment. It is conceived thus, as an internal force that sustains a tendency to some particular behavior pattern when there are other options.

The question then presents itself: which of these many different meanings, which of the two ways of thinking, actually describes that construct whose development it is

here proposed to foster by counseling? In order defensibly to settle upon one or the other from among all these meanings and ways of thinking; in order adequately to conceptualize moral character and its development, it becomes essential not only that empirical evidence be examined, but that some philosophical issues be resolved--if only by making explicit any presupposed assumptions.

Thus, for instance, philosophical presuppositions regarding the nature of man inevitably determine whether evidence shall be interpreted in the light of 'free will' or of 'determinism.' So far it has not proved possible to settle that question on the basis of compelling empirical data. And there is little reason to suppose that it ever will be possible.

Certainly, unless character is simply descriptive of a way or pattern of living, it could have little meaning if persons have no freedom to choose, and to act on the basis of their choice. Certainly the decision-making of Szasz's morality would be pure fiction.

An important question, thus, is "How free is man?" Is he in some sort of bondage to determinism? Is his behavior determined by the complex of forces--whether physical, psychological, or both--operating at the time of his behavior? Or does an individual, by his own choices, create for himself his own nature?

Others of the great philosophical issues, the resolution of which would bear weight on the question at hand include:

1) What is the nature of reality? Is it purely relative to the apprehension of the observer? Does it have an objective existence of its own? Doubtless this question must take priority even over that concerning the nature of man.

2) What, if any, are man's mandates, his obligations? In consequence of the nature of reality and of man himself, are there 'oughts'--as distinguished from determining forces--to which man is beholden?

3) What are the things, events and people that are of most value? How is value determined?

Again, it is doubtless impossible to specify the answers to these questions solely on the basis of empirical data. Nevertheless, it seems imperative to take an explicit position on at least some of them [attention will be focused on the nature of man and of reality] which is at least internally consistent before a defensible position regarding moral character may be taken.

The Philosophical Framework

Reality and responsive behavior. The position is here taken, in keeping with phenomenological thought (see e.g., Snygg and Combs, 1949) that there are two ways of considering reality. One is material, objective, historical; either governed by or governing natural physical law. The other reality is perceptual; it is the phenomenon of any individual's unique experiencing of his universe, including

himself at any moment. In his perception, be that as distorted or as accurate as it may, this is the phenomenon for him. And for all intents and purposes, this is reality as far as his responsive behavior is concerned. There is no point in contending here about the nature of the 'objective reality'; whatever it may be, objective reality has no effect on the individual's responsive behavior, except as it is reflected in his phenomenological reality.

It is with what is here distinguished as responsive behavior that 'character' is seen to be related. This is distinguished from consequential behavior which as a direct consequence is essentially automatic or even autonomic. Thus, when upon being cut an individual's finger bleeds, his character is not involved; the behavior is an automatic consequence. Nor is an individual's character involved when a person twice his size collides with him and he falls to the ground. The fact that he falls to the ground is a simple consequence of the objective reality that another collided with him. It had nothing to do with his perception of the event.

His responsive behavior, however, will very largely be related to his perception of the big guy's intent--both initially and presently. Even more, however, it will be related to his 'character.' Thus, even if he perceives the other to have collided with the deliberate intent to cause his fall and humiliation; even if he perceives himself capable of retaliation; his character may well decree that there

be no retaliation, or it may govern the nature of the retaliation. This is the responsive behavior with which it is here postulated that character has to do. It is, moreover, the 'phenomenal reality' to which character relates and that influences responsive behavior.

Phenomenal reality and human choice. It is here assumed that it is the essential nature of man--probably unique with man in life as we know it--to be conscious of his own existence. But as suggested above, his consciousness is of that reality which he is experiencing at any moment. Because this is presumably not the case with other forms of existence, physical laws and objective reality are assumed to exercise exclusive determination of their behavior. Because, on the other hand, it is not objective reality to which man responds, but to phenomenological reality, it is here contended that his behavior is not inescapably determined.

At the same time, it is quite clear that the phenomenological position as commonly enunciated is explicitly deterministic. Thus Snygg and Combs (1949) maintain that 'choice' does not, as a matter of fact, occur. Individuals invariably behave as they perceive they have to in order to maintain or enhance their 'phenomenal self' in a particular situation. Choice, thus, is to phenomenologists merely the action which results as a direct function of the phenomenal field at the given time. Man's nature and behavior are bound by his inherent drive to maintenance and enhancement of self in his perceived situations.

Beck (1963) registers strong dissatisfaction with this aspect of phenomenology and spoke of "choice" as being a pseudo concept among its advocates.

It is, thus, truly a parsimonious explanation of behavior that phenomenology affords. But in its parsimony, it fails to account for much that we actually observe in our human experience (Rogers, 1962). Just as surely as does behaviorism (cf. Skinner and Rogers, 1956), it denies anything that we know of freedom to decide, to initiate, to be responsible as well as "responsive," as here defined.

However much or little it may be that choice is an illusory or pseudo construct, there is a phenomenal experience involved even in perceiving that one has made a choice. The very experience simply of perceiving oneself a) to have deliberately reduced options by rejecting alternatives, and b) to have deliberately espoused commitment to one or more among alternatives, itself restructures the "field."

Thus it is here proposed that an individual's experience of phenomenological reality is subject to his own commitment experiences. That is, it is subject to his experiencing of an aroused will; to a volitional experience of choosing, whether in some real sense, or for that matter, only in a pseudo sense. By the exercise (or non-exercise) of his will, a man creates his own nature, so to speak.

Choice, will, and attitude. It is further proposed that the quality of that interaction between an individual and external environmental forces which arouses his will

is influenced by his attitudes salient at the time. Attitudes, however, are not themselves a 'behavior' subject to determination by organismic traits and phenomenal field. On the contrary, by its salience, an attitude is itself a part of the phenomenal field and influences the arousing of the will.

Moreover, selective attendance to stimuli is largely governed by salient attitudes. Selective attendance to attitudes, on the other hand, may well be governed by the will. Thus, the prevailing attitude may be functioning by default, or it may be functional in response to an exercised will. However it may be, it is here contended that man is free to experience his will in regard to his attitude and thereby in a sense to create for himself that phenomenal field out of which his behavior is said to be determined.[1] Thus, after his years in a concentration camp Frankl could say:

> Everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms--to choose one's own attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way. (1959, p. 65)

The human will is thus here postulated as a function of human experience that by its very exercise renders a man free within the framework of environmental limitations. It renders him free for that decision-making which is essential (see Szasz, 1967) to any meaningful understanding of 'morality' or of 'character.'

It is not necessarily the entire phenomenological position that is here being taken or defended. Rather it is the importance to responsive behavior of phenomenal reality

(as enunciated by phenomenologists) that is being emphasized. As far as individual character is concerned, phenomenal reality is here seen to be the only reality.

A modified self-actualizing tendency. A further significant presupposition here assumed regarding the nature of man has to do with what has been referred to as a self-actualizing tendency. [By 'self-actualizing tendency,' reference is made, of course, to what Goldstein terms the "sovereign drive" of his Organismic Theory, i.e., a drive that moves man to strive continuously to realize his inherent potentialities by whatever avenues are open to him (Goldstein, 1939). Snygg and Combs (1949), Maslow (1954), Rogers (1951), e.g., have strongly supported this concept.] While the self-actualization tendency is here affirmed, it is contended that it must be recognized as specifically modified.

The model of this modified self-actualizing tendency is taken from the physical organism itself. Thus it is perceived that the physical organism has innate, genetically 'programmed' tendencies to develop the full stature of its mature potential. Not only that, but it is also seen to be innately health restoring and health maintaining. At the same time, however, it is here perceived that there are disintegrative forces operating which can both interrupt and even damage beyond repair the actualizing process.

This modifying force is seen to operate not only in the physical organism as such, but in the entire psychical self. Theology might be inclined to contend that this

disintegrative function is itself alien to man, an intruder, a product of 'sin.' Be that as it may, the physical organism clearly indicates that the self-actualizing process is a modified one--modified by a universal tendency to progressive disintegration, culminating of course in death, which it is here held functions throughout the self.[2]

The major elements of the presuppositions here assumed, then, suggest that . . .

1) it is phenomenal reality that serves to govern responsive behavior and that is thereby relevant to conceptualization of character;
2) it is because man at the very least experiences himself as willing and choosing, that he is free for that decision-making behavior that renders him responsible and capable of morality and character;
3) self-actualizing tendencies must be recognized as modified by functioning of disintegrative forces and hence not to be expected to produce developed moral character simply in consequence of natural developmental processes.

Moralization Literature and Moral Character

For the most part, by 'moralization of persons' has generally been meant the induction of some kind of individual disposition by which proscribed behavior tends to be inhibited, even in the total absence of external constraint,

and even though situational cues strongly elicit it. It refers to processes that are largely functions of socialization. The end of the processes may take several forms, depending upon the mechanism by which the socialization occurs, e.g.:

1) Introjected parent, emphasizing guilt formation.
2) Internalized group sentiments, emphasizing a) conditioned conformity to group mores, and b) shame rather than guilt formation.
3) Individual empathy with the experiences of other individuals, emphasizing pursuit of justice and equity in all human relationships.

[While each of these end forms of the socialization process has by one or another been nominated to the role of moral character, it is here suggested that character may yet be clearly distinguishable from any of them.]

Moralization of persons, thus, is one among the forms by which socialization has been seen to occur. It is here proposed that the formation and development of moral character is, in turn, one among the alternative forms by which the moralization of persons may occur. Moralization, then, would not necessarily be identical with development of character except as the former might take the form of the latter.

While the end effect of the moralization of the individual may take one of the forms enumerated above, Brown (1965) has described the ideal outcome as something very

like moral character as here conceptualized . . . "that rare state which has been mistakenly assumed to be usual," i.e., "some reasonable consistency among judgment, feeling and action" (p. 414).

The commonly and long held notion of moral character has represented it as either . . .

1) a constellation of culturally approved traits or behavioral habits into which culturally defined virtues (e.g., honesty, altruism, self-control) have been translated; or . . .

2) a set of virtues--whether culturally or divinely specified--which has been translated into measurable habits of behavior in temptation situations.

[As commonly proposed (e.g., by Aristotle, William James and much religious educational practice) development of such a character is accomplished by a) training in 'good habits' through precept, example, practice, and reward; and b) discouraging of 'bad habits' through preventing either their practice or reward.]

Alternatively, moral character has been seen simply as cultural standards internalized in the course of socialization and taking the form of . . .

3) conscience--a personality structure consisting of 'introjected parent' and energized by guilt formation; or of . . .

4) anxiety-conditioned behavior cued by situational factors. (A 'character' construct is not only difficult to recognize here, but learning-theory proponents in general have specifically repudiated the construct as such--see e.g., Berkowitz, 1964.)

['Internalization' has been seen to be variably fostered by a) parental disciplinary practices; b) parent-child relationships; c) adult and peer modeling; and/or d) reinforcement schedule.]

As stated above, except for the pseudo-character represented by anxiety-conditioned behavior, moral character has commonly been presumed to be some sort of internal structure by which proscribed behavior is inhibited. In the case of anxiety conditioning, there is not seen to be any internal structure . . . behavior is determined instead by external situational cues as they have become conditioned operants.

What, then, may evidence and theory regarding the moralization of persons be said to contribute to clarifying the whole idea of MORAL CHARACTER?

First and foremost, they actually raise serious question as to the very existence of any identifiable, internal disposition or stable quality of person that individuals bring into situations that can be depended upon to mold their behavior in any predictable manner. The Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) conclusions, for example, were that individuals

emit behavior that is honest not because they themselves are honest, but simply because the particular behavior elicited by situational cues happens to be able to be defined as honest. The same conclusions seem indicated by the conflicting evidence regarding both a) the antecedents of theoretically suggested structures, and b) the lack of correlation between such structures and behavior.

On the other hand, reference has already been made to the factor analysis of Hartshorne and May findings by Burton (1963). He found the Hartshorne and May interpretation to be confirmed by a number of correlations between situation-specific factors and the variations reflected in the several tests of cheating behavior. At the same time he also found a small but significant "general factor." This has been variously interpreted a) as evidence of a trait of honesty, or b) as differential sensitivity to threat of punishment. Kohlberg (1964), on the other hand, suggests that this general factor may more probably represent a general "character tendency." In support of this conclusion he cites the Hartshorne and May finding that measures of honesty, service, and self-control all correlate among themselves (r= .21 to .33) as closely as do the tests of honesty within themselves. He contends that this could hardly have been so if based simply either on an honesty trait or on sensitivity to threat of discovery.

> These findings suggest a core of truth to commonsense notions of general good character, and provide some justification for adding up measures of various aspects of moral conduct into a total assessment of moral character. (p. 387)

Nevertheless, the facts seem to be that one of two conclusions is inescapable:

1) There really is no psychological structure that individuals bring into situations that serves to lend a consistently moral pattern to the behaviors they emit whatever the variables of the situation.

2) If there is such a structure, the attempts to intervene in its formation have been so notoriously ineffective as to make its function extremely difficult to detect in empirical observation.

At the same time, and on the other hand, Kohlberg and others have shown clear evidence that seems to demonstrate beyond question that there is in individuals a developable capacity--a developmentally actualizable potential--for such functions as:

1) Discriminative valuing

2) Principled decision

3) Moral judgment

4) Implementing moral judgment in behavior regardless of conflicting situational cues, inclination, group expectations, or other environmental contingencies

Moral character defined. In light of the evidence, it is here proposed that a defensible definition of character might be something like . . .

> THE ENTIRE CONSTELLATION OF PERSONALITY ELEMENTS THAT SERVE TO GOVERN THE FORM OF BEHAVIOR BY WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL WILL RESPOND TO THE SITUATIONAL CUES TO WHICH HE IS SUBJECTED (e.g., health, intellect, talents, attitudes, beliefs, values, conscience, etc.).

Moral character could then be distinguished as . . .

> SUCH AN ORDERING OR STRUCTURING OF THOSE ELEMENTS OF PERSONALITY AS WILL SERVE TO RENDER THE INDIVIDUAL'S BEHAVIOR SUBJECT TO RATIONALLY SELF-ESPOUSED PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

From another viewpoint, character could be described as the entire pattern or structure of an individual's intrinsic motivational promptings as "abstracted from the raw data of the myriad social behaviors in which individuals engage" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 369). Moral character could then be described as . . .

> THE PATTERN OF INTRINSIC MOTIVATIONS WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL IMPLEMENTS IN BEHAVIOR TO WHICH HE PERCEIVES MORAL STANDARDS TO ADDRESS THEMSELVES, BEHAVIOR THAT MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS CONFORMING TO CULTURALLY--OR DIVINELY--DEFINED VIRTUES AND VICES.

[Moral judgment here is taken to mean the evaluating of situations, and of behavioral alternatives within those situations, and the making of decisions, on the basis of basic moral values or principles.]

Principle defined. Having thus related character to principle, there is indicated a need to elaborate somewhat on the latter, especially by way of foundation for yet a further enunciation of the character concept. Everyday usage commonly equates "a man of character" with "a man of principle." Again, whereas "moral judgment" is frequently seen either as moral character itself or as a primary component of it (e.g., Kohlberg throughout; Hare, 1959; Wilson et al., 1962), Hare further equates moral judgment with "decisions of principle."

As used by such writers, a comprehensive statement would equate PRINCIPLE with:

> A unique category of VALUE--a value that is
>
> 1) autonomously and rationally derived and held;
> 2) overridingly prized and implemented;
> 3) to which is accredited the status of a generalized INTENT or END that is
>
> a) perceived to be of universal application,
>
> b) from which derive such REASONS for behavior as tend to PRESCRIBE forms for that behavior
>
> . . . under whatever kinds of circumstances may prevail,
>
> . . . for all people on all similar occasions.[3]

A principle, thus, has two basic elements: a) an end or intent, generalizable over a variety of circumstances; and b) the behavior prescription entailed in that end.[4]

Against the background of this consideration of the meaning and function of principle (along with that in the related Notes) there is foundation for yet a further definition of moral character as being

THE PRODUCT IN PERSONALITY OF DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE.

It is here postulated that as a consequence of decisions among behavioral alternatives which an individual makes in terms of conscious reference to principle (or to a moral standard or value) there is a cumulative residual effect in the personality. Essentially, this is what is legitimately and defensibly referred to as his moral character. Once more, moral character may be defined as

THE CAPACITY FOR, AND THE COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF, MORAL JUDGMENT OR DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE.

For the purposes of this study, the following brief working definitions of principle and of moral character (in two dimensions) are submitted:

PRINCIPLE = A value-derived and value-prompted intent or end, of such a nature as to be behavior-prescriptive.

CHARACTER =

1) The capacity as well as disposition
   a) to discern, consult, and be subject to Principle, with its behavior prescriptions; and
   b) to withstand inclination to disregard them.
2) The content of the body of principles which an individual is disposed to consult and be subject to.

[It will be noted that this definition of character a) makes no attempt to indicate what the 'capacity' and 'disposition' may consist of; and b) takes no account of the repertoire of behaviors available to the individual for his implementing of principle. These considerations will be dealt with in the two sections following.]

It is here submitted that a twofold mistake has commonly been made, i.e.:

1) Presuming that the one dimension of character entails the other. That is--transmit a body of principles, and it may reliably be expected that disposition to implement will ensue. Again--develop the capacity and disposition, and the content of the principles may be relied upon to fall into the desired pattern.

2) Failing to recognize that many seemingly effective ways of influencing content of an individual's body of principles often militate against the capacity and disposition to espouse and implement them.

It is on the other hand acknowledged--indeed contended--that by the time an individual has derived and espoused for himself an integrated body of principles which he is prepared to consult and be subject to, the probabilities are rather large that those principles will be quite acceptable to society. [There undoubtedly are 'principles' underlying the behavior of the immoral as of the amoral; but the

assumption seems justified that they are not consciously espoused as such, nor is there any deliberate subjection to them. In such a case, situation, inclination, or expediency are undoubtedly the determiners of behavior.]

Evidence indicates, however, that it is far less probable that assent to a commendable body of principles will automatically reflect itself in the capacity and disposition to consult and be subject to those principles, or to withstand inclination to disregard them.

Finally, and by way of summary, it remains that MORAL CHARACTER is a hypothetical construct which conceptualizes at least two distinct dimensions of personality:

1) Every individual has his own individual 'character,' consisting of all the discrete attitudes, values, feelings, beliefs, dispositions and habits that tend to predispose him to particular patterns of behavioral response to situational stimuli. His behavioral output may be rather consistently 'moral,' although it may be distinctly unmoral. Nevertheless, this is his moral character.

2) On the other hand, there is in each individual a measure of disposition towards a generalizing of morality to all his predisposing attitudes, feelings, beliefs, values and habits. Here the reference is to moral character.

In the first instance, character is a constellation of personality elements and dispositions; in the other, it may itself be recognized as a trait of personality.

With regard to the morality of character, a common sense analysis of what is encompassed in the everyday expression 'good conscience' suggests comprehending it in three dimensions:

1) There are those whose lives are governed entirely by expediency or even by hedonistic impulse. (Phenomenologists would probably explain that due to threat to need satisfaction, their perceptual field is limited to these considerations.) For such persons, 'good conscience' may be mostly irrelevant.

2) Then there are those whose lives are governed by rules and conventions. Compulsive and strict adherence to the rules alone enables them to enjoy 'good conscience.'

3) Finally, there are those whose lives are governed by the purpose or intent of the principles out of which all but arbitrary rules grow. For them, 'good conscience' is the product of seeing the purpose approximated.

The literature (see Chapter III) has shown that the actual correlations which emerge among these three dimensions of morality, as well as the correlations which emerge relating instances within each of the dimensions, while

usually positive, are mostly low. High correlations are generally missing. It is this that has led many virtually to discard 'character' as a viable construct. It is the very essence of this study, however, to discern means of raising those correlations, rather than discarding the construct because of low correlations.

Further Constructs Significant to Moral Character

The bulk of recent studies and thinking concerning the origins and development of individual morality--as of moral character--have focused upon variables in social environment and experience. Indeed, it seems undeniable that the moral or social content of 'character' is in fact a product of the consequences of socialiazation processes.

Individuation

On the other hand, it is here contended that the capacity and disposition to respond to principle (see above) are the product of a process that is to be distinguished from 'socialization' as it is usually conceptualized. Thus, it is proposed that the primary source of the qualitative dimensions typically attributed to the commonsense notion of 'character' (e.g., stability, perseverence, resistance to temptation) is a process which has been referred to as individuation--as opposed to socialization. [Most accurately, 'individuation' may properly be recognized as one among the various processes of socialization. Nevertheless, the two need to be clearly distinguished.]

As conceptualized by Jung (see Wolman, 1973) 'individuation' refers to the developing to fullest capacity of all the various systems within individual personality. The realization or actualization of the self which results from this developing process thus becomes distinct from the original, undifferentiated wholeness in which the personality systems originate.

As here abstracted, however, individuation is more specifically defined as establishing or identifying the facts and perceptions which may serve to afford differentiation of the individual from environmental others (see Ziller, 1964). Contrasting processes have been referred to both as 'deindividuation' and 'depersonalization,' as well as 'socialization.' While the product of individuation as here used is a more or less clearly differentiated self, the product of the contrasting processes has been described as 'ego diffusion' or 'anonymity.' [As was suggested above, such individuation might actually more accurately be referred to as one among distinctive kinds of socialization.]

Among others, Ziller has drawn attention to a very basic tension--hypothesized as present in all individuals--between . . .

1) pursuit of ego differentiation through individuation, and . . .

2) pursuit of ego diffusion through group identification (i.e., socialization).

Analagous to this tension between pursuit of ego differentiation and ego diffusion is that between independence seeking and dependence seeking. Ziller proposes, however, that this latter tension is only a symptom of the former. It is when ego differentiation has eluded an individual that he may lash out in a bid--sometimes bizarre, sometimes violent, but always aggressive--for independence. Given a clear differentiation of his self, the aggressive bid for independence would be both unnecessary and unlikely.

Not only is the differentiation-diffusion tension more basic than that of independence-dependence, but the pursuit of differentiation is seen to hold priority over the pursuit of diffusion. Thus, Erikson (1959) has characterized the establishment of a 'self' clearly differentiated from environmental selfs (i.e., ego identity) as one of the major developmental crises that must be negotiated if individuals are to become fully or even merely adequately functioning. Differentiating the self takes on the nature of a 'drive.' It is postulated that experience of individuation is so basically reinforcing that those situations will be preferred which afford the widest variety of criteria for distinguishing or differentiating the individual self from the other selfs in the environment.

At the same time, ego diffusion is reinforcing under certain conditions. It is to be recalled that the Nirvana pursued so avidly in Buddhist life and philosophy is essentially a total and utter ego diffusion. The individuation

of ego differentiation tends to be pursued in supportive social climates that promise to afford respect, esteem, regard, admiration, approbation, and similar positive reinforcement (individuation emerging thus as 'instrumental'). On the other hand, the anonymity of ego diffusion may tend to be sought in intimidating social environments that threaten the individual with being the target of contempt, scorn, ridicule, disapprobation, censure, harm, and other such negative reinforcement. (It may be hypothesized, thus, that the attainment of Nirvana is seen as release from the ceaseless and insatiable pursuit of that differentiation which is essential to any kind of satisfying human existence, but which may largely be denied by the social environment.)

Pursuit of ego diffusion may thus afford opportunity for escape from the threat potential that a given situation poses for a differentiated ego. Again, it may afford opportunity to escape from a persistently unsatisfied pursuance of ego differentiation in a criteria-poor environment. On the other hand, diffusion of ego through group identification may itself serve as instrumental to individuation as the individual's primary reference group is contrasted with other groups.

While he acknowledges the function of ego diffusion and cites evidence to suggest that there is a cyclical nature to the pursuit for differentiation and for diffusion, Ziller (1964) nevertheless maintains that the pursuit of individuation holds precedence. However much the social

climate may threaten, functioning as an individual demands ego differenation from some source or other.

In support of his formulations regarding individuation, Ziller offers evidence cited by various other researchers in connection with their theoretical positions. Thus, from the evidence he has found, Festinger (1954) has derived a theory of social comparison. He has hypothesized, thus, that individuals experience a drive to evaluate themselves with other specific persons whose opinions and abilities do not differ too widely from their own. Ziller, on the other hand, contends that this drive to social comparison actually derives from the even more basic need for a clearly defined self-concept, for a differentiation of the self as opposed to ego diffusion. In support of his contention, he cites a hypothesis of Festinger's own theory, i.e., that "the tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one's own increases" (p. 120). Ziller holds that the preference for comparison with a person whose opinion or ability is closer to one's own is due to the fact that this affords a more refined delineation of the self than is comparison with a person who, because his opinions and abilities deviate so markedly from one's own, is simply categorized as 'different.'

Schachter (1959) has seen first-born and only children as having "higher need for affiliation" than do others. Ziller (1964), in contrast, has interpreted the evidence as

suggesting that by the very nature of their relationship with parents, first-born and only children are sufficiently more individuated as to be less threatened by some ego diffusion, less driven by a need for achieving differentiation, and less disposed to anxiety in depersonalizing situations. At the same time, having been accustomed to individuation, these children will cyclically return from diffusionary relationships to those that are individuating, or will seize upon individuating elements within the diffusive situation. On the other hand, the first-born or only children, Ziller suggests, will be inclined to seek highly individualized roles (prominent, affording personalized regard) in the depersonalizing situation.[5]

Ziller cites and reinterprets studies by Fiedler to further clarify and support this theory of individuation versus socialization. Fiedler (1960) conducted a series of studies of what he called the 'psychological distance' of leaders. As a measure of this 'distance' he employed descriptions (given by several task-group leaders) of the group members with whom they had gotten, or would best get, an assigned task done, and the ones with whom they had previously had or would have the most difficulty working. The results showed that the leaders of the most productive groups were those who indicated the greatest variance between the ratings of their 'best' and their 'worst' members.

Fiedler interpreted this as indicating that the leaders of the most productive groups were 'psychologically

distant' as compared with those whose closer personal relations prevented their giving widely varying ratings to 'good' and 'poor' workers. Ziller, on the other hand, holds that what was actually measured was the leaders' capacity and readiness to discriminate among workers and to communicate that differentiation. He finds here evidence, thus, that productivity is enhanced as group members are enabled to experience themselves as 'individuated' as well as to perceive (in themselves) the bases of the differentiation.

As already indicated, in some cases self-identity (individuation) is fostered through identification with a group. In others, however, the effect is ego diffusion. Due to the postulated primacy of the pursuit of individuation, it must be assumed that where the effect is ego diffusion the consequence will tend to be repudiation of the group and its norms. Where escape from the group is not practical, the recourse will often be to identification with another group and its norms as a source of differentiation.

When differentiation is readily available to the individual within his associations, it may be expected that he will retain and even intensify them. When, on the other hand, individuation continues to elude him, it is suggested that his pursuit may well lead him to alienation from or repudiation of his group associations. And since a clear sense of ego differentiation derives from social comparison, that very alienation will further deprive him of the opportunity

for self-definition--a vicious circle which, it is proposed, eventually precludes anything comparable to adequate human functioning.

Ziller (1964, p. 344) has interpreted the delinquency studies (e.g., Glueck and Glueck, 1950) as suggesting that . . .

> delinquency is flight from ego diffusion or lack of identity resulting from parental relationships that fail to regard the individual child as singularly important or as someone whose presence or existence makes a significant difference in some emotional sense to the parents. In addition, these parents fail to help the child to develop a well-defined boundary system that can be incorporated in the self-structure. [Mothers of delinquents were found by Glueck and Glueck to be less warm (45 per cent to 80 per cent), more indifferent (21 per cent to 3 per cent), and much more likely to be lax (57 per cent to 12 per cent).] Thus, in search of an identity, the child turns to deviant behavior, which is singular and well delineated by definition.

The implication, thus, is that the greater the individuation afforded in more conventional social relationships, the less likelihood there is that it will be sought in deviant or bizarre forms.

The indication becomes compelling that to the degree an individual has experienced in his social environment clear individuation or ego differentiation, to that degree he will have a clear self-concept. At the same time, Snygg and Combs (1949), Purkey (1970) and Ziller (1971)--among numerous other self theorists--cite an extensive body of empirical evidence to support their hypothesis that individual behavior is essentially implementation of self-concept. Thus it is here further hypothesized that to the degree that social

interaction has provided a source of individuation, to that degree behavior may be relied upon to be freed from situationally specific factors and therefore individually determined.

It is here further proposed that this is a necessary (though by no means sufficient) component of such "character" as may be reliably expected to implement principled moral judgment in consistently "moral" behavior.

Instead of focusing on the process of socialization in which the reference group becomes a primary factor in behavior, the definition of character would seemingly shift its focus to individuation. Here, clarity and definition of self-concept would seem to contribute to the likelihood that whatever the social environment, the individual would have a clear concept of his self to which to be "true." It would contribute, moreover, to the capacity and disposition to be subject to decisions of principle.

The Neural System.

There is a body of evidence from the field of neurological science that is not directly related to processes of socialization or moralization, and consequently it has not been included in the literature regarding moralization of persons. Nevertheless, it has such a direct relevance to habit formation, and thereby to internal structures affecting moral behavior, that it requires consideration here.

Eccles (e.g., 1968, 1973), eminent Australian neurologist, has made a classic study of the synaptic junction

(i.e., the space between the axon of one nerve cell and the dendrite of another) across which nerve impulses must pass in proceeding from one nerve cell to the next. With the aid of electron microscopy he has determined that minute button-like enlargements come to form at the synapse end of axon fibers (i.e., the sending fibers of nerve cells). He has dubbed them with the French "bouton." His findings reveal that the bouton is a product of relatively high-level electrochemical energy impulses generated in the brain and passing through the nerve cell. The outcome of the impulse is generally to stimulate some kind of behavioral response. Whenever a nerve impulse traverses the same neural route from cell to cell from the brain to a terminus it produces the same behavioral outcome. Repeated transmission of impulses over the same neural route is further found actually to increase the build-up of the bouton formations among the axon fibers in proximity to the dendrites of those cells involved in producing the particular behavioral outcome.

The significance here is that the boutons were found to secrete the chemical acetylcholine--among others--which tends to "close" the synaptic gap between the axons of the sending cells and the dendrites of the receiving cells of the neural route involved in producing a given behavior. Thereby is increased the likelihood that a subsequent nerve impulse will move along the neural course where the boutons are concentrated rather than any one of the myriad others it might take. A thought or action that is often repeated,

then, would contribute to the deposit of boutons at the ends of the nerve fibers productive of that thought or action, increasing the likelihood that, once initiated in the brain, nerve impulses would traverse the identical route--with increasingly less nerve energy--to produce the same thought or action. Hence, there is demonstrated to be an actual tissue base for behavioral predispositions.

In his classic study of the practice of psychiatry, Sadler (1936) described established habits as literal pathways through the nervous system, such that frequent repetition of the same thought, feeling, or action "wears a deeper groove," just as repeated walking over a lawn will wear a deep path in the sod.

In confirmation of this, Chalmers (1975) cites a conversation with neurologist-brain surgeon Penfield. The latter spoke of his studies of brain stimulation in patients undergoing open-brain surgery. He reported his findings that nervous tissue responds more readily with each stimulation. Actual physical changes are found to take place in the responding nervous tissue as a result of the stimulation.

Eccles' evidence indicates further that the higher the level of energy in a given nerve impulse, the greater the build-up of boutons. Furthermore, the more decisively a decision is made--as opposed to a wavering decision, or a decision by default--from among the available options, the higher the level of nerve energy emitted by the brain. Thus, the evidence suggests that boutons are formed in response to

any kind of decisive action of the decision-making faculties of the mind. Given repetition of such action, neural pathways create habits that may range all the way from a tendency always to start with the right foot when putting on shoes, to a tendency to strike automatically the correct keys on a typewriter, to a tendency to defer to a particular principle in a given moral issue.

There is an important distinction to be made here between a) the neurological aftermath of 'decisions of principle,' and b) that of reacting to cues or complying with pressures that are extrinsic to the moral issues involved. Evocation of the latter produces overt behaviors conditioned to the situational factors. With the former, on the other hand, the immediate behavior evoked by the situation is not an overt behavior but a 'decision of principle' which could thereupon mediate a behavior that is not subject simply to a reflex conditioned to factors of the situation.

There is a large difference, then, between Aristotelian "habits of virtue" and the honesty that may emerge from bouton-based habits. Aristotle is seen to promote the repetition of honest acts. It has been shown, however, that this will produce a predisposition to similar acts only when identical situational cues are to be recognized. Bouton-based habits, on the other hand, may come to include the cognitive apprehending of the moral issues in a situation and the making of decisions of principle. The habits that may be expected to produce consistently moral behavior are

not, thus, the habits of honesty or of altruistic behavior such as Aristotle seems to have envisioned.

There is, thus, nothing about all of this that necessarily challenges the Hartshorne-May hypotheses to the effect that to whatever degree behavior in a given situation is 'honest,' it is due to specific cues of the situation. The critical point is that whereas the cues may elicit a direct, overt, reflex-type behavior, they may instead elicit a 'covert' cognitive process. The 'honesty' of a behavior is not indicated to be due to a habit in overt behavior. There is nothing in the neurological evidence that points to a 'habit of honesty.' As Hartshorne and May contend, honest behavior may be due simply to a reflex conditioned to cues in the situation.

On the other hand, what does seem to be clearly implied by this neurological evidence is that the immediate behavior evoked by the situational cues may be covert rather than overt, i.e., cognitive. The 'habit' may be a predisposition to a particular cognitive structuring of perceptions of situations. In particular, the cognitive behavior elicited may be the making of a decision of principle. Depending upon the principles espoused, then, the decision may be to opt for a behavioral alternative that is honest . . . because it is honest. The habit that contributes to consistently honest behavior is thus not itself behavioral but cognitive.

It is here contended, then, that the neurological residue formed in the process of unequivocating decisions of

principle affords predispositions in subsequent issues of principle that must be reckoned with in a comprehensive conceptualization of 'moral character.' In fact, a final definition of the construct emerges:

> MORAL CHARACTER IS THE CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION a) TO APPREHEND THE MORAL PRINCIPLES OF A SITUATION AS AMONG ITS CONTINGENCIES, and b) TO ASCRIBE PREEMINENCE AMONG THE CONTINGENCIES TO THOSE PRINCIPLES.

Analysis of the Proposed Conceptualization of Moral Character

In order further to elaborate and analyze the conceptualization of character here postulated, the following propositions are posited.

> Proposition 1a. MORAL CHARACTER REPRESENTS PRIMARILY A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT--AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A BIOLOGICAL OR PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT.

While physique (e.g., mesomorphy, endomorphy, ectomorphy, etc.), temperament (e.g., extroversion-introversion), neurological conditions (e.g., high-low neuroticism), and other largely hereditary characteristics, are seen to influence strongly individual responsivity to character-forming interpersonal experiences, they are not themselves seen as constituents of character. [See, however, Proposition 2.]

> Proposition 1b. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THIS CONSTRUCT CONSIST OF CERTAIN COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE COMPONENTS.

These character-constituting components are to be clearly distinguished from 'traits.' Traits are here considered to be properly seen simply as generalized descriptions of more or less consistent behavior patterns. Contrary to common assumption, but in keeping with Hartshorne and May findings (1928-1930), they are not accredited with any dynamic influence of their own to mold behavioral responses to external or internal stimuli such as to conform behavior to the trait.

The constituent components of character are here proposed more properly to be seen, then, as: a) cognitive--especially beliefs, attitudes, values, principles, moral insight or judgment and certain ego controls; b) affective--especially feelings of guilt, attachment, warmth, hostility, altruism.

Thus, in harmony with Roback (1927), it is here contended that character is not to be equated with personality. The cognitive-affective functions of personality provide the 'stuff' of character . . . they provide the latent capacity out of which character comes to be. Once developed and developing, character itself becomes an aspect of the personality along with such others as intelligence, temperament, physique, physical apparatus, etc.

While aspects of personality such as temperament may be directly affected by such things as endocrine alterations, character as an entity is not thus directly altered by such physiological events. Again, for an individual to lose a

limb or an organ does not thereby directly alter either his individual entity or character. There would be little denying, however, that such entity often does actually experience pronounced alteration by way of indirect consequence as the loss is mediated through attitude and self-concept.

> Proposition 2. IN ADDITION TO THE PRIMARY PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORAL CHARACTER, THERE ARE ACQUIRED NEUROLOGICAL STRUCTURES WHICH DERIVE FROM ORGANIC QUALITIES OF THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM.

As already noted, psychological literature rather generally either a) denies credence to a functioning will, or b) ascribes functions of such will to ego operations, especially to attentional processes. It is here proposed to account not only for habit but for a functional will in terms of synaptic structures of the nervous system--as well as of ego-attentional processes.

Reference here is to the "boutons" discovered and described by Eccles (1968, 1973). It is held that these formations which appear to be laid down in synapses by the flow of electrochemical energy contribute significantly to the behavioral outcome of stimulus situations. Boutons appear to be formed among the synapses in consequence of the relatively high flows of energy that result from decisive decision--as opposed to wavering decision or to decision by default --from among available options. These boutons establish a readiness for a similar response on subsequent occasions (see p. 230ff.).

It is here contended that these neurological formations (i.e., those bouton formations laid down in neural tissue in the process of decisions of principle) afford predispositions of habit and of will in subsequent issues of principle that must be comprehended among the constituent components of 'character.'

Proposition 3a. THESE COMPONENTS COME TO FUNCTION IN AN INTEGRATED PROCESS OF COGNITIVE INTERACTION --AS DISTINCT FROM FUNCTIONING EITHER IN ISOLATION OR 'MECHANICALLY' (cf. Freudian mechanisms).

Again in harmony with Roback it is here proposed that human personality is distinguished from even the 'highest' type of animal individuality in that it functions as character. This is to say that while cognition, affect and specified neural structures may all three be credited in isolation to animal experience, the cognitively interactive functioning of these distinguishes the human personality.

This is not to deny the functioning in human personality of Freudian-type 'mechanisms.' But it does deny that their function there is inevitably in any kind of fixed, unvariable or mechanical manner such as is more characteristic of animals, and that permits little variation except as may be in keeping with the mechanism, and then only after 'painful' training. It is here proposed that character is one of the structures in human personality that permits self-initiated modification of behavior in keeping with the perceived situation.

Proposition 3b. THIS INTEGRATION OF COMPONENTS FURTHER INTERACTS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS OCCURRING IN THE PHENOMENAL FIELD TO COMPOSE A 'FUNCTIONING' OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

In harmony with Hartshorne (1930) and others, a 'functioning' is here seen to involve the distinctive meaning which an interaction holds for the whole of an interrelationship. Thus while ice may generally be seen as a cooling agent, its function in one instance is to preserve foodstuffs, in another to reduce the swelling of a sprained ankle. As an individual perceives meaning a) in his contributions to an interaction, and b) in the interaction to a cosmic whole, his behavior becomes truly 'responsive' as distinct from 'consequential.' It is only out of such responsive behavior that character emerges.

Formation and development of character, thus, are greatly influenced by the perceptual or phenomenal field. They cannot occur apart from experienced meaning of interaction between individual and his phenomenal reality.

Proposition 3c. THE BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE REPRESENTED BY THIS 'FUNCTIONING,' ITSELF SERVES REFLEXIVELY AS AN ELEMENT IN THE CONSTANTLY EVOLVING PROCESS OF INTERACTION.

The interaction of cognitive and affective components and the interaction of components with experienced situations constitute a constantly evolving process. 'Character' as here postulated may then be said to consist in the

traces left upon personality by the functional interactions of a) an individual, and b) his experienced situations. As Lustman (1962) suggests, character itself may thus be viewed as a constantly evolving process.

Proposition 4. FROM THIS WHOLE INTERACTION PROCESS EMERGES A FUNCTIONAL ENTITY WHICH IS PROGRESSIVELY SELF-INTEGRATING AND DYNAMIC.

It is thus here hypothesized that 'character' is no mere summation of anything . . . traits, habits, characteristics, or what have you. The capacity inheres in personality to integrate the traces left upon it by the interactive 'functionings' here being considered. The very interacting of these traces is the process above suggested to be character.

Proposition 5. IT IS THIS DYNAMIC ENTITY FUNCTIONING TO MEDIATE INCOMING STIMULI AND GOVERN RESPONSE TO THEM THAT IS THE PRIMITIVE 'CHARACTER.'

In order that this emergent 'entity,' this primitive character, shall function, there must be phenomenally perceived options. There must be an invitation to decision-making behavior (see Szasz, 1967). Apart from this, behavior could be little more than mechanical or consequential. Given such a decision-making opportunity, it is here postulated that 'character' is called into function.

Proposition 6. IN THE EVENT THAT AN AROUSED WILL EMERGES TO SALIENCE IN THE INTERACTION PROCESS, CHARACTER BEGINS TO FUNCTION ABOVE THE PRIMITIVE LEVEL ON A MORE TRULY 'MORAL' LEVEL.

It is postulated, thus, that the crucial component of moral character is the human will. While cognitive functions are basic, there can be no character as it is here abstracted except as the will becomes salient in the interactive process. As Frankl has observed (1959), man's final and absolute freedom is his freedom to choose (will) his own attitude in any given situation. It is the exercising of the will that opens the way for character to function on a moral level.

> Proposition 7a. THE PRIMARY MEDIATIVE FUNCTION OF CHARACTER IS TO INHIBIT IMMEDIATE INCLINATION IN FAVOR OF THOSE VALUES OF THE INDIVIDUAL THAT PARTAKE OF THE NATURE OF 'PRINCIPLE.'

The two basic elements of this proposition are a) inhibition of impulse, and b) principle. In harmony with Roback (1927) it is proposed that the actual psychological event instituted by character is inhibiting action produced by response to phenomenally espoused principle.

Admittedly this seems negative. It might seem preferable to postulate character as a more positively motivating influence. But there is no call for a mediative function if the salient impulse has a positive quality. Doing the 'right' thing when the 'wrong' thing is inconvenient is no problem, as Huck Finn so well knew. It is when a salient impulse must be inhibited in order for the 'right' thing to be implemented that 'character' must function.

It is not mere inhibition of impulse that is proposed. If character is to be involved, the inhibition must be deliberate implementation of principle as it is perceived and espoused by the individual.

Wilson (Wilson, Williams and Sugarman, 1967) summarizes criteria that suggest which of an individual's values may be considered to be 'principles.' For opinions or values to be accredited as principles . . .

> 1) They must be autonomous (freely held). 2) They must be rational. . . . 3) They must be impartial as between persons. 4) They must be prescriptive. One might very roughly express the last two criteria as follows: if someone expresses a moral opinion ('It is wrong to steal,' 'It is a good thing to keep one's promises,' or whatever), then i) he is laying down a principle of behavior not just for one particular person or occasion, but for all people on all similar occasions, ii) he commits himself to acting on that principle (though of course he may sometimes lack the means or the will power so to act); that is, a moral opinion does not just make an observation about what is good or bad, but (if sincerely held) prescribes for the person, or commits him to, a certain type of behaviour. 5) They must be overriding: that is, they must take precedence over his other opinions. [Wilson appears to use 'moral opinion' here as 'principle' and 'opinion' as inclusive of 'value'.] (p. 77)

Proposition 7b. THE INHIBITIVE FUNCTION MAY OR MAY NOT BE AT THE SERVICE OF CULTURAL MORES AND SOCIAL ETHICS.

The matter depends entirely upon whether or not the mores and ethics are based on principle. If they are not, then conformity to them is not to be ascribed to character.

Proposition 8. AS A COGNITIVE FUNCTION, 'CHARACTER' IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM ALL IRRATIONALLY COMPULSIVE OR NEUROTIC FORMS OF RIGIDITY.

While character will, by definition, contribute to consistency of behavior, this consistency is not to be confused with 'neurotic mechanisms.' The consistency is deliberately, intentionally produced for accordance with voluntarily espoused principles. As Wilson (et al., 1967) says, "If people are to act morally at all, . . . they must act for a reason in this sense: they must not be, so to speak, just pushed around by causes" (p. 50).

Proposition 9. REPEATED EXPERIENCE OF INHIBITING OF IMPULSE IN FAVOR OF A PRINCIPLE DEVELOPS A KIND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INERTIA OR MOMENTUM.

It has here been postulated that the history of an individual's experience of conflicts between principle and inclination produces a neurological and a psychological fact. That fact may be apprehended as an inertial force or momentum patterned after the trend of the history of this experience. And it is this postulated psychological-neurological fact of an inertial force or momentum, developed in experience of conflict between principle and inclination, to which the term 'character' is here specifically applied.

Proposition 10. IT IS FROM THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENTUM THAT CHARACTER DERIVES ITS DYNAMIC QUALITY.

Proposition 11. FUNCTIONING IN THE SERVICE OF PRINCIPLE, CHARACTER SERVES TO SUSTAIN a) INDEPENDENCE FROM TEMPTATION, AND b) INDIVIDUATION IN THE FACE OF THE PRESSURES OF SOCIALIZATION.

Character may thus be seen as the capacity to sustain independence from a) internal pressures of impulse, feeling, inclination, as well as of neurotic compulsiveness; and from b) external pressures and coercions from persons or circumstances.

Ziller (1964) gives no hint that he is concerned about moral character as such. Nevertheless he addresses himself to concepts that appear to be central to it. Thus he deals with the two processes of socialization and individuation. In a very meaningful sense, character may be seen as the capacity to sustain a vigorously operating individuation process in the face of all sorts of environmental pressures, while experiencing the fullest profit from the socialization process.

Proposition 12. BEING ITSELF A COGNITIVE STRUCTURE, CHARACTER IS CONTINUALLY SUBJECT TO RESTRUCTURING.

Proposition 13. A PRONOUNCED DEVELOPING OF CHARACTER OCCURS AS A RESULT OF a) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENTUM THAT GROWS OUT OF REPEATED EXPERIENCE OF INHIBITING IMPULSE IN FAVOR OF PRINCIPLE (OR VICE VERSA), AND OF b) THE CONTINUAL, LIFE-LONG RESTRUCTURING IN THE OVERALL INTERACTION PROCESS.

Proposition 14. THIS 'DEVELOPMENT' OF CHARACTER MAY BE EITHER TOWARD OR AWAY FROM INTEGRATION, STABILITY, AND REGULATION BY PRINCIPLE.

Proposition 15. CHARACTER, WHILE MORE DEVELOPED IN SOME THAN IN OTHERS, IS NOT ABSENT IN ANY COGNITIVELY FUNCTIONING HUMAN BEING.

It is here contended that character is not something which an individual may have or not have. Moreover, it is not something of which an individual may have less or more. It may, however, be strong or weak to maintain consistency with principle, while the principles espoused reflect themselves in the form of behavior.

Character, thus, is here postulated to be the quality or manner of an individual's functioning among the moral issues of life . . . whatever that quality or manner may be. To develop it is to effect change in it (in harmony with the development theory of Kohlberg--see Chapter III). As the process of functioning becomes more and more characterized by the momentum of a given inertial direction, it becomes increasingly difficult to alter the character to any appreciable extent.[7]

Proposition 16. CHARACTER IS BEST TO BE DESCRIBED NOT BY TESTING, MEASUREMENT OR EVALUATION OF OVERT MORAL BEHAVIOR, BUT IN ONE OF TWO FORMS:

a) IN TERMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S LEVEL OF MORAL JUDGMENT AS MEASURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH KOHLBERG'S (see any number of his works here cited) MORAL JUDGMENT SCALE.

b) IN TERMS OF THE DEGREE OF INDIVIDUATION OR SELF-DEFINITION EXPERIENCED BY THE INDIVIDUAL (see Ziller, 1964), AS INDICATED BY MEASURED STRENGTH OF EGO CONTROLS.

In summary. Character, then, has here been conceptualized as an essentially psychological entity--with the notable exception of the neurological structures referred to in Proposition 2 (see p. 237). It is seen as a dynamic, cognitive functioning of the personal system that to the degree of its development mediates phenomenal experience of stimuli and governs responsive--as distinguished from consequential--behavior. A satisfactorily functioning character is seen as consisting of well-developed affective and conative components at the service of and subject to a similarly well-developed and dominant cognitive component.

As suggested in Chapter II in connection with the consideration of the theory of Wilson et al. (1967), their explication of 'morality' comes just short of the conceptualization of 'character' here developed. It is here contended that if their 'morally educated' person is to be seen as having developed character; if their 'morality' is to be extended to comprehend 'character,' then one further criterion or specification must be added.

This final criterion is that there must be a consistently and reliably ongoing quality about an individual's moral behavior. Acts in themselves moral but scattered and occasional amid a general way of life at variance with them are to be seen as coincidental or situation specific, and cannot be truly considered 'moral behavior.'

Thus to their five criteria for a 'morally educated' person must be added yet this other:

> 6) In consequence of repeated commitment to moral behavior in rejection of pressure to do otherwise, [a morally educated person] experiences a dominant, dynamic inertia or internal drive to persist in behavior that is a positive response to moral thinking.

Or again, to their six phenomenological descriptions of attributes of morality (e.g., PHIL, GIG, EMP) must be added:

> 7) A component or attribute that is a developed inertial tendency for their--i.e., the other listed components--capacity to implement principles into action to be functioning regardless of the pressures not to [KARTeros].

Wilson et al. certainly repeatedly contend that there must be a translation of moral thinking into moral behavior if there is to be true morality. If, then, they would accept the further specification just mentioned, then their morality would be most difficult to distinguish from the conceptualization of character here being proposed. Of course, they might not accept such a specification, in which case character and morality would be thus distinctive concepts.

Formation and Development of Moral Character

It has here been postulated that moral character is

. . .

> Such an ordering or structuring of those personality elements that serve to govern the form of behavior by which an individual will respond to the situational cues to which he is subjected, as will serve to render his behavior subject to rationally and self espoused principles of right and wrong. (See p. 216.)

Again, it has been postulated to be . . .

> 1) the capacity--as well as disposition--
> a) to discern, consult, and be subject to principle . . . with its behavior prescriptions; and
> b) to withstand inclination to disregard them;
>
> 2) the content of that body of principles which an individual is disposed to consult and be subject to. (See p. 218.)

If, then, this be granted, what may be deduced from available evidence as to how moral character comes to be? Moreover, how may its formation and development be promoted?

It appears indisputable that the concept verbalized in the Aristotelian formulation has been the fundamental premise upon which most character education has been based. Aristotle declared (1955, 1956):

> Virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. While intellectual virtue owes its birth and growth to teaching, moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. The moral virtues we get by first exercising them; we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. (pp. 55-56)

It seems to have been presumed that inducing children to habitual behavioral conformity to prescribed values assures formation of character of a corresponding form. If compliance can be obtained--by virtually whatever means--it

will assuredly become character fabric . . . the habits formed by children's compliance to behavioral prescriptions will surely come to form their principles and traits, and these, in turn, their character.

In accord with such an Aristotelian concept, it is clear that conventional understanding has widely assumed consistent conformity to moral values--be it voluntary or coerced--virtually to guarantee formation of moral character. At the very least, it has typically been seen as sure evidence of individual morality--often even being equated with it.

Thus it has been further widely assumed that any methods conducive to such behavioral conformity are correspondingly conducive to development of morality or moral character. In the name of character development or education, then, traditional or conventional methods have largely consisted in attempting to teach the practice of conventional virtues, rules, manners and beliefs by conditioning, by persuasive indoctrination, by exercise of authority, if necessary--even by "brainwashing" of various kinds.

As has been repeatedly cited in this study, however, studies have frequently demonstrated that variations in parental discipline and training in good habits have not produced consistently correlated variations in measures of children's honesty, responsibility and obedience behavior (see e.g., Burton, Maccoby, and Allinsmith, 1961; Grinder, 1961; Harris and Valasek, 1954; Rau, 1964). Further, it has here been

repeatedly noted that Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) found no relationships between their tests of honesty and character education in Sunday School, Boy Scouts or special classes.

These negative findings need not be seen to conflict, however, with the demonstrated effectiveness of training and punishment to produce short term resistance to temptation and situational conformity (Aronfreed and Reber, 1965; Walters and Demkow, 1963). There is no indication from these studies that training and punishment produce general habits of character that function in different types of situations (e.g., permissive, surveillance-free, sanctionless, etc.). As noted in the preceding paragraph, however, there is considerable evidence demonstrating that training in good habits or conscience formation do not thus carry over to consistently moral conduct in such different situations. These methods have rather generally failed to produce distinguishable groups of honest and dishonest children. They have moreover failed to produce individuals whose behavior--whether honest or dishonest--in one situation will reliably predict behavior in other situations.

One prominent exception to this failure may be noted in the current Soviet system. Bronfenbrenner (1962) has observed extensively both the method and the product of Soviet socialization. Clearly it has produced citizens who can be relied upon for consistently predictable conforming behavior --behavior that does not vary with situational variability.

(It remains possible that the effectiveness of the system is due to inducing a sense of the pervasiveness in all situations of certain behavior-eliciting cues.)

In order to produce a citizen disciplined to the Soviet style, however, authority, peer group pressure and threat of surveillance and sanction have to be exercised in ways that are transparently offensive to a democratic society. They are certainly and patently contrary to the American Constitution.

At the same time, as described by Bronfenbrenner, it is only the systematic manner in which the methods are used at which many people can justifiably take offense. After all, methods such as prescriptive moral formulae, guilt formation, group sanction, peer pressure, surveillance, external restraint, etc. have all along been used unsystematically by traditionalists in moral education. As he describes the product of this systematic Soviet socialization, however, it differs vastly from the rational self-control that has here been postulated for 'moral character.'

With but a few exceptions (e.g., Festinger and Freedman, 1964), reports of research and theoretical formulations typically read as if the attempt were being made to account for character development exclusively by either guilt formation, anxiety-conditioning, or development of moral judgment. While this may serve to be conducive to the testing of null hypotheses, it is here submitted that it has not been productive of an understanding of the process of moral

or character development. The alternative suggestion here proposed is that no one of these processes alone accounts for the formation and development of character. Any attempt to do so actually obscures the nature of the process.

Studies by Kohlberg [e.g., of Milgram's (1963) obedience subjects; and by Haan, Smith and Block (1968) of Berkeley "sit-in" participants] have shown a strong correlation between level of moral judgment and consistent morality of action (see Kohlberg, 1972b; Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971). It has already been noted here that Kohlberg's evidence shows the development of such moral judgment to be an ongoing reorganization of previously existing cognitive structures. He does not, however, attempt to account for the formation of the initial structures.

It is here submitted that both guilt formation and anxiety-conditioning antecedents contribute to that formation. On the other hand, it is further proposed to recognize as conclusive the evidence and logical support for the notion that both mature morality and mature character consist essentially of mature moral judgment in interaction with strong ego controls. That being the case, it will be held that once basic conscience structures and behavior patterns have been internalized (in harmony with both psychoanalytic and learning theory formulations), the primary developmental processes for character are those described by the cognitive-developmental orientation (see Chapter III).

Kohlberg (1964) has drawn attention to the well attested conclusion that the core structures of both superego and anxiety-conditioning functions are essentially formed and stabilized in the first few years of life, to be altered very little--if at all--in later years. He has seen thus, that moral behavior has not lent itself to any kind of age-developmental analysis. On the other hand, he has pointed to moral judgment as being subject to stages of pronounced development that continue to occur on into adult life.

If, on the one hand, moral character be equated with superego or conditioned guilt-anxiety, there is little indication for considering development of moral character in the framework of the counseling process. As already noted, the essential form of these structures is specifically shown to be firmly established in the earliest years . . . before a counselor normally encounters the individual. If, on the other hand, moral character be identified as moral judgment, capacity for decisions of principle, or as decision and 'will' functions of ego strength, then because development has been demonstrated to occur well into adulthood, the counselor's relevance becomes defensible. As already noted, it is the latter view of character that is adopted in this study.

Intervention for Character Formation and Development

Premoral formations. Kohlberg has spoken extensively to the effect that the basic processes involved in moral development have to do with the restructuring of cognitive organizations of perception. In contrast, the position has

here already been taken that it is the intial character formations--themselves premoral--that are to be accounted for through processes postulated by psychoanalytic and learning theory and confirmed by research. [It will later be contended that a major mistake has quite widely been made in failing to differentiate between formational processes and developmental processes: it will be held that they are not only distinct, but that among conditions contributing to the one are some that are inimical to the other.]

It is here postulated, then, that the formational processes--as distinct from developmental processes--by which 'primitive'character structures come to be are elucidated by all of the best research findings on a) antecedents of formation of conscience and moral restraint, and on b) contemporaneous conditions of modelling, identification and habit formation. On the other hand, it is only these formational processes to which these findings are relevant. It will shortly be otherwise postulated that developmental processes must be accounted for by other means.

Summarizing primarily from Becker (1964) and Hoffman (1962, 1970), the following brief outline is presented of factors shown to be effective in producing 'internalized' structures relevant to primitive character:

1) Frequent and consistent communication of an unconditional warmth and affection.

2) Communication of a conditional approval: i.e., an early introduction to rules and consequences for adhering to or violating them.

3) Use of whatever extrinsic pressures are required --but no more--to obtain consistent conformity to norms and values deemed essential. (It should be noted that the area under consideration here is 'formation' not development. The latter has been shown to be deterred by extrinsically pressured conformity.)

4) Exercise of love-oriented discipline: while all disciplinary encounters contain some components a) of power assertion, b) of love withdrawal and c) of 'induction,' the optimal approach for establishing these premoral formations most susceptible to development into moral character gives predominance to the discipline components in the reverse order, combining this with frequent expression of affection.

   a) Avoidance of power-assertive methods.
   It is important to note with Hoffman (1970) that any disciplinary encounter generates a certain amount of anger in a child by preventing him from completing or repeating a motivated act. Techniques with high power-assertive components have been shown to be most apt to arouse intense anger in the child as they frustrate both the child's need for autonomy and his need to complete the motivated act--at the same time that

they provide an aggressive model for dealing with subsequent conflicts of will with others.

b) Limited use of love withdrawal.
All discipline encounters communicate some disapproval and may therefore be expected to arouse the child's need for approval in varying degrees. Techniques with pronounced and unqualified love withdrawal components are especially likely to arouse not only this need but often even an intense anxiety over loss of love. Both power assertive and love withdrawal methods tend to focus attention of the actor on consequences of behavior for himself, rather than for others.

c) Preferential use of 'inductive' techniques (i.e., reasoning, thinking about the intrinsic effects of the behavior for others). Hereby, rather than dealing with the emotional experience of the discipliner, attention is focused on the precipitating issue --giving opportunity to think about it without undue anxiety over loss of relationship, as well as possibly to do something constructive about it. Inductive approaches have been demonstrated effectively to enlist already existing emotional and motivational

resources within the child--his need for approval, his empathy by which he vicariously experiences the damage he has caused another. Induction is viewed as both a) directing the child's attention to the other person's pain, and b) communicating to the child that he caused that pain.

At the same time, it is important to note that using reasons to support demand for behavior can be risky. When the reasons are rejected a) because they are 'beneath' the hearer, or b) because they are not comprehended by him, the behavior is likely to be rejected as well.

5) Distinction between the first 3 years and later years--moving from firmly restrictive to continually more permissive approaches.

6) Provision of consistent modelling of desired behavior and attitudes, especially communicating the importance of considering others.

7) Maintenance of family cohesiveness.

8) Recognition of a sex differential with regard to optimal effect:

   a) An overdose of affection and control being shown to be a common experience and danger for girls;

b) An underdose of affection and control being shown to be a common experience and danger for boys.

Having such an outline for consideration, Becker's (1964) cautions become apropos: there is considerable evidence supporting the caution against extremes in such areas as a) either restrictiveness or permissiveness; b) use of love withdrawal--"it may be so powerful a control method that the development of independence is jeopardized" (p. 204); c) hostility--"a measure may actually facilitate a child's readiness to cope with the realities of independent living in our society" (p. 203). Rather than any exclusive enthusiasm for any of these, Becker offers the caution that it may be more indicated to think in terms of optimal levels rather than a "do or don't."

At the same time, there is considerable evidence from numerous studies (see Chapter III) that the methods just outlined provide an optimal approach for intervention in formation of primitive character structures. In the light of conceptualizations of character here postulated, however, it can hardly be over-emphasized that it is 'premoral formations' for which effective intervention has been described. A strong possibility needs to be recognized that some methods conducive to formation of conscience, resistance to temptation, behavioral conformity to external values, etc., are actually a deterrent to development of individual morality or character.

Ego capacities. The evidence is strong (see above, this chapter) that ego capacity variables more satisfactorily account for variations in individual moral behavior than do superego variables. Certainly it seems justified to assume with Hoffman (1970, p. 93) that . . .

> a prerequisite for . . . a [reality testing] conscience is a level of cognitive development advanced enough to allow the person to consider alternative actions and weigh them in light of both his values and the particulars of the situation.

However, interventions for development of such cognitive strengths as intelligence, attentional processes, extended time perspective, etc., appear to cover an extremely broad range of human experience . . . more broad than is justified for treatment in this study. Suffice it to point out here that essential to cognitive development is a wide range of human interactions in an environment made stimulating by its opportunities for experience and discovery. Additionally, any development of moral judgment contributes, by definition, to cognitive development. Hence, all of the factors indicated for the former (see below, this chapter) have significance as well.

Whatever, then, contributes to cognitive development is here recognized as contributing to an essential prerequisite to development of moral character. That is not, of course, to say that the two are equivalent; historical and common sense observation are sufficient to establish that many highly intelligent individuals have been largely devoid of a recognizable morality or moral character. At the same

time, it is probably a reasonable assumption that a relatively advanced level of cognitive development is indeed necessary--if not sufficient--for a functional moral character.

Moral judgment. Though maturation in moral judgment may not be sufficient for equation with development in moral character, the present conceptualization of character postulates maturation as necessary to the development. It is very largely in the area of moral judgment, then, that the developing of character is here postulated to occur. Both psychoanalytic and learning theory formulations hold that the essential internalizations and identifications produced by moralization are established very early in a child's life (see p. 253 and reviews in Kohlberg, 1964). Beyond early childhood they see the basic structures of moral character to be essentially fixed. Moral judgment, on the other hand, has normally only begun to develop by the time a child is ready for school. Moreover, such is the nature of the transformations which it undergoes that its involvement in moral character renders the latter liable to and capable of considerable development long after the time other theories leave the structures they abstract as fixed.

Kohlberg and others have extensively documented the stage-sequence progression within which moral judgment is developed. A considerable body of evidence has demonstrated such development to be transformational progression of qualitatively different attitudes that grow sequentially out of premoral attitudes which themselves are the product of the

dawn of cognitive perception of social environment. This transformation process is a result largely of role-taking the attitudes of others in social interaction. If unfrustrated, the process is seen inevitably to lead to a transforming of concepts and rules as external things into internal principles.

The evidence indicates that a program of intervention calculated to develop premoral attitudes and conscience into matured moral character needs to include the following factors:

1) As a prerequisite: the primitive premoral formations [e.g., conscience, social awareness and attitudes, etc.].
2) As a prerequisite: ongoing development of cognitive and ego functions.
3) Unabashed familiarization with cultural beliefs, attitudes, values and principles.
4) An environment rich with opportunity for and invitation to social interaction [warm, close, affectional, non-threatening].
5) A just environment affording equitable and universal recognition of fundamental human dignity [including the child's or individual's own].
6) Wide and varied experience in role-taking [Kohlberg contends that this is the central stimulus and precondition for moral development]. Mosher and Sullivan (1974) characterize role-taking as

> a) an awareness by the individual that there are other people who are like himself but who have different feelings, desires, and ways of seeing the world, and b) the tendency to look at one's own behavior from these others' points of view and interests. (p. 4)

In other words, central to development of moral judgment and character is involvement both actively and vicariously in implementation of empathic appreciation of the other's experience.

7) Opportunity for and encouragement of self-definition; development of self-esteem.

8) An environment rich in opportunity for decisions of principle--rich in truly viable options, relatively free from arbitrary, retributive, extrinsic consequences [while at the same time unprotective from reciprocal, intrinsic consequences].

9) Frequent encounters with dissonance arising out of self-chosen, principle-conforming behavior that is in conflict with immediate inclination; experience of such prompting to principle-conforming behavior as does not vitiate dissonance. The relevant cognitive dissonances are those between a) the meanings which basic moral principles hold for the individual; and b) their application in situations of moral ambiguity.

10) The stimulation of confrontation with genuine moral dilemmas [i.e., moral conflict situations in which self-espoused values are ambiguous or

problematic]. A Blatt and Kohlberg study (1973) tested and confirmed the Turiel (1969) postulate that the central condition for reorganization or upward movement in moral and character development is cognitive conflict. For this to occur, there must be freedom to exercise viable options (it being impossible productively to confront a moral issue at the same time as promoting a selected resolution of the dilemma). To 'stimulate' would involve confronting the individual with issues for which his dominant mode of reasoning will prove inadequate.

11) Experience in self-resolution of conflicting moral obligation [stimulating that cognitive reorganization of meanings which is true moral development by confronting conflictful situations and affording opportunity for decision of principle and its implementation as distinct from decision of expedience]. The significant aspect is not the solution of the dilemma at which the individual arrives, but the mental and emotional process by which he seeks a solution . . . the considerations he employs in resolving the ambiguity. The centrality of role-taking is here emphasized: individuals who fail to take the role of others experience no real moral conflict.

12) Exposure to modes of moral reasoning one Kohlberg stage in advance of the individual's own [i.e., that are more integrated and inclusive than his]. Note has already been taken that using reasons to support demand for particular behaviors can be risky: when the reasons are rejected because they are beneath the hearer's level of maturity or because they are not comprehended by him, the behavior is likely to be rejected as well. Comparably, modes of reasoning tend to be rejected if they are below the level at which an individual is functioning or if they are too far above (more than one Kohlberg stage). Individuals tend to assimilate most the highest level of reasoning that they can understand (see Turiel, 1969, and Blatt and Kohlberg, 1973). Since conflict is necessary to spontaneous usage of next-stage-up reasoning, and since some prior spontaneous usage (at least 20%--see Rest and Turiel, 1969) is necessary for a child to comprehend "+1 exposure," the utter uselessness is obvious of attempting intervention for character development by verbalizing of such moral platitudes as it seems desirable to adults for the child to utilize. It is not so much verbalizing socially preferred moral views that fosters actual new learning. Rather, it is stimulating

use of what has already begun to be assimilated, comprehended, and even preferred of next-stage-up reasoning. It is the individual's own restructuring of experience and meaning as it is a) demanded by experiencing the inadequacy of his dominant mode of reasoning, and b) enabled by role-taking experience. In fact, it has been shown that the development process must be initiated by the individual himself as, in confrontation with conflict, his spontaneous use of higher forms of reasoning--already comprehended by him--is supported by the +1 exposure.

13) Experience of responsibility for action in harmony with self-resolution of conflicting obligations and impulse.

14) Functioning of the above stimuli and opportunities for development during critical periods. Mosher and Sullivan (1974) call attention to the evidence that there appear to be critical age periods when transitions between the three Kohlberg levels of moral development are most easily accomplished. Thus, the ages ten to thirteen cover the period when transition from preconventional to conventional moral reasoning is most likely to occur, while ages fifteen to nineteen are the comparable time for transition from conventional to postconventional thinking. In fact . . .

> Longitudinal studies show that children who do not achieve conventional moral thinking by age 13 probably will not achieve postconventional thinking in adulthood. . . . Those people who do not begin to use some (at least 20%) postconventional or principled thinking in this period [before 20] are also unlikely to achieve postconventional moral reasoning in adulthood. (p. 4)

In summary, to afford an individual with opportunity for and stimulus to experiences in role-taking; to stimulate moral conflict by drawing attention to genuine moral ambiguity and dilemma; to expose him to modes of thinking that are more integrated and inclusive than his own; then to leave him to do his own reorganization of meanings--this is to foster character development. This is a process that does not in any way deprive the individual of his own human dignity or freedom.[8]

Principle derivation. By very definition, essential to development of moral judgment is self-apprehension and espousal of a progressively more integrated body of principles. At the same time, the two have been seen to be concurrent--even one and the same thing. For rules, norms, etc., to become principle requires a radical and transformational cognitive process that is far more a matter of assimilation than of internalization, and that has been equated with development of moral judgment.

Rather than incorporating/internalizing a body of values and principles as transmitted to them by others, individuals derive the principles which they truly espouse by assimilating those principles to which they are exposed in the arena of resolving moral conflicts and ambiguities.

In fact, it becomes evident from both experimental studies and common sense observation that meaningful values --to say nothing of principles--cannot be 'transmitted' in whole cloth at all. They are intensely personal and extremely subjective. They originate 'inside' a person as he individually processes his own social experience.

For those preoccupied with 'transmitting values' it is significant that they recognize that by the time an individual has actually assimilated (as distinct from incorporated or internalized) what they have transmitted, it may well be quite unrecognizable. [A rather vivid example of this could probably be recognized in the experience of many a father of today who, as a young man, served patriotically and proudly in his country's armed forces during World War II. Doubtless many of these fathers shared with this author an utter loss to recognize the values they had thought they were transmitting when their sons announced their readiness, at any cost, to resist the draft during the Vietnam War. By the time these boys had fully assimilated and restructured for themselves, the outcome proved often to be a real shocker!]

It seems clear that nothing can be more deceiving or uncertain than the outcome of conformity that is born of compliance. No matter how much conditioning be effected, nor how much demand of authority and sanction be imposed, the "moral philosopher" that every child/individual is (see Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1968b), himself determines the form that

cultural or religious values will actually take in his moral character by the moral reasoning that he does about them. It is, then, the quality of that moral reasoning that ultimately determines the quality of the body of principles he will derive and espouse.[9]

Behavioral conformity to specified values by their subjects cannot be the primary objective of those concerned with intervening for development of moral character. The postulations of cognitive dissonance theory indicate that giving priority to this objective commonly contributes to an individual's actually externalizing rather than internalizing values or principles. Instead, it is this 'assimilating' of values that alone affords moral growth.

At the same time, such assimilation may not always result in behavior identical to the model, or conformant to the intent of the value specifier. In fact, this assimilation does not immediately or directly issue in behavior at all. Rather, its direct outcome is principle--such principle as tends to self-implementation in behavior prompted for actualization of the principle rather than for conformity to a model.

Apart from the impossible task of controlling an individual's cognitive processing or assimilating of incoming information, there is no way of controlling or even predicting the form it will take in his cognitive-affective system. Providing a child with a package of information, or contriving to obtain from him a specified behavioral pattern, does

not for a moment determine or even suggest the form it will take in the cognitive-affective system of his moral character.

On the other hand, the evidence has been seen to indicate that whatever the content of the input, a naturally developing moral character inevitably tends toward that maturity of moral judgment which functions in terms of ethical principles. There must, of course, be freedom to develop, along with appropriate stimulation from the individual's interpersonal interactions within his circle of society.[10]

Research evidence and moral philosophy combine to suggest that an integrated body of ethical/moral principle is the product of:

1) A personal values-clarification process through experiences in valuing in terms of the Raths, Harmin and Simon (1966) formula of a) choosing freely from among viable alternatives; b) openly prizing the choice made; and c) repeatedly acting on the choice in a pattern of life.
2) An ongoing individual restructuring of the meanings that ethical norms hold in situations of moral ambiguity.
3) An openness to awareness of all available behavior options.
4) A subjecting of behavior options to principle as currently apprehended, implementing that behavior, and resolving any resultant cognitive dissonances.

5) An ongoing process of principle modification and rational dissonance resolution (see this chapter, first part).

It seems clear, then, that character development requires exposure both a) to rules, norms, values and principles, and b) to modes of moral reasoning a stage above that at which the individual is functioning. But promptly to demand behavioral conformity is to 'short circuit' the process by which the self-espoused principles of moral character are derived. Of course, there may be occasions on which behavioral conformity must take precedence over development of character, and on such occasions whatever authoritarian means as are necessary may well have to be used. But it cannot for a moment be supposed that corresponding character will result. As has already been suggested, just the opposite may in fact be the outcome.

Moral character and temptation. At least one further area requires consideration if elaboration of the character development process is to approach completeness. Reference is to the mutual effect of moral character and of temptation on each other. As here conceptualized, moral character tends very largely to govern the outcome of 'temptation situations,' while character itself is very largely affected by those outcomes of temptation.

A temptation, by definition, involves incentive to behavior that promises attainment of felt values. It is when the desirableness of values is phenomenally experienced

that incentive is present. When the behavior to which incentive is thus present conflicts with espoused values that are phenomenally experienced as hierarchically superior, then 'temptation' has been experienced. The 'temptation syndrome,' as here abstracted, has then not yet run its full course, however. Following the experiencing-of-the-incentive phase, there comes a consideration phase in which values and outcomes are weighed and ordered. This consideration is followed by a mental and emotional consent either to the hierarchically superior values, or to those that are inferior.

If the consent is to the superior values, the temptation situation may be said to be over.[11] If, on the other hand, the consent is to lower values, then a phase of planning may ensue during which the implementation of conflictful behavior is anticipated and planned. The temptation syndrome finally climaxes in the behavioral implementation.

The longer form of the 'temptation syndrome,' thus, includes the following distinct phases:

1) Situationally elicited experience of incentive
2) Consideration
3) Consent
4) Planning
5) Implementation

In a very important sense it might well be contended that whatever the outcome of temptation experience, it remains the 'long form' that is followed. Thus, the temptation situation is not resolved until behavior has been planned and implemented in accord with the consent to principle or incentive.

It is here proposed, thus, that what occurs during the consideration phase as well as following it tends to be governed by 'character.' Whether the consent is to principle or to situationally cued incentive tends to be determined by character, and itself affects character. If character tends toward consent to principle, then temptation can be expected to be resisted, while strength of character itself is further developed in the direction of the principles that were operational. If, on the other hand, extant character tends toward consent to immediate incentive, then a yielding to temptation may be expected, with concurrent development of readiness to ignore principle subsequently.[12]

Notes

[1]It seems pertinent at this point to note, in the terms here being used, the province claimed by the Christian Gospel. The Gospel claims to function by the introjection of stimuli uniquely calculated to arouse the will to such exercise as will radically restructure the phenomenal field. Its claims to exclusiveness as a 'saving agent' are rested in this unique capacity to arouse the will and fashion attitudes.

[2]Again, the distinctive claim of the Christian Gospel is here seen to be that through its provisions it is possible decisively to interrupt the disintegrative tendency universal in man as we know him.

[3]As Value, principle is to be distinguished from those opinions and beliefs, as well as attitudes, feelings, goals, and aspirations that Raths et al. (1966) refer to as "values indicators" which may or may not develop through the "valuing process" into values.

To be such, all values--and especially principles--have to be both rationally and autonomously derived, rather than transmitted, inculcated or otherwise imparted by social agents.

For a value to become a principle, it must hold overriding precedence even over other values in the individual's value system--it must have such priority in his hierarchy of values that in a values conflict it will be implemented at the expense of those other values.

No matter how highly prized, beliefs, attitudes, aspirations, etc. cannot be accredited as either values or principles of an individual unless they be implemented

in his pattern of life. It is from that pattern of life that his principles may be discerned.

To be counted as a principle, a value must represent for the individual a basic and fundamental end or objective which he moreover perceives to be--without any respect of persons--a desirable end for all persons under all similar circumstances.

The most fundamental aspect of 'principles' is that they 'entail' or necessitate particular kinds of behavior if they are to be operative, becoming thus 'prescriptive' in very essence.

[4]By way of illustration (adapting from Hare, 1959), the 'circumstances' may be that an individual is in the midst of busy traffic and wants to change lanes. There is a 'principle' to the effect that "In order to afford safety and equitable convenience for all traffic, all drivers should give proper signals before altering their course of direction or stopping." Admittedly, there are laws to this effect. But those laws become far more than a societally enforced norm when or if the stated end becomes for the individual an overridingly prized, autonomously held and implemented value equally applicable to all men in such situations.

Again, the 'circumstances' may be that an individual is threatened with severe censure and loss if, upon questioning, he were to acknowledge some behavior of his. It has been held that there is a 'principle' to the effect that "In order to facilitate those interrelationships among persons necessary for actualization of their potential, it is essential that all persons be open and truthful in their communication." If the individual prizes such open relationships and the actualization they afford above avoidance of the experience of personal censure and loss threatened by discovery, then the principle may be considered his own. His truthfulness will then be 'prescribed by his principle, not by societal practice or sanction, however 'internalized.'

Hare (1959), among others, has drawn attention to the necessity--while firmly invoking principle in decisions--of flexibility in the discerning of principles. That is to say, knowledge of principles is primarily a consequence of behavior in kinds of circumstance. Thus,

the principles of safe driving--as well as the knowledge of them--were not somehow produced intuitively in whole cloth. Instead, they were put together by deduction as kinds of behavior were found to fit--or not to fit--kinds of situations.

Hence, as situations unspecified in the seminal enunciation of a principle arise, it is important to be able to apprehend--and to make--the modifications in the principle that are called for. Thus, while the general principle calls for signalling before all stops, it would be important to be prepared to make a modification in the prescriptive element of the principle if a child were suddenly to dart in front of a moving car. Clearly, the stop should then be made immediately without regard to opportunity for prior signalling.

A full expression of a principle, thus, would need to include not only the two elements already referred to (i.e., a generalizable intent or end, and a behavior prescription entailed in the end), but also

1) A major premise specifying

   a) the general end, as well as

   b) the kind of behavior necessary to that end;

2) A minor premise specifying modifications due to

   c) prevailing circumstances, along with

   d) the specific behavior called for under those specific conditions.

Thus,

1) In order to provide safety and equitable convenience for all traffic,

   All drivers should always give proper signals before stopping.

2) When an emergency stop is required to prevent running down a child who has suddenly darted out in front of your car,

> You should stop immediately, quite without regard to absence of opportunity for a prior signal.

Hare (1959, p. 75) goes on to note that generations commonly do one of two things: either they seek to transmit intact a more or less rigidified articulation of principles as they have come to discern them under the conditions prevailing in their time; or, in awareness of inapplicability of older enunciations of principle, they despair of having anything at all to pass on. He speaks, thus, of children whose moral education has made of them "good intuitionists, able to cling to the rails, but bad at steering round corners." By way of contrast he points to others who "grow up opportunists." They are "well able to make individual decisions, but without the settled body of principles which is the most priceless heritage that any generation can leave to its successors."

Hare contends that the preferable approach would be to seek to develop in an upcoming generation the capacity to make decisions of principle, to discern principle, and to make effectual modifications to them. To do so, he maintains, is "to become morally adult," that is, to learn

> . . . to make decisions of principle; it is to learn to use 'ought'-sentences in the realization that they can only be verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own. (pp. 77, 78)

There is commonly a confusion as to whether divine laws derive a) from God's authority, or b) from principles. It seems indisputable that whatever God's authority may be, Scripture holds that it is from principle, rather than from His authority, that His laws derive. Reference here is to the affirmation of Jesus that all human relationships--whether with "God" or with "neighbor"--as well as all of divine laws--hang upon the two principles,

> Thou shalt love the Lord they God with all thy heart . . . [and] thou shalt love they neighbor as theyself. (Matthew 22:37-40)

Even for those for whom situationalizing ethics is unacceptable, there is Scriptural precedent for the practice of modifying the 'minor premise' of a principle. Whereas the 'major premise' affirms that the general end of 'neighborly' human relations prescribes that a man shall not take the life of his fellow man, Scripture indicates at least one set of conditions under which the 'minor premise' requires the behavior prescription to be modified; i.e., when specific divine mandate calls upon men to implement divine judgment, rather than being suspended, the principle is to be modified (see, e.g., narratives in Deuteronomy, chapters 2 and 3, and throughout Joshua).

There seems to be unimpeachable evidence that the commands of the Decalogue are an enunciation of eternal principles as they are accommodated to the specific conditions of 'fallen' men. Of course, to the extent that those conditions obtain, the enunciation, reasonably, should hold. On the other hand, there clearly are situations in which the principle, as well as a modified behavioral prescription, need to hold precedence over the specific form of the command.

Is the force of the command forbidding the bearing of false witness against a neighbor to be seen as due to its being a) a prescription of divine authority, or b) an enunciation of the principle "Love they neighbor"? If it is the latter, then if conformity to the command involves imposing avoidable suffering upon a neighbor, what should one do? If the force of the command derives from a prescription of authority, then there could be no question as to the behavior demanded.

If an individual must choose between a) involving his neighbor in avoidable suffering, and b) sparing him avoidable suffering, which should he do? If to spare the other he must lie, if to tell the truth he must involve him, which should be done? If the force of the commands of the Decalogue does indeed reside in eternal principle rather than in the legislative authority residing in deity, then it is essential here to appeal to principle as engaged to circumstance.

It may well be that a decision will be made that, in a setting of a God who can work even disaster to human good, maintaining the condition for open, mutually trusting relationships holds precedence over avoidance of

suffering. (Saint Paul does, after all, speak of the contrast between our present "light affliction" of the moment, and the "far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory"--2 Corinthians 4:17.)

But it is essential that a decision of principle be made--in the light of all the circumstances, including the trustworthiness of God--rather than that an automaton-like application of the command be fallen upon. The latter becomes, in reality, a 'cop out,' and fails entirely to afford development of moral judgment, and the moral character with which that may be equated.

Similarly, the commands of the Decalogue proscribe killing, Sabbath labor, and taking what belongs to another. The behavioral prescriptions of the principle underlying at least these commands have been known to be modified under specified conditions. Thus,

1) to implement the judgment of the Life Giver, killing is enjoyed;

2) in the face of threat to human life and even simply of suffering, Sabbath labor is declared to be in full harmony with the principle underlying the command; and

3) by instruction of him to whom another is 'steward,' taking what belongs to that other is sanctioned.

[5]It usually becomes extremely upsetting--inescapably so--for a confirmedly rule oriented person to be confronted by a principle oriented person. The latter is not always consistent in rule following. His main concern is the purpose and intent of principles and he is prepared to violate rules to attain purposes. Especially to the Expedient and to the Conformer (see Peck and Havighurst, 1960) this smacks of hypocrisy. It does to the Irrational-Conscientious also, but he is only inclined to tighten his own halo a bit. The E or the C is more inclined to 'blow his cool' and abandon whatever rule following he has practiced.

[6]That being the case, there seems to emerge a suggestion for those who have a predefined set of values

and virtues to which they seek adherence. If they can contrive to afford to their charges the kind of differentiating environment that is commonly experienced by first-born or only children, they may anticipate that deviance will not be deemed so desirable as a source of individuation. At the same time, having enhanced a differentiation or ego identity (specificity of self-concept) within a nonthreatening values conformity, they can expect freedom to identify with those values in spite of their tendency to introduce a depersonalizing situation.

[7]It is here that the Christian Gospel claims to introduce a new element such as can transform character, however established it may be.

[8]It is here submitted that the major function that religion (i.e., Christian) has performed in the development of morality has been to attempt to increase resistance to 'temptation' by rendering comparatively absolute a) risk of detection and punishment, and b) the certainty and desirability of reward.

It is submitted further, however, that there is no 'morality' as such in this whatever . . . it is sheer expediency born of egocentrism, whereas morality is, by definition, a social concern--a self-other system.

On the other hand, it is submitted finally that the more desirable functions that Christian religion could (and should) perform are

1) Afford and continually enhance relationship to God--which alone--it may be--can afford the basis for wholesome, potential-actualizing human interrelationships.

2) Reconcile an individual to himself.

3) Afford relationship to the Holy Spirit --to whatever degree Scriptural claims to His efficacious involvement with the human individual are reliable.

4) Afford an extra-human source of reliable information about the principles actually

operative in those relations to which an individual can be party.

5) So free the individual from guilt-anxiety as to eliminate defensive self-justification.

6) Implant new motivations and supply an empowering of will that enables implementation of those motivations.

[9]Scripture (including Jesus specifically) coincides with Kohlberg's contention for the primary influence of moral thinking (e.g., Proverbs 23:7; Proverbs 4:23; Matthew 15:19, 20).

[10]Christian teaching and experience posit Deity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) as paramount elements of the society of those individuals in fellowship with them. Thus, Christian faith affords a circle of interpersonal interaction that includes God, with the impact that such interaction may afford in stimulation to development.

[11]The "wilderness" temptation of Jesus [see the Gospel of Matthew, chapter 4] tapped into values which doubtless were themselves legitimate (i.e., desire for nourishment, for unequivocal evidence of the announced Son-Father relationship with God, for personal dominion over the human race, etc.), and thereby afforded experienced incentive to behavior. That behavior, however, would have conflicted with values that were to Jesus hierarchically superior: i.e., desire for His heavenly Father's approval, for an ongoing faith-fellowship with His Father, for dominion over the entire universe, etc. Hence, though He doubtless weighed His values and the outcome to them of behavior options, He promptly consented to His higher-order values, bringing the "temptation" experience to a prompt close.

[12]It is here submitted that what has been called "communion" or "fellowship" with Christ does not, in and of itself, affect character. It is in test-temptation

situations that the potential for character development resides. It is when incentive to transgression (i.e., competing of values) presents itself, and when the soul's response is "obedience," [" . . . obedience is not a mere outward compliance, but the services . . . and allegiance of love" (White, 1956, p. 60)] that character is formed and developed. It is here proposed that it is important to view 'abiding in Christ' as incorporating not only communion with Him, but also that heart obedience without which communion would be broken.

The concepts here postulated are given a distinctive enunciation in the devotional writings of White:

> It was possible for Adam, before the fall, to form a righteous character by obedience to God's law. But he failed to do this, and because of his sin our natures are fallen and we cannot make ourselves righteous. . . . If you give yourself to Him, and accept Him [Jesus Christ] as your Saviour, then, sinful as your life may have been, for His sake you are accounted righteous. Christ's character stands in place of your character, and you are accepted before God as if you had not sinned.
>
> More than this, Christ changes the heart. He abides in your heart by faith. You are to maintain this connection with Christ by faith and the continual surrender of your will to Him [i.e., heart obedience]; and so long as you do this, He will work in you and to do according to His good pleasure. . . . Where there is not only a belief in God's word, but a submission of the will to Him [again, heart obedience]; where the heart is yielded to Him, the affections fixed upon Him, there is faith--faith that works by love and purifies the soul [character?]. Through this faith the heart is renewed in the image of God. (White, 1956, pp. 62, 63)

Again . . .

> A noble character is not the result of accident; it is not due to special favors

> or endowments of Providence. It is the result of self-discipline, of subjection of the lower to the higher nature, of the surrender of self to the service of God and man.
>
> . . . The tendencies of the physical nature, unless under the dominion of higher power, will surely work ruin and death. . . . The passions are to be controlled by the will, which is itself to be under the control of God. The kingly power of reason, santified by divine grace is to bear sway in the life. (White, , pp. 488, 489)

And finally,

> While God was working in Daniel and his companions "to will and to do of His good pleasure," they were working out their own salvation. Philippians 2:13. Herein is revealed the outworking of the divine principle of co-operation, without which no true success can be attained. Human effort avails nothing without divine power; and without human endeavor, divine effort is with many of no avail. To make God's grace our own, we must act our part. His grace is given to work in us to will and to do, but never as a substitute for our effort. (White, 1958, p. 487)

CHAPTER V
COUNSELING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL CHARACTER

Introduction

Among the many definitions of theory, Stefflre and Maheny (1968) have singled out the following for their possible relevance to the constructing of counseling theory:

1) A human convention for keeping data in order which would be unnecessary if human memories were better than they are;

2) A conceptual model postulated to explain an inner process inferred from observed behavior--behavior that makes sense only if we are able to postulate some such inner process which, if indeed it operated, would result in the behavior;

3) A cluster of relevant assumptions systematically related to each other, and to a set of empirical definitions.

Again, the same authors have suggested that a counseling theory, in particular, represents a combination of the notions a counselor holds about a) himself, b) others, and c) the helping process. More specifically they describe a theory of counseling as a systematic way of viewing the counseling process for the purpose of organizing what is known in such a way as to furnish . . .

1) guides to the counselor's behavior,

2) clues to understanding of the client,

3) directions for counselor education, and

4) suggestions for promising research dimensions of counselor-client interaction.

What, then, is known--what are the data relevant to the function of counseling in promoting the development of moral character? How can those data be systematized so as to capture their meaning? What does that organization of data suggest for counseling practice? The answers to these questions constitute the THEORY which it is the object of this study to derive.

A basic form or model of the THEORY may be enunciated as follows:

1) The data can be interpreted as supporting abstraction of such a quality of personhood as may justifiably be termed 'moral character,' to which some have ascribed value preeminence.

2) The data further support a postulation that there are certain specifiable conditions which account for the existence and developing of that quality.

3) It is therefore reasonable to postulate further that there are counselor behaviors which may be expected to contribute to a measurable increment of that quality.

Elaboration of the THEORY will emphasize four elements of the model:

1) The quality of personhood to which preeminence in value is ascribed;
2) The conditions in general that have been shown to contribute to increments of that quality;
3) Counselor behaviors that contribute to such increments;
4) Measuring increments of that quality.

The Quality of Personhood

It has long been a major goal among agents of socialization to foster formation in individuals of some sort of inner organization and force that would dependably render such individuals both sensitive and subject to considerations of right (as against wrong), and moral (as distinguished from prudential or preferential), whatever the situational incentive or opportunity to be otherwise.

There are at least two basic reasons that have variously contributed to the ascription of value to such a quality of personhood. In the first place, it is often impossible otherwise to ensure that individuals will consistently conform to rules and norms--it is not possible or practical to provide sufficient or sufficiently consistent external reinforcement, coercion, surveillance or even persuasion to assure moral behavior apart from some force internal to the individual that is largely independent of external and situationally variable factors. In the second place, attempting to manipulate and maintain such external pressures has been

perceived to be a dehumanizing process both for the one who exerts the pressure and for the one upon whom it is exercised.

While a behavior-determining internal organization has thus been seen as desirable, the data (see Chapter III) suggest that either there is no such quality of personhood as 'moral character,' or else attempts to produce it have generally been notoriously ineffectual. Until recently (see e.g., Kohlberg and colleagues throughout) there has been little empirical evidence to support the notion that individual behavior is appreciably affected by internal structures brought into a situation that are not subject to situationally specific cues. The evidence has suggested, rather, that morality of behavior is generally the effect not of morality of persons but of situational cues.

On the other hand, evidence has been noted (see Chapter III) that there is something in personality which, across individuals, is variably operative, and which so mediates the influence of situational factors as to render a relative consistency to the moral quality of behavior, independent of those situational contingencies.

Moreover, there is evidence of the occurrence of a developmental process, underway rather universally, which if adequately stimulated and given specifiable conditions, eventuates in a principled moral judgment. Controlling for stage of development has shown behavior to be predictable apart from such situational contingencies as reinforcement,

constraint, surveillance, coercion, etc. To the degree that mature principled moral judgment has been developed, it affords a reliably consistent morality to behavior that is not situation specific.

Among the data cited in the literature here reviewed, therefore, there was found to be a considerable body that supports--even seems to demand--postulation of a quality of personhood which individuals bring into their environment that mediates the input of situational factors in such a way as to contribute a distinguishably moral pattern to the behavioral outcome of those situations. This has been shown to remain true in spite of the considerable evidence that individual behavior seems to be highly situation specific.

At least four basic components are here seen to constitute this quality of personhood. Together they have here been postulated to constitute what has traditionally been termed 'individual character.' These four constituent components are:

1) Temperament as determined by hereditary factors, i.e.:
   a) Morphological characteristics
   b) Introversion-extroversion (cortical function)
   c) Excitability-placidity of autonomic nervous system
2) Acquired features of the neurological system, i.e:
   a) 'Bouton formations' produced in consequence of decisive behavior

3) Ego controls, i.e.:

   a) Differentiated ego identity (individuation)

   b) Cognitive development generally

   c) Intelligence

   d) Extended-restricted time perspective

   e) Attention-persistence

4) Potentially moral structures of personality varying from individual to individual in stage of development--from premoral formations toward mature principled moral judgment--e.g.:

   a) Conscience (i.e., guilt formation and response)

   b) Reinforcement-punishment expectations or anxiety

   c) Attitudes toward rules in general and specific

   d) Attitudes towards objects of moral relevance (i.e., moral ideology)

   e) Facility for role-taking (empathy)

More specifically, the term 'moral character' has variously signified one or the other from among such conceptualizations as the following:

1) A "bag of virtues" (cf. Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971, e.g.). Havighurst and Taba (1949, pp. 3-5) conceptualized character as a composite or sum total of a set of virtues, conceived as those traits of personality which are subject to the moral sanctions of society. Essentially these virtues are seen to be the product of exercise--

they are behavioral habits formed by exercise in the doing of virtuous acts. As Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) point out, the first problem raised by this approach is that of obtaining agreement on which virtues are to be included in the virtue bag.

2) Affective personality structures--here termed 'primitive, pre- or potentially moral formations' --in interaction with temperament. These structures are largely irrational and other determined. Behavior remains a non-rational, impulsive response to situational situation-aroused affective factors rather than to cognitive consideration of moral issues. The essential structures of such moral character are assumed to be universally present from early childhood, at least in 'normal' human beings.

3) Developing premoral formations. While such affectional and primitively moral formations as attitudes and conscience may be seen as an internal influence on behavior, ascription of 'morality' is here denied them. Only as these affectional forces are undergoing the sequential cognitive restructuring consequent to self-resolution of moral ambiguity and conflict are they seen to constitute 'moral character.' Both the process and the immediately consequent quality of

personhood are seen to constitute moral character that so governs individual perception of situations as to 'determine' behavior in them. (It is worth noting that in this sense while self-resolution of moral ambiguity may be predicated on egocentrism and eventuate in a thoroughly immoral or amoral quality of personhood, it still falls under the rubric 'moral character' as used here.)

4) Matured, principle-oriented judgment. This is seen as the inevitable outcome of the developmental process to the degree that it is both unobstructed and afforded essential stimulus. [In a very real sense, this conceptualization of moral character is never more than is represented in the 'developing premoral formations' above. Developmental restructuring of cognitive meanings never ceases so long as new situations are confronted and decisions of principle are made. Nevertheless, usage has included speaking of a 'man of character' in this fourth sense, and this is certainly the sense in which proponents of stimulating character development commonly speak of it.]

The quality of personhood relevant to this Theory of Counseling for Development of Moral Character is essentially number 3 above. It is thus a) the product of cognitively developing primitive, premoral structures, paralleled by and

interactive with b) a developing of ego-control strength, and c) neurological structures resultant from implementing of principled decision.

Essentially, then, moral character has here been postulated to consist of those components of individual character which are subject to a measure of self-control as they function in issues involving interpersonal relationships. The process and experience of self-involved decision making and decision implementing are here posited as the essential formateur and developer of moral character.

Increment-Contributing Conditions

The data attested by the literature here cited support postulation of a number of conditions as primary contributors to existence and developing of moral character. Chapter IV delineated them at some length. A condensed outline includes:

1) Early socialization experience effective in implanting primitive, pre- or potentially moral structures (e.g., anxiety-conscience, rule-oriented attitudes, habits, etc.);
2) A social environment rich in opportunity for, and stimulus to, experiences in social interaction and role-taking;
3) A just environment, rich with communicated respect and regard for each developing individual;
4) Frequent encounter with conflicting moral obligations and genuine moral ambiguity and dilemma,

with all of their uncertainty and disagreement about genuinely problematic situations;

5) An environment rich in truly viable options, affording, thus, opportunity and invitation to self-made decisions of principle, with freedom to implement such decisions while being responsible for their consequences;

6) Incentive to principle-conforming behavior sufficient to induce it, but minimal enough to maximize cognitive dissonance;

7) Exposure to modes of thinking about moral issues that are more integrated and inclusive than those currently being utilized by the individual;

8) Freedom to experience self-definition processes that include being unthreatenedly aware of owned internal promptings;

9) Freedom to explore and reorganize the meanings of experience and principle in an ongoing process of self-resolution of moral ambiguity and conflicting moral obligation.

The data moreover indicate that certain commonly employed character education methods actually inhibit development of moral judgment and character. Prominent among these inhibitive approaches are:

1) Verbalizing of moral precepts or platitudes in a form a) prespecified by and congenial to morally experienced adults, but b) liable to rejection

as a consequence of being too far above the individual's level of moral reasoning (see also item 5 below);

2) Overt indoctrination with values and precepts in the absence of experienced perplexity and uncertainty in, as well as invitation from, the individual;

3) Authoritarian definitions of value and of conflict resolving solutions that preclude the experience of dissonance and the cognitive restructuring that would tend to self-resolution;

4) Persisting, undiminishing imposition of conformity to behavior prescriptions--however desirable their underlying principles--that precludes the opportunity and need for autonomous derivation and development of behavior-prescribing principle.

5) Such appeals to prudence and convention as are liable to rejection--and with them, the behavior thus supported--because they are below the individual's level of moral judgment.

It becomes essential to distinguish between a) attempts at transmitting prespecified 'moral' values and precepts, and b) attempts to stimulate overall moral development. The effect in the former case may indeed be facility at mouthing espousal of a package of values, but an equal facility at abandoning some of those values under situational incentive

or social pressure. On the other hand, the assumption--as well as data-supported expectation--in the case of item b) here, is that the maturely moral individual may be relied upon autonomously to implement moral principles in his behavior, and consistently to resist social pressures to act in immoral ways. Kohlberg has suggested (see Mosher and Sullivan, 1974, p. 8) that at least two central things are happening in the process of such overall moral development. The first is the developing of the individual's capacity for empathy. The second is the "emergence of a more comprehensive understanding of the principle of justice in human relationships and human social units." With that understanding comes an abiding 'field' upon which is perceived--and which thereby inescapably structures--that meaning of situations which tends to determine behavior.

Seminal Postulates

From these considerations emerge the seminal postulates of the THEORY OF COUNSELING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL CHARACTER. They are as follows:

1) Principled moral judgment combined with clearly differentiated ego identity (individuation) and strength of ego controls constitute a developed moral character which can be depended upon to mediate situational input to an individual, and thereby definitively to influence his behavioral output.

2) Identifiable counseling behaviors (hereafter to be described) will stimulate development of principled moral judgment and individuated ego strength.

3) Therefore, it may be hypothesized that such counseling behaviors will contribute to progressive development of moral character.

4) Increments in development of moral character may be measured by comparing from time to time its constituent components, i.e.:

   a) Kohlbergian stage of moral judgment;

   b) Clarity and differentiation of self-concept;

   c) Strength of ego controls.

Contributive Counselor Behaviors

It seems probable that by the time a counselor encounters an individual as a counselee, whatever premoral structures of personality are to be produced have without doubt largely been formed. Certainly the hereditary roots of temperament have been fixed, as have primitive conscience, attitudes, and reinforcement expectations. The counselor thus encounters character as it already exists--his concern is not specifically with that initial formation which has necessarily already occurred. A significant exception has to do with his opportunities to intervene in that environment which shapes that initial formation.

The counselor's function in a one-to-one situation would thus be to join with those whose interaction with the individual tends to stimulate the development of those pre-moral structures and of those ego strengths that enable him to implement principled judgment in a consistent pattern of behavior.

A "Moral Functioning"

A key concept of this Theory--and thus in distinguishing such counselor function--has to do with a "moral functioning." Thus, a central postulation affirms that for optimal contribution to the development of a counselee's moral character it is essential for the counselor to distinguish between a) what is here referred to as a true moral functioning of an individual, and b) the functioning of any of the several constitutive elements of such a functioning. While the functioning of a number of distinct constitutive elements (e.g., affective, cognitive, neurological, and ego-control elements) are necessary to a moral functioning, these all may yet function discretely, without thereby constituting such a moral functioning. The latter is a distinctive interacting of the several necessary--though not sufficient in isolation--elements.

By a "moral functioning," then, is meant:

1) Distinguishing by principled decision which among available alternatives may be adjudged right and which wrong in a moral sense.

2) Commitment of the self to one among the right options thus distinguished;

3) Implementation of the commitment in behavior.

Such a moral functioning is to be differentiated from a) choice by default, b) decision from expedience or preference, c) conformance to a prespecified code of behavior, and even from d) principled decision without commitment and implementation.[1]

This postulation affirms that it is only a true moral functioning that actually contributes to an increment in character development. Hence, while a variety of counselor behaviors has been held to facilitate the likelihood of the functioning of the several constitutive elements, it is here postulated that the optimum--and only truly effective--contribution to character development is afforded by assisting a counselee to experience a complete moral functioning. (It is to be noted, moreover, that a wide range of possible counselor behaviors may actually contribute to precluding the counselee's experiencing of a 'moral functioning,' even while they contribute to the functioning of one or another of the constitutive elements.)

Restated, the postulate affirms that . . .

> To the degree that a counselor is able to elicit from a counselee a genuine moral functioning; to the degree that he can accustom the counselee to the performance of moral functionings in the resolving of perplexities; to that degree there will have been an increment in development of his moral character.

It is contended, thus, that counseling cannot contribute directly to the development of character. Such development must be individually won through actual, full moral functioning. Counseling must be content with whatever intervention enhances an individual's readiness to function thus fully.

Nature of Intervention for Developmental Change

A further key postulation has to do with the nature of the change which development of moral character is seen to constitute, and of the intervention that effects such change. At least three kinds of individual change may be distinguished. They may be characterized as follows:

1) Change which is the result of a natural process internal to the individual that may confidently be expected to occur if not impeded. [Intervention for effecting such change takes the form of providing the conditions that make some inherently natural state possible, freeing the individual from unnatural obstacles. Such intervention has been spoken of as facilitation.]

2) Change which is the result of an internal process that is natural only to the extent that it may confidently be expected to occur upon activation by external factors, or that it would not occur even in the absence of obstacles without activation by external factors. [Intervention takes the form of providing the activating condition

without which some inherently natural developmental change would not ordinarily occur. This intervention has been described as stimulation.]

3) Change which is essentially the direct product of a process which occurs only as external factors produce it in the individual. [Intervention takes the form of providing conditions that cause a state that is not inherently natural--essentially alien--to the individual. Intervention of this kind may be differentiated as causation. Whereas in neither of the first two is the intervention itself the cause of change (the cause being internal to the individual), here the cause of change is essentially the external intervention.]

It is here postulated that the very nature of moral character decrees that optimal counselor intervention for its development must take the form of stimulation as distinguished from either facilitation or causation. Utilizing a counseling situation to afford a contribution to increment in development of the counselee's moral character, then, would consist in focusing on stimulating in him a moral functioning.

This may rather promptly be distinguished from approaches of some other theories of counseling (see, e.g., Patterson, 1966, along with Raths et al., 1966). Both Client-centered and Valuing-process approaches emphasize the intervention of facilitation. Learning-theory approaches,

on the other hand, emphasize causation by reinforcement conditioning. Psychoanalytic approaches to character formation and development also emphasize causation--while at the same time postulating little influence for counselor intervention because of its being too late in the individual's psychosocial development.

Moreover, traditional approaches to character education have, by nature, focused on causation also. The individual has either been seen as commencing life as a sort of tabula rasa or 'erased slate tablet' on which socializing agents attempt directly to formulate or build character, or he has been seen as essentially evil and needing the intervention of external agencies to turn him from his inherent bent to evil.[2]

The intervention-by-stimulation approach, on the other hand, may be compared with the educational theories of Dewey and Kohlberg, for instance (see Chapter III). Whereas such counselor interventions as direct reinforcement of specifically 'moral' behaviors or even facilitation of a valuing process have been shown to leave individual behavior subject to situational cues (see Chapter III), stimulation of developmental change in moral judgment has been shown to predict consistency in behavior, irrespective of situational factors.

Specifically stated, this postulate affirms that . . .

> To the degree that the counselor's elicitation of counselee moral functioning takes the form of stimulating developmental change--as opposed a) to mere facilitation of a valuing process, e.g., or b) to direct causation either by coercive pressure or by

> reinforcement of norm-conformant behavior--to that degree there will have been increment in development of his moral character.

It is here submitted that intervention even to rehabilitate 'maldeveloped' character is most effective when it takes the form of stimulating development. Support for this may be discerned in the evidence sustaining the developmentalists' assumption that moral judgment develops sequentially and in one direction only (see Chapters III and IV).

Counselor Behavior to Stimulate Moral Functionings

There is an obvious parallel between the first element postulated for a 'moral functioning,' (i.e., distinguishing by principled decision which among available alternatives may be adjudged right and which wrong in a moral sense) and Kohlberg's 'principled moral judgment.' Hence it may be concluded that what his evidence has shown to stimulate stage-to-stage development of moral judgment will also serve to stimulate at least the inception of a moral functioning. Furthermore, as has been demonstrated by empirical data reviewed in Chapters III and IV, moral judgment--when controlled for stage or level--can be expected to be implemented in behavior with a relative consistency as to pattern of morality. Hence it is here postulated that many counselor behaviors which stimulate development of moral judgment will similarly contribute to stimulating such a moral functioning as will contribute to development of moral character.

A brief review of counselor behaviors which evidence (see Chapter IV) indicates stimulate development of moral

judgment--contributing thereby to development of moral character--includes:

1) Efforts to stimulate development in the counselee of all those cognitive ego strengths that afford him the capacity to use moral judgment for controlling his behavior (e.g., intelligent prediction of consequences; tendency to choose the greater remote reward over the lesser immediate reward; and ability to maintain stable, focused attention). Thus, the counselor . . .

   a) seeks to enhance his experience of individuation;

   b) seeks to expose him to experience of empathy, warmth and congruence;

   c) seeks to expose him to experience of being truly listened to.

   [While such efforts will not directly contribute to moral functionings, they may be expected to contribute to capacities necessary--if not sufficient--to their occurring.]

2) Efforts to accustom the counselee to confronting and dealing with the moral issues involved in the situations he encounters. To this end, the counselor . . .

   a) genuinely confronts him with the moral--as distinguished from, e.g., the prudential--issues involved in his immediate situation [rather

than attempting to ease anxiety, he seeks to give salience to genuine moral dilemma];

b) fosters his experience of role-taking by unabashedly focusing upon consequences for the rights of others entailed in the alternative courses of action open to him;

c) [While emphasizing thus, the conditional nature of outcomes as determined by counselee's electing from among options, he] perceives and communicates unconditional positive regard for his moral reasoning, whatever its stage of maturity or conclusions;

d) encourages him to examine the pros and cons of his behavior in the light of his own moral considerations.

3) Efforts to stimulate development of the counselee's own moral judgment. Thus, the counselor . . .

a) confronts him with genuine moral dilemma;

b) exposes him to moral reasoning of a stage at a +1 remove from his own;

c) fosters his descrying of moral principle;

d) facilitates his movement toward such situation resolutions as involve decisions of principle.

4) Efforts to facilitate the counselee's avowal of personal responsibility in the moral issues he encounters. To this end, the counselor . . .

a) eschews prescribing of solutions to specific moral issues and imposing conformity to those solutions--as distinct from enunciating administrative convenience regulations and demanding conformity thereto;

b) relieves him from necessity of a defensive maintenance of his position in the face of threat of regard that is conditional;

c) eschews overt indoctrination in the absence of stimulating and utilizing cognitive dissonance;

d) intervenes to foster for him an environment that . . .

i) is <u>just</u>, in which he may himself experience providing input to the nature of expectations laid upon him;

ii) matches its moral demands to his prevailing spontaneous and internal moral demands, avoiding the treatment of behavioral demands as moral in the absence of comparable moral values in the counselee;

iii) refrains from attempting to moralize issues that have no genuine moral meaning outside of a limited environment;

e) seeks to enhance the counselee's decision making capacities, to this end attempting to involve him in settling his conflictful deliberations of moral principle decisively and resolutely.

Stimulating Moral Functioning in the Counseling Interview

Counselor behaviors seen specifically to elicit moral functionings by a counselee, then, include:

1) Establishing clearly that counselee's experience and viewpoint have been empathically heard.
2) Involving him in role-taking the concerns of other persons involved in his situation.
3) Confronting him with moral ambiguities and dilemmas involved in his presenting situation (being alert to apprehend and reinforce any concern regarding what is the 'right' thing to do).
4) Confronting him with the moral issues involved--making a moral issue out of his situation along with considering prudential and preferential issues (while being alert for indications of his level of moral reasoning).
5) Making of the resolution process a principle-formulating process. Mostly, counselee is aware of his alternatives--at least dimly: he needs involvement in search for criteria by which to make a moral evaluating of alternatives and their consequences.
6) Avoiding prescription of behavior while helping to enunciate criteria to be met by behavior.
7) Communicating unconditional positive regard for his moral reasoning.

8) Interjecting content at a stage one level above his manifestly dominant one. Thus outcomes of alternative behaviors may variously be evaluated in terms of . . .

   a) their effect on the self in terms of expediency and avoidance;

   b) their effect on the self in terms of hedonistic rewards;

   c) their effect on others' attitudes toward the self (and thus indirectly their effect on the self);

   d) their effect on others and their concerns;

   e) their effect on the legitimate rights of self and of others;

   f) their effect on the opportunities of all affected persons for approach to a fully functioning state.

9) Involving him in formulating the behavior prescriptions entailed by principles apprehended.

10) Enhancing commitment by reflecting the alternative for which it is perceived that he is opting.

11) Focusing on whatever intrinsic-to-situation incentives there are for implementing his commitment, especially the self-reinforcement to be derived from intrinsic satisfactions due to implementation of principle, as distinguished from extrinsic situational rewards.

The evidence here adduced indicates that having brought the counselee this far, the counselor must entrust him with responsibility for carrying on from here. To lay heavy persuasive pressure on him to implement his judgment will rob his behavior of an essential element of a moral functioning. Thus, even if he actually does the moral thing, if it is in response to external pressure (here, the counselor's) it will very probably not result in an increment in development of moral character.

Stimulating Moral Functioning through Group Interaction

It seems clearly indicated that for the counselor to have the most telling impact on development of moral character, he must make large use of group interaction. In harmony with Oliver and Bane (1971, p. 267) it is here held that given the proper environment, the interaction in a group "forces each of its members to respond in some way to the views of others, whether by rejection, assimilation or accommodation." As they suggest, an ongoing involvement with a group of people "engaged in a search for a truer and more personally relevant view," affords the individual member opportunity and stimulus for continuing experience in such thoughtful exploration of his self, his values, and his personal relationships as fosters development of moral character.

The environment specifically held to be essential if group interaction is to have optimal impact on moral learning (after Oliver and Bane, 1971) includes two major

characteristics. To promote such an examination of rooted and important values as will stimulate development of moral character, a group must first of all be important enough to the individual for him to take seriously the thoughts and feelings of other members. [Research reported by Jacob (1957) has impressively demonstrated that for an environment to have impact on individuals' values, it must be both intense and emotion laden.]

A second essential if the 'moral learning group' is to be influential specifies that the situation be comfortable enough for the individual to disclose himself with some degree of intimacy. That is . . .

> The relationships must be truly open and egalitarian. No member's thoughts should be rejected out of hand, nor should any member's be accepted uncritically. (Oliver and Bane, 1971, p. 267)

Held, therefore, to be specifically indicated are:

1) Such freedom from traditional status distinctions as may serve to enhance likelihood that members not relate as occupants of roles but simply as people engaged in a common search for life's deeper meanings. Essential is opportunity for close interaction with both adults and youth (not meerly peers) in which private feelings may freely be tentatively explored--without threat of rejection or condemnation.

2) A variety of procedural conditions including . . .
   a) an extended bloc of time free from other obligations;

b) skilled leaders who can help the group i) to avoid abdicating to sub-groups, and ii) to avoid riding roughshod over them.

3) Opportunity to test/experience consequences of moral decision making in the community at large.

Testing the Theory

What has here been postulated, of course, is a 'macro-theory'--synthesized from a number of individual 'micro-theories.' Each micro-theory has been deemed necessary but not sufficient to account for the formation and development of moral character. The attempt has been to synthesize and organize the various lines of relevant evidence in such a way as to provide a guide for that counselor's behavior whose values suggest a high priority for such development. While a macro-theory such as this does not lend itself to uncomplicated testing, it seems indefensible to attempt to dispense with the theory when the phenomenon concerned (i.e., moral character) itself appears to be the product of complicated, interrelated and interacting processes.

The theory here postulated is not impossible of testing, however. Two lines of research suggest themselves. The first of these is indirect, involving the testing of the several micro-theories which are essential elements of the macro-theory, e.g.:

1) Theories related to the Kohlbergian stage-wise development of moral judgment;

2) Ziller's theory of Personal Change;

3) Ziller's theory of Individuation (as distinguished from Socialization);

4) Theoretical implications of Eccles' synaptic junction evidence;

5) Festinger's theory of Cognitive Dissonance.

Empirical evidence confirming these several theories may be deemed to afford some support for the macro-theory of Counseling for Development of Moral Character here postulated.

A second, more direct line of research may also be feasible as well as profitable. It is proposed, thus, to put the macro-theory as a whole to experimental test. Pre- and postexperimental measures of character development would consist essentially of a) ascertaining stage of moral judgment, and of b) measuring the strength of individuated ego controls.

As already noted, one of the more recent approaches to accounting for moralization of persons is that of describing moral character in terms of the interaction between moral judgment level and strength of ego control factors. Thus, resistance to temptation to cheat, etc., has been shown to correlate with variations both in moral judgment and in ego strength (see, e.g., Kohlberg, 1964; Grim, Kohlberg, and White, 1968). Krebs (1967) on the other hand, has conclusively demonstrated that even more significant correlations are found when resistance is related to an interaction between moral judgment level and attention stability (his ego strength variable). His findings are depicted graphically in Figure 7 (p. 314).



Figure 7. Ego-Moral Judgment Interaction

Thus, the lower level of moral judgment consistently correlated with a low level of resistance to temptation. On the other hand, high ego strength correlated both with highest and lowest resistance. Thus, the lowest level of resistance occurred when high ego strength interacted with the low moral judgment, while the highest resistance related to high ego strength interacting with high moral judgment.

The evidence suggests, then, that ego strength allows moral values to be determinative of behavior, while ego weakness leaves the behavior subject to situational forces. The higher the ego strength, apparently, the more the individual has the capacity consistently to implement his values--be they moral or immoral. On the other hand, moral judgment advance consistently predicts to moral behavior regardless of

ego strength. At the same time, high strength of ego control intensifies the strength of the correlation.

Measuring Increments in the Development of Moral Character

A meaningful test of any theory related to development of moral character must clearly involve the measuring of increments in that development. In the light of the evidence regarding the correlation between moral behavior and interaction of moral judgment with strength of ego controls, as well as that of much other data here cited (see Chapters III and IV), it seems entirely defensible to attempt to measure such increments in terms of level of a) moral judgment and of b) ego strength (e.g., attention stability). At the same time, because higher levels of moral judgment have been shown to correlate consistently with higher levels of moral behavior, it is here proposed to measure developmental increments in terms of moral judgment alone.

A further attestation of the data is that increments in moral judgment may be measured in terms of Kohlberg stages by "mode-of-reasoning-in-moral-dilemma" scales. Indeed, at this writing, the foremost example of measuring level of moral judgment is that formulated by Kohlberg (1958). In this method, subjects' reasoning about a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas is ascertained. It is important to emphasize that it is not the solutions of the dilemmas themselves that are here significant, but the reasoning by which solution is attempted.

To ascertain this reasoning, subjects are confronted with the dilemmas either in individual interview or in written format to which they respond in writing. Indications as to their reasoning are evoked by carefully devised questions. Typical is the often cited dilemma about Heinz and the questions accompanying it. Because that is quoted elsewhere in this study, the following (see Kohlberg, 1973(c), pp. 6-8) is here given as an example:

> Two young men, brothers, had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Karl, the older one, broke into a store and stole $500. Bob, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Bob told the man that he was very sick and needed $500 to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the man back. Although the man didn't know Bob very well, he loaned him the money. So Bob and Karl skipped town, each with $500.
>
> 1. Which would be worse, stealing like Karl or cheating like Bob? Why?
>
> 2. Suppose Bob had gotten the loan from a bank with no intention of paying it back. Is borrowing from the bank or the old man worse? Why?
>
> 3. What do you feel is the worst thing about cheating the old man?
>
> 4. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store?
>
> 5. What is the value or importance of property rights?
>
> 6. Which would be worse in terms of society's welfare, cheating like Bob or stealing like Karl? Why?
>
> 7. Would your conscience feel worse if you cheated like Bob or stole like Karl? Why?
>
> 8. What do people mean by conscience? What do you think of as your conscience and what does it do?

8a. What or who tells you what is right or wrong?

9. Is there anything about your sense of conscience which is special or different from that of most people? What?

10. How do people get their consciences? How did you get or develop a conscience?

A detailed "sentence coding guide" is provided for each of the hypothetical dilemmas which has been formulated on the basis of responses given by a large number of subjects. In using the guide, each subject's responses to a dilemma situation are divided into "thought-content" units --essentially, sentences. Thereupon each unit is classified according to aspect and stage. At least two distinct ratings are derived from the profile thus formed:

1) Classification of subject in terms of the stage most used;

2) A moral maturity score (MMS). The maximum MMS is 600 (100% Stage 6), the minimum is 100 (100% Stage 1).

In addition to Kohlberg's somewhat involved approach to scoring the protocols for assessment of moral judgment, Porter and Taylor (undated) have devised a more simplified approach.

While published data on reliability are somewhat scarce, both Kohlberg's and Porter and Taylor's method of scoring have been shown to provide reliable inter-judge ratings (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1973; Krebs and Kohlberg, 1973). Typical are the data reported in the Blatt study:

Stages:	1	2	3	4	5	6	MMS
Interjudge rating:	.86	.84	.76	.74	.26*	.83	.89

*Blatt explains that the low correlation between judges on Stage 5 was caused by a single "deviant case," since only 4 of the 33 cases had any score on the stage at all.

Essentially, then, moral judgment level may be ascertained by using Kohlberg's method of rating reasoning evinced in interviews regarding hypothetical moral dilemmas. Increments in development may then be discerned and rated by administering the measures from time to time (e.g., pre- and postexperimentally).

It is postulated, then, that the present theory may be tested by . . .

1) administering a preexperimental measure of moral judgment level to randomly designated control and experimental groups;
2) variably subjecting experimental groups to aspects of the counseling experiences described herein;
3) administering a postexperimental measure of moral judgment level;
4) analyzing variance of whatever differences in moral judgment level may thus be induced.

Summary

There is much to recommend a counseling theory that ascribes a large measure of preeminence to stimulating the

development of moral character. Mosher and Sullivan (1974, p. 2) have maintained that there is . . .

> A basic need in counseling . . . for theory that will enable the field to move beyond a primary concern with the treatment or rehabilitation of atypical individuals or subpopulations (e.g., school underachievers, the emotionally disturbed, drug dependent adolescents).

They further assert that

> . . . we believe guidance uniquely should provide educational experiences that help every individual grow as a person--more specifically in terms of moral, emotional, social and vocational development.

Of course, the emphasis that is relevant here is that upon moral development.

At the same time, as Wilson et al. (1967, p. 307) insist, "there can be no question of anyone concerned with . . . education abdicating responsibility for moral development."

> In all these activities [teaching reading or arithmetic or French] we may advance, or retard, the child's moral development . . . . We are furthering or hindering a child's moral progress every time we foster his self-respect by giving real responsibility, or remain uninterested in trivial problems that loom large to him, or make arbitrary decisions overriding his developing ability to think for himself. We are all moral educators, whether we like it or not [emphasis supplied].

Dewey (1963) followed by Kohlberg (e.g., 1969) and others have maintained that the basic object of education is stimulation of human development. Because this is here held to be precisely the case, it is also held that counseling--as an integral member of the educational team--may defensibly be held accountable for interventions that will more and more be actualizing its potential for stimulating development of

moral character among those individuals who are within its sphere of influence.

Moreover, it seems apparent that counseling literature has rather generally and deliberately shunned addressing itself to the area of moral education or of moral character development. Nevertheless, it seems equally apparent that few things could so contribute to the goal of freeing an individual from the control of unconscious or irrational behavior determinants as development of moral character as it is here conceptualized.

An intrinsic and inescapable element of any social relationship, of course, is the attempt to influence in some way behavior of participants in the interaction. More specifically, counselors are in the business of modifying behavior. It is here proposed that moral behavior that is the effect of developed moral character is much to be preferred to behavior that arises out of a) societal coercion in the interests of preserving its own concerns; b) irrational submission to unconscious and--especially--neurotic mechanisms; or c) societal 'behavior management' (i.e., operant conditioning). What has here been proposed, then, is moral character development as an alternative to the various forms of therapy and behavior management more commonly utilized by counseling practitioners.

It is readily acknowledged that the impact upon development of moral character of a counselor-client relationship as normally occurring--either in schools or otherwise--will

be of low power as compared with the impact of family, teacher, and peer relationships. Hence it is not here proposed that increment in moral maturity due exclusively to a counseling experience will ordinarily be marked or readily measurable. Therefore the counselor will profitably seek to bring influence to bear upon the larger environment of his counselee with the intent thereby to intensify the influences contributing to development of his moral character.

Nevertheless, it has here been postulated that there is distinguishable counseling behavior--of the nature of what herein has been deduced from evidence cited--which, if implemented, will have an impact to stimulate and facilitate development of principled moral judgment and strength of ego controls. Thereby, according to this postulation, measurable increments in the development of moral character may be confidently expected. This postulation, moreover, predicts that maturity of moral character will manifest itself in behavior that is relatively free from situational control and subject, instead, to principled moral judgment.

Notes

[1] In connection with a 'prespecified code of behavior,' divine law has been seen to afford one of three functions:

1) Authentic elaboration of a behavioral code as societally approved in a former era.

2) Authoritarian prescription of behavior as arbitrarily specified by the divine authority.

3) Authoritative description of principle-prescribed behavior.

Philosophically, deference to authority is not moral. To be moral, behavior must derive from consideration of and deference to principle. To the degree, then, that divine law is perceived as descriptive of principle-prescribed behavior, to that degree may it be of meaning in relationship to a moral functioning as here conceptualized.

[2] Christian theology has made much of the 'depravity of man.' It would seem, however, that many exponents of this theology have largely ignored certain significant passages of the Biblical Gospel. Suffice it here to refer to only one such passage from the Gospel of John.

> There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe. He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. John 1:6-9 (RSV) (emphasis supplied)

One writer who has not so ignored this aspect of the Christian Gospel is White. While acknowledging a "natural bent to evil, a force which, unaided [i.e., by the power of Jesus Christ], he cannot resist," she has this to say:

> Christ is the "light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." John 1:9. As through Christ every human being has life, so also through Him every soul receives some ray of divine light. Not only intellectual but spiritual power, a perception of right, a desire for goodness, exists in every heart. (White, 1952, p. 29) (emphasis supplied)

In other words, in spite of its affirmation of the 'fall' of man, the Christian Gospel also affirms that any postfall depravity has been universally modified by the impact of the Christ event. This in no way demeans the Gospel nor the necessity of its Christ. It does maintain, however, that as a consequence of that event, no matter how fallen, every man has been endowed with potential--thereby made native to him--whose stimulation and actualization function to lift him to infinite heights. The same writer elsewhere submits that

> Wherever there is an impulse of love and sympathy, wherever the heart reaches out to bless and uplift others, there is revealed the working of God's Holy Spirit. In the depths of heathenism, men who have had no knowledge of the written law of God, who have never even heard the name of Christ, have been kind to His servants, protecting them at the risk of their own lives. Their acts show the working of a divine power. The Holy Spirit has implanted the grace of Christ in the heart of the savage, quickening his sympathies contrary to his nature, contrary to his education. The "Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" (John 1:9) is shining in his soul. . . . (White, 1941, p. 385)

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Garth Dewayne Thompson was born on August 21, 1925 in suburban Chicago, Illinois. Adolescent years were spent in Jamaica, West Indies, where his parents were missionaries of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. He received his Bachelor's degree in Religion from Andrews University in Michigan in 1946. In 1947 he married Ruby Freeman. To them have been born four children, Don, Jeanine, Janelle, and Ron.

From 1946 to 1954 he served as pastor of various churches in Indiana. Then from 1954 to 1970, he with his family served as missionaries in Indonesia and Singapore. During most of this time he taught religion in seminaries operated by the Seventh-day Adventist Church in these countries. The three final years in the orient he was principal of a church operated college preparatory school in Singapore.

During occasional furloughs in America, he did graduate study at Andrews University, obtaining an M.A. in 1959 and an M.Div. in 1967. He began his doctoral studies at the University of Florida in 1970. During the latest years of work on this dissertation he worked at Pacific Union College, a church operated liberal arts institution in California as a counselor in the college counseling center with a teaching appointment in the Behavioral Science Department.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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